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a ® United State® Arsny Signal Corps Aviation Section
m s a weak air service devoted primarily to experimental
testing prior to World War Z« la March 1916* president
a punitive expedition into Mexico
to capture the Mexican nationalist, Francisco CPanaho)
villa* 0n© of the organizations assigned to the ©xpedttioa was the First Aero Squadrons
operational unit*

the Signal corps* only

M » & study

ite H @ $ s i w punitive

expedition, preparedness for World war 1, m & the develop-*
meat of united states air poster. It ooneludes that the
Mexican punitive expedition was a critical point in the
history of the united States M r Force*
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GHAPTEB X

The airplane la m Amerioan invention, but the united
States was the last ujer power to recognise its value, espe
cially os an instrument of war. on December ?, 1903, Milbur
end Orville Wright made the first successful, controlled
heavier-than-alr flight at Kitty hawk, Berth Carolina.

One.

year later, January 18, 1905, they offered their invention to
the united states government! only to be rebuffed by the Ord
nance and Fortification Board* whose members were skeptical
of the very existence of an air machine.

This skepticism

toward aviation, at first, as to its reality, and later, as
to its usefulness, caused m e united states to fall behind
the other great powers in m e field of aeronautics.1
Congressional conservatism toward aviation, resulting
from uncertainty over the value of m e experimental military
machines, delayed the development of American air power.

It

was not until August 29, 1918, that the law makers appropriated ^
the first suitable

sub

for arny aviation, 13*281,666 dollars,

^Letter, -frank p. bahts, First lieutenant. Signal Corps
to m e Chief signal Officer, War Department, 1907, united
States Air Force Arohivea, 168.651,6. {Photocopy.)
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a

fill* action, t m m **•*■*»•#
tu®

m ® initial m m m for

GMpmmitm ®t tU® th®n infant

today’s air f o m .

These funds fulfilled a desperate need:

to provide trained aviators and operational aircraft for the
United states* entry into World War I.2
Congressional uncertainty limited the physical growth
of the army Air Service*

Prior to the passage of 'the

National Defense Act, June % 1916, aviation manpower was
severely reetrloted.

The Act increased the Tables of

Organisation of the Signal Corps of the united States Army,
removed 'the age, rank, and marital restrictions on aviation
officers, and set the stage for the creation of a reserve
force.3 unfortunately, the provisions for money and nan mere

too late to fully prepare the Army Air service for its role
in the Great War*
WwW Wm&

nSr'ahkdWlfe.
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However, these aote did provide a basis

^111 m l iw a

The fledgling Army Air Service was also vastly improved
by events that transpired in -early 1916*

These events cen-

tered around the employment of the first Aero Squadron during
the hexioaa punitive expedition.

The publicity created by

2u.s., statutes at Large. Vol. XXXIX, pt. 1 (December

1915 to Rareh 1917J, "An Aot Mating Appropriations for the
Support of the Army for the Piseal Tear Ending June 30, 1917*
and for Other Purposes,0 August 29, 1916, oh. 618, pp. 619-623
3u.S., statutes at Large. Vol. XXXIX. pt. 1 <December
1915 to Maroff"I V m , "Mr Wit "for Baking Further and hore
Effectual Provision for the national Defense, and for Other
Purposes,* June 3, 1916, eh. 136, pp. 166-176*

3
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m

awak#B#S Congr^ff# #?#. the

American public to toe true plight of army aviation.
®hia period of change* 'the Mexican punitive expedition#
end.the notions of the First Aero Squadron is the major
theme of this paper#'
In order to provide the reader with an adequate background# the writer will first discuss the beginnings of the
Ana? Air Service* and the aerial capabilities of the First
Aero Squadron,

a# will then follow m e course of the

Mexican punitive expedition* in order to develop its inrpaot
ffiyi army ©#j*0touti0§#

to&i

mb

and lessons of the expedition#

to

to#

Finally* toe writer will

attempt to aseertaia the effect on the American Air service

$his thesis Is net all inolueive.

She writer has

limited his subject to the heavisr»tha»*air A m y Air service#
1% id fsosflsai'SeS. to&i
of military aviation.

toMwiMto aasistod tig# idpwto
However# the primary purpose of this

paper is to highlight the importance of the effect of toe
nextc&n i^anSiSSu#' Bix&BtiiA&M to to# teito# steto# sBSistol.
defuse sad especially, its aerial preparedness for World
M
f■#
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1907-19x5

state#* military and naval aerial

corps £ t x sot «*!•* . . . • as a viable faro* is 1915.*
St was as air arm is naae M y *

the total operational

capability of all air gsrvlaos, as of Jane 1915* was eleven
airplanes, seven aray and four navy, ana their serviceability
was questionable.2 is*© Arm? Aviation Section, h*spere<4 ty
inadequate General Staff support had yet to develop an air
doctrine,3 stifled by iapdseifeie personnel petiole* and low
funding, M M

States* allitary aviation lagged behind the

rest of the

While bb* saarepeaa belligerents secretly

developed,, tested, and Implemented their air foroes over the
trench lines* the wlags of the baited States eagle renamed
It m s n© wonder then, that in Heroh 1915,
aMsanweMi
atawawaiaoiaiwiisaiiiwawwsiMiiMiwttawBaawMwtMa^^
as sited fey Aerial one boehly. m
1915, 0*

28,

Jane 88, 19X5, p. 3*1.

.

«

^Benjamin 0 Fouloi#, statement on the seoesalty for
the Creation of a Department of Aeronautic*,* baited. states
M r faro* Archive# lii,68*18, October 1919, p* 8 , hereafter
aited as "Poulois Statement." {'fypewrifctea.)
^Arthur Sweeteer, Tha Aasrleaa.Alr. .Service (sew M s
P# jR^ps01»CHEI 4l^3wl
* rp.
*

Alan E. Hawley, President of the Aero Club ashed* "If the national
bird cannot Ply -- what sort of bird is
The role placed upon army aviation by United States* military
leaders was primarily reconnaissance*

The air service was to provide

a field commander strategic .and tactical warning, thus depriving 'an,
enemy of the capability to deliver*' * • .* unexpected blows and
surprises *

6
* *M This concept embodied a philosophy that air

power assisted to extend the time honored positions of the cavalry.*
infantry* and artillery*

Aircraft could only pinpoint objectives,

and eliminate, some unnecessary and uncertain searching for enemy
armies.

Their capability to cover a broad expanse of territory.,

coupled with rapid radio and telegraph communications, provided the
field commander with a scope and depth of operations never before
available*

The resultant effect of the ^reconnaissance only” concept

of air power was the establishment of a principle that war strategy
was not changed by the airplane* only certain tactical applications

7

were*1 Therefore, an air doctrine was not necessary*
Iftlitary aviators in the Aviation Section, and others

'’Aerial Age Weekly, March 22, 1915, P- 13
6
U, S* War Department, .annual Report of the Chief Signal Officer*.
JMted_^
fiscal Vear ^ d
.30, 1015 fwaahin^ton, D.C.sGovernment Printing 0ffice, l§15}, p.<b. , her^fter cited
as Annual Report 1915.
^Ibid.* pp. 6-8.

6
is quarters friendly to the promotion of as air doctrine,
bold more controversial and less accepted roles for air
power* da earl; as 1907, lieutenant Benjamin D. fouloia,
then a member of tbe Signal Gorps, wrote os "The faotioal
sod Strategical Value of Dynamical flying Haehiaes.®8 Xn it
he predicted future air engagements would occur days before
hostile ground forces made contact, and that these engage
ments would affect the final outeome of future conflicts,?
Xa 1993, Rajer George Owen Squier, Signal Corps, united
States Army, forecast the eventual use of aircraft as a stra
tegic deterrent to war that could be directed * . . . at the
seat of government Itself . . . .®xo
She majority of secondary air roles considered as fea
sible were lees strategic and more tactical in nature,

the

successful use of aircraft ia Europe, m well as aa emerging
fenfifc&iftal

many tlyil

SSsSftS*

yn^i t ^ y leaders that ai,y#Pi-irt aouX4 provido a fmMMm of
^■
^[©leiwwswsseawawMewwaewweMeMewweeapwsew*^^
®Benja®in o. Pouloia, ®Personnel service report for
period 1898 to 1919,* United States Air Force irohivee
163,88-5, October 14, 1919* p* 3, hereafter cited as
•Foulois Beoord,® (Typewritten.)
9lM4.
lOoeorg© 0. Sqular, *The Present Status of Billtary
Aeronautics,* (paper presented at the December 1938
Resting of the American society of Reohanical Engineers,
lew fork, K.X,, Deoenber 1908}, p. 1615, (Bepriat
from Journal of American Society of Mechanical
ssngineers.)

7
teftottMf mixmrlmz
support*

#e# froat Sin# combat

these predictions were bached by the statements

and experiences of Europeans. M r power was seen as being
useful la idle interdiction of supplies aad personnel, la
spotting and controlling artillery fire, in preventing enemy
air reoonnaiseance, aad as a rapid means of transportation
for M g s level officers.

Zn an attempt to implement some of

these capabilities, Brigadier General George f* dorivea,
Chief Signal Officer, United States Army, requested in July
191$, that the air service be famished *eff«aalve type* and
*I*0pt,Cl nirang

W t Aiksibbwted.itt'

SUfcmiliis««aat.

!§{,$

_usst^»ML A . •***...au,
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$1*# size of a panguin»e.

Prior to July 11, Iftft, congress had failed to aafc#
definite provisions by law to provide for the fuaotional
duties of the Signal Corps with respect to an air service.12
Congressional action had been either limited to individual
attempts by Congressmen to gain military reservations for
their respective states, or It had been concerned with pro~
vlding limited funds, limited personnel, and aviator pay and

1%* Earl KoClea&oa, *fhe Question of autonomy For She
united States M r Are, 190?»19b$. * (unpunished paper
prepared for the Documentary Sesearoh Division, Air
university, 1950), p. 7* hereafter elted as "McClendon
HOpOFVe w

death benefits.11 it had not sought to delineate how the Army
would operata, train, supervise* or implement an aviation
unit.11* When, on July 18, 1914, Congress established on
Aviation section in the Signal Corps* United States Amy, it
finally fixed the pay, grades, and numbers of personnel, and
formulated the rules that would govern them.15
She Aviation section was
, , . charged with the duty of operating or auper.
vising the operation of all aircraft, including
balloons and aeroplanes, all appliances ’
pertaining,
to said eraftj also with the duty of
‘ ‘
officers and enlisted,men in matters
to military aviation.16
Executive, administrative and scientific services m r e
to be provided ty the Signal Corps# while the Sd aviation
officers and students and the add enlisted personnel were to
operata the schools, units# and material areas.1?
The offlow corps was limited hr the dot,’to a maximum
grade of temporary captain. 'Those officers selected for
aviation duty were considered to ho on a detached duty tour
13compiled from a survey toy author for all sessions of
Congress, December 0* 1911 to October 20, 191%, from
Congressional Becord. vol. 48 through Vol. 51.
JJLi*
it

'AM
i?ihid.

■A

HI

p»

8*
i86*p,"53

of four years*. At the end of their tour they were to return
to their regular branoh of service. Officer resources fop
aviation duty were to he restricted to unmarried lieutenants
of the line who were less than thirty*

upon their selection,

which caste only after being recommended hy the Chief Signal
Officer, they were to to designated as aviation students.
This student duty was act to exceed on year* If the novice
aviators were found to be unfit for flying service they were
to be immediately returned to line duty*’ if however, they
qualified, they would receive an aeronautical rating of
Junior Hllitary Aviator*

as

flying experience progressed,.

but la no case la loss than three years, the Junior Military
Aviators were to be upgraded to Military Aviators,18
flying duty was considered hazardous, and the law
specifically limited it to volunteers except in war tine.
In order to induce military officers to volunteer for flight
duty, congress .provided financial incentives.

A H aviators,

below the rank of Captain, were to be advanced a m rank for
purposes of pay, rank, and allowances.

In addition to this

increase, if their duties required frequent aerial flight,
Junior Military Aviators would receive an additional 50
percent pay Increase and Military Aviators a 75 .percent pay
raise,19
18m a .

pp.

314-515.

igibia. pp, 513-518*

Congress, la creating the Aviation Section, also speci
fied the str«»ngth and composition of the enlisted ranks. 'She
authorisation

260

provided

3U2 mssSw

signal electricians, 12 first-class sergeants, 2% sergeants,
78 corporals, 8 cooks, 82 first class privates, and 84 pri
vates. Of these, a maximum of forty could he trained as avia
tion aaehaaloa and twelve oould he enlisted pilots.20
The constraints placed by Congress on the Aviation
Section hampered it primarily in two major areas:

personnel

funding.21
The act of July 18* 1914, inoorprated two faulty perBit afrni M lm i' f t *11

mrMi. l Jfcti
*
©wtslipr®8 m

of

“GSl'jfc

* J bva

SSp^SSSrS

dtfNik

i m
iH i
& E?Sa!H8U
1
S

*% a l i i 'ijilW i'^liii^

inw'ltrtl.rfmjfi j£k

p M H i

Seaaad, officer resources were to be selected only from the
ranks of unmarried lieutenants who wore in their twenties.
Both reetrictions served to- create an oxperleaee vacuum,
especially in the area of command. Oeseral Soriven noted
this in 1915, When in his annuel report hefought to retain
Foulois * . . . one of the few off!cert- ?f age and experience
in the aviation section , , . and one of the beat practical

u
fliers * , . ,*22 Foulois, soon fee be promoted to permanent
oaptain «ss on the verge of returning to the infantry, She
thirty-year old age limit served to amplify the laok of ex.
perlenca by » . . . filling? the aviation section with
young and inexpertenced officers of a few yesra* servioe,
the vast majority of whom /were7 second lieutenants.“23 ©f
the total twenty-nine Aviation Section line officers, only
five were first lieutenants as of August 16, 1915.

the age

and marriage limit also seriously hampered the availability
of new aviation candidates, © m y 6.0 percent (65} of the
line first lieutenants and 64,9 percent {668} of the second
lieutenants were eligible for aviation selection.

Of these,

at least 20 percent were unable to pass the required physical
examination*

Therefore, only 27 percent of line lieutenants

were actually eligible for Aviation Section servioe.

The

Chief Signal officer stated, in 1915* if personnel limita
tion* were not removed it would * . . . be absolutely Im
possible to fill satisfactorily the important command or
administrative positions in the Aviation Section.«a^
Congress also had an unblemished reoord of continual
failure in providing adequate funds for the promotion of
military air power.

The first nation to fly in 1903, M i

BOPOrt 1915. pp. 3-10.
23ibld.. p. 10.
2% M d .. pp. 9-10.

12
by I9I3, assumed fourteenth place in military air appropriations
among the world's nations.

Germany was the world leader with 28

million dollars, and even Bulgaria, Greece, Spain, and Brasil had
invested more funds in aviation than the United States had*

25

By

the end. of 1913, the ■total United States appropriations for army

05

aviation amounted to a scant 600,000 dollars***

Inspired by a

public opinion of "the United States never was so safe from invasion
as it is today," and by failing to foresee the need for military
aviation, Congress had continuously withheld needed moneys.

27

General Scriven, in requesting an aviation appropriation of 1,358,000
dollars in July 1915, noted " • • • the lack

of a

sufficient appro

priation ^ o r aviation? has greatly hampered the equipment and
operation

of the ^viatioj|7

school and the First Aero-

Squadron***^®

As a result of these meager appropriations and the great
secrecy surrounding any aeronautical developments by the European
belligerents, the United States' technology lagged

^U. s., War Department, Annual Report of the Chief Signal
-Officer* United States Army, for the Fiscal Year Ended June30> 1917.

'ifcnSriSnt,,rFri^^

rJ917}f;p7 r5^

after cited as Annual Henort 1917*
g^The Independent. October 25, 1915, P. 120.
Annual Report 1915. pp. 12-13.

that'©f ■other world

Xtt an age wft©** military aircraft

engines ©f up to 1 6 0 horeepawer ©r imp© were coming into
favor, the newest addition 6© America's air fleet, ■the Curtiss
ja-2» had only a 90 horsepower engine,30 The total heavier*
than-sir force consisted of twenty-three aircraft aa of
December 21, 1915.3* This force was quite mixed. as it included
Martin f*s and ff*s, Curtiss W flying boats, Burgess it*s,
Curtiss J82»a ana m$*a and on® Burgess-Duane armored sea
plane,32

Curtiss F flying boats were primary trainers,

the Martin aircraft advanced trainers, and the CurtigedH's
■era the front Una reconnaissance foree.33 Bon® of the air*
craft were equipped with armament,

is pusher aircraft had

b a m condemned la 151% {tm feeing Inherently dangerous in
case of a crash lauding) all the aircraft, except the sea
Pianos «ere tractor type.3^ sot only were American aviators

(AAF Historical Office: '
p* 13| anft sweetser, Air

%*yy*
my Air Ann, 191*^—1995,
iers Army Air Forces, 1996J
pp* 32*33*

3S»Ar®y Aviation notes,* Aerial, Age Xeettlv. .Kay 2fe« 1913*
p* 325*
-'
■ ■ .■•.■■■■
,, *the United States
?.* (Air University:
hereafter cited
aaaMfr
- '•
32X010.. pp.128.136.
^military Aviation Hews,* Aerial AaeHeetav. y m y 19, 1913*
‘ *
P* It®
%25* ■
3%lfre§ Ooldberg <ed.}, A.,ilatwa’
_..afT wwroaiWi
,
1907-195?
<Princeton:
D.
van
Noo‘
t
, p, 9, .hereafter cited aa QoMbera,

forced to fly second rate machines, the American aviation
Industry had yet to produce a completely reliable aircraft
e n g i n e . 35

in addition, * . . . the Army own/ed7 no suitable

grounds for an aviation

f i e l d , *36

this last item, noted by

the Aerial Asee Weekly. July 15, 1915, pointed out the fact
that even the Aviation Section's flying school,, located at
North island, San Diego, California, was not government
owned, but occupied at the pleasure of John D, Spreckles.3?
In addition to the school, the Aviation section of the
Signal Corps consisted of an Aeronautical Division in the
Office of the Chief Signal Officer of the Army, Washington,
D.C., several small detachments in Hawaii and the Philippines,
and the First Aero Squadron.38
the manning of the Aviation section, as of July 1, 1915*
consisted of thirty officers and 17? enlisted personnel,

of

these, twenty officers were qualified Junior Military Aviators,
eight additional officers were aviation students, and two
more were Signal Corps officers. Only twenty of the enlisted

3®Geonge p, Scrlven, "Organisation and Methods of
Administration of the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps,*
United States Air Force Archives 16?,12-C, May 16, 1916,
p. 1, hereafter cited as "Organization." (Photocopy of
typewritten Memo.)

men were aviation mechanics and Just nine enlisted personnel
had received soma flight instruction,39
'The Aeronautical Division was tuo m e H w m ofali air
activities.

Founded August 1, 1907, it toad been originally

chartered to deal, ulth * * *'* aAlmattere pertaining to mili
tary ballooning, m i machines and all Kindred subieots* *60
It remained the single source of A m y air activities, both
operational and administrative, until July 18, 1916, when
Congress passed the efficiency act which created the Aviation
Section,

Proa that tine on, the Aeronautical Division became

an administrative clearing house for the ■specification of M r *
eraft and equipment, procurement requests, aeronautical data
a m personnel movements,61
The operational, training, and research facilities in
1915 were primarily located at the Aviation School, Worth
Island, San Diego, California,^2 Established December 1913,
by General Order -So* 79, War Department, me-'sohool and iis
location were an outgrowth of a 1910 ■invitation by oienn
Curtiss to provide fro© instruction for throe.Amy Officers*
.#■ P* 9*
6%, Allen, a0ffice Memorandum 80* 6," Waited states
Air Perce Archives 167, 12*6, August 1, 1907, (Photocopy
of Original Beffioraaauo, certified by a demo for the Eecord,
December 22, 1966*}
61"Organisation, * pp. 1*2#

16
the southern California location was selected because of its
ideal olimatio end meteorological conditions.

However, the

school's remoteness from normal supply and administrative
channels created problems.

Because of this, and its exposed

position to attach from either Mexico or the Pacific ooean,
there existed a reasonable doubt whether dan Diego would
always remain m

ideal saheol location.^

Prior to m e school's creation, air training had been
conducted In relaxed fashion, flight instruetion followed
the sun:

sooner* in College Parle, Maryland and at the

Wright airplane factory in Dayton, Ohioj and winters at Fort
Sam Houston, Texas, Augusta, Georgia, and at the Curtiss fac
tory in san Mega, California.^ The course of instruetion
was as varied in level as it was in location. Typical of the
period were the informal handwritten progress reports inform-,
tag the Chief Signal Officer of lieutenant Henry B. Arnold's
training progress, Kay to June 1911, at m e Wright

F a c t o r y . ^5

* pp. 2-d{ and Glenn H. Curtiss and
Augustus Poet, "The gurtlas Aylation Book8 {Mew forkt
PrederioiE A. stokes ^ j ^ , 1 9 1 2 y , pp; 122, las, lay.
*%.S*» War Department,
united states —
p. 20, hereafter
Henry H. Arnold. Qlo)
1951), p. 2t| and*

-ng 'Office;,
s.
west Chandler and Frank p.
(Mew fork: The Bonald Press

if#7pp»‘
^Heary h. Arnold, 'tetters Addressed to m e Chief signal
Officer, U.S. Army,» united states Air Perce Archives
168,655-2 , 20 May 1911 to 10 June 1911* (Photocopy*}

Less typical, but true, were the orders given Pouloie in
January 1910, when he was told to proceed to fort a m Houston,
Texas, and *to teaoh /himself/ to fly.* He succeeded, with
the aesistaaee of frequent correspondence with Orville and
Wilbur Wright, although he had to provide 300 dollars, twice
as much as the government provided, of his own funds to beep
airborne.1*6
The lech of formal organization did not deter the young
aviators from attempting to establish aerial standardisation
or from Military experimentation.

Student aviators, by

July 6, 1911# were required to pass the night test prescribed
by the Faderatioaal Asronautlque Internationale {FA1). This
test as modified upward in 1912 and 1913* remained in effect
as well as provided the basis for the 1914 "acquirement* for
Military- Aviator dating** enacted October 27, 1913* by Sorlvea.^
United states aerial military experimentation began
January If, 1913, at a bos Angeles, California air show when
Lieutenant Paul W* M b used a erode bembslght to drop dummy
bombs*

A year later, January 15, 1911. Lieutenant Myron

Crissy, dropped live boobs at an air meet at Tanforaa,
California.

This meet also served as a test for airborne

^•Pouloi* accord,* pp» 3-4,
6?eha»ftiar and Lah®,
3£S-313i
Arnold* C-lobal Mlsslon. a. 34* Anrom flCBQrt 1912. p. 25,

radio communications by Book, and aerial photography by
Lieutenant John 0* walker from an aircraft piloted by
Walter Brookins*

Experiments In air to ground firing occurred

August 20, 1910, when Lieutenant Jaoob s, Biokei fired a rifle
at a three foot by fire foot target from m altitude of 100
feet* the aircraft was flown by ctieim Curtiss. ' One month
later, Curtiss and Piokel repeated the experiment using a
pistol.**8 By July 191a, Brigadier General James Allen, Chief
Signal Officer, was able to report tests in radio telegraphy,
*.

Ap/i rtjtftiAl tmvm&mw j«tt <$# Khlch

* . • * demonstrat/ed/ the possibilities of aeroplanes for
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followed.
In December 1912, the total complement of the temporary
College Park, Maryland eohool {fourteen flying officers,
thirty-nine enlisted men, and nine aeroplanes) moved to
Son Diego, California.

The aove marked the birth of formal

aerial training and the establishment of research facilities.
By July 1915, the aviation school at San Diego was a wellestablished fact sad part of the education system of the United
States Army.51 ih® school commander was Captain Arthur S. Cowan,
^ Stady 98. pp. 4jM*6,
^Annual Jenort, 1912, p. i%*
50studr 98. p. 73, and Goldberg. p. 7.
^ “organisation,* p. a*

w
a Signal Corps Officer, wl», altoon^t unrated, had been active
ta aeronautics sine© 1910, when tie relieved Captain Charles
Del?, Chandler m

Chief of the Aeronautical Divieion.52 ®j©

school was divided tots tee sa|er departments;

one far train*

tog' and toe other for e^pariffi^Qtatlon and maintenance.5?
ft*0. escperitsental sr*& repair 4#pii?te©is^ provided research
and development, material, and depot maintenance services for
t o Aviation Section,

Composed of one offiter. Captain

Townsend P, Dodd, Military Aviator, one aeronautical engineer,
SBl*02ISIlSSSSlS

SBSS»BSSF.i

JTt&$ SWSb SSSB

mechEdiicc. $ti& unit sSwlSsiie touted« s w i^ h s s lis i o r rebuilt
engines, airframes, accessories, fuels, lubricants, and spare
parts.51* Daring too fiscal year of 1915, its activities in*
eluded lubricant 'tests, propeller balancing, stabilizer tests,
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communications toots to radio telegraphy and avia
phones, bomb droning, Maoy autopilot tests, and toe location
of i m I m m A m xaiw&B*

txk sSditioii to H 10

the

group designed and constructed toe epecial type trucks* tois
fleet provided toe First Aero Squadron with a mobile machine
shop, several mobile spar© part test cribs, & transportable
l
eiiwswiitoitoitoiWitoiWMtoeittotoitototoiwwiiwoiMtoitototoe^.
aiweii
n
wiiWBtoii
S
totowsiiwstosiiijtotsi^^
5%fcudg 98. p. 19#

fuel capability, and aa aircraft transport

s y s t e m , 55

the principal department of the aviation school was
the training department.
uaitsj

Thla was subdivided into, two major

a school for officers and a school for enlisted par*

soansl.56 courses of instruction, in oil phases, ware mainly
conducted by civilian instructors, although soma military
flight instructors were used.5? Professional shills .and
technical training were the primary subjects as the duties
of offlcera and enlisted aen ware * . . . approximately 90
percent * , * technical, mechanical, and industrial, gm&f
. , .

P « m t m strictly military, *50 Candidates

for either aviator or mechanic training were required to pass
«« examining board of three experienced aviation officers and
two medical officer* prior to receiving their certificates of
qualification.

Further, any officer found inefficient la his

aerial duties was immediately returned to line duty.59
SI*, course for officers# covering subjects both thee*
Beport 1915. p. 11* Also see various Aerial
4*
5d*0rganiaatica,» p. JS, sad Annual Beport 1915. p. u .
» m.

^
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retieal and practical, was taught in two phases, ground and
air*

fbe ground phase consisted of aeronautical and mechani

cal engineering, the theory of flight, the operation, con
struction and repair of aircraft, accessaries and engines,
and a course in meteorology,

Whenever possible, lessons in

the practical aspects of these subjects wore conducted in the
machine and repair shops.The flying phase began in the
Curtiss ff hydro-aeroplane. Shis aircraft was selected as the
primary trainer because of its great stability and the accessi
bility of water landing areas*

Under the instruction of

Francis *doo * Mildman, the student first mastered straight
and level flights, then turns, and finally landings. The
course of instruction varied according to ability, but gener
ally after five flying hours, the student progressed to land
machines.

Gsoar Brindley, another civilian, taught the second

flight phase by giving flying instruction in the Martin air
planes*

Once the student soloed, he was turned ever to'the

officer in charge of training, who decided if the student
training*

If $t$e wiw&s# M i found acceptable*

he continued his solo worh until he could pass the civilian fftl
pilot test*

Matt, I2ie young aviator trained in cross-country

flying and navigation prior to an examination and flight test
for a rating as a Junior Military Aviator.

This comprehensive

22
teat adralnietereft tap throe officers determined beyond question
the pilot candidate teohaloal capability.

If he failed to

satisfy all these cheese instructors, he was eliminated.6!
fhe flight coarse for the enlisted personnel selected as
Idiots paralleled the night instruction phase of the officer®.
m m majority of enlisted men selected for technical training
were trained as aviation mechanics, m i s course, enter the
guidance of Oeerg© Malletfc, one of the nation’s expert field
aviation mechanics, imparted the knowledge necessary to maintain air frames; re-rig aircraft; sake fittings, ribs, spars,
stmts, shits, and wires; cover fuselage and stag parts with
canvas and dope; remove, replace, ant repair tires; and clean,
overhaul, rebuild, m i adjust aircraft engines,

fhla course

was highly practical as it was conducted, in the shops and on
the Hying field, After completing the mechanic coarse, the
mechanic candidates m m given a phase test, if they achieved
a grade of 75 percent or better, and passed a physical exami
nation, they received a certificate of Qualification, lavtag
successfully completed their course of technical instruction,
the new aviators or mechanics could anticipate possible assign
ment to the only operational unit of the Aviation Seotion, the
first Aero Squadron.62
6l*orgsnieatioa,*
«%__
» pp.
xx*5»&l Sfca&y 98. p. ltl| and
^Studr M , pp. Itl-lb*; and Jnauai aeporfe i m s y
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'fhe First Aero Squadron was the aerial reconnaissance
unit of the Army,

Originally formed as a previsions! squad*

rod at Texas City, Texas, Hareh f# 1913, it had responded to
the tense Mexican relations that resulted from the February
St, 1913, Rexiean

co u p

dlsfeat led by Vioteriano Buerta.63

By June 15, 1913, it- was virtually disbanded when its equip* ■
ment and personnel were transferred to and integrated -into me'
Aviation school at. San Dieg©, California. ^ Approximately two
years later, July 1, 1915, the' First Aero Squadron was equipped
with new aircraft sad restructured as a field capable unit.65
fhe organization of the First Aero Squadron, prior to'
July 1, 191.5#' consisted of a Squadron headquarters, commanded
by Cowan and manned by an adjutant, lieutenant Boy C. Kirkland,
and five enlisted personnel, fhe operating sections were two
companies, the First and the Second. 'fhe latter units commanded
by Fouloie, and lieutenant Walter a. Taliaferro, respectively,
had six and seven; officer aviators end thirty-two and twentyfive enlisted men.

This organizational structure proved inade

quate because of the reliance it placed upon. Company Commanders,
63*Field Order ho. lt* Headquarters, First Aero Squadron ,
hareft j. 1913, Baited States- Air Force Archives 168.650 fl-7,
Official Unit Histories. {Typewritten.)
*
f
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- 65°grief History of theFirst Aero Squadron,® Official
Histories, United states -Air Force Archives. 168.650 8-7, {^rpewritten, ); and
Jtma
1915, p. 297.
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and the lack of support it gave
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On July 1, 1915* Fouloie was given. command of the first
Aero Squadron*

He was exceptionally troll qualified for the

role as he was one of the first three military aviators in the
United states* and had been on continual duty with the Aviation
Service alnoe July 1908» except for a one year "Kanohu law*

i/

return to the Infantry* Foulois, a graduate of the A m y Signal
StttMNA* Fort Leavenworth, Kansas* Nlft gev^nte^n years
military experience*

He was eeomissioned la the field*

February 2* 1901* when he was on duty with the infantry in
the Philippine Islands*

Me had been active in the technical,

operational* material, and experimental details'of aviation*
He had evaluated foreign aircraft designs at Haney* Prance in
September 1909.
balloon in 1908.
la 1910.

Me had flows the first Baited States dirigible
He had been the only United States aviator

no had designed tiro first set of wheels for the

Wright airplane*

Me had helped construct tiro first aerial

radio receiving set used in the united States*
o&ps&Aft in inissfNiMS sBlSSSE$f

He had parti*

aerial espsyissnSs*

During the eighteen months prior to his assumption of command,
Foulois had reorganized the training system of the Aviation
Section, helped outline the new organisation of the First Aero
66*First Aero Squadron** Official Histories, united States
Archives 168,650 K-f {typewritten organization Chart.}j and
Study 98. p. 1A6.

Squadron, and participated ia the design of 'the mobile truck
fleet, machine shop, and field tent hangere.6?
The first Aero Squadron as reorganised consisted of twelve
sections:

headquarters, supply, engineering, transportation,

and sight Hying sections.

Besides Poulois, there were four

teen offloors, eighty-five enlisted men, and one civilian
mechanic, Jacob Bailey,

Its equipment consisted of eight

Curtiss JH*s, m s for eaeh crew of two pilots, fourteen trucks
for fuel, supply, and aircraft transport! two machine shop
trucks, and six motorcycles.6® All the officers were respon
sible for the maintenance of their aircraft, and could fly no
m e elee's, except in an emergency,Because of the motorised
nature of the unit, all officers were bought to drive motor
tjFuoks and

as

united

the Curtiss JN-2,70
The Curtiss JM-2 was representative .of the latest air.
craft produced by the United State*.

Underpowered in m

era

when 160 horsepower engines were being adopted, it was barely
comparable to a European trainer,?! Distinguished by it*
6?*Foulois Becord," pp. 2-5, and Aerial Aga_ Meetely.
June It, 1915, p. 297.
6®Aerial.Axe Weekly. JUn* It, 1915, P* 297*

981 p. 166,
yOAerlal Age weekly, Kay 31, 1915* P* 257.
^•Aroy Aviation Motes,* Aerial Age Meekly, way 26, 1915,
P. 225*

* • « . low rakish lines, m effect produo«ft Or staggered
planes,* and a long# narrow and unusually deep fuselage# the
IS series became an inspiration to msay young aittwwu?® She
aircraft* s wing span meaaured 63 feet 7-5/10 inches and woe
26 feet 10*1/2 inches in length,

it hsd an empty weight of

11?0 pound* and could carry a useful load of 660 pounds# con
sisting of 200 pounds of fuel, 35 pounds of water# 30 pounds
of OH# 150 pooad pilot, and a 265 pound cargo or passenger,^
fhe latter was placed or sat oa a wtoJter basket seat*^
Powers, by a 99*160 horsepower 0% engine#
of 80 alias per hour and a stall speed of 60 miles per hours.
It could climb 6000 feet in ten minutes and could fl? at fall
throttle for 6 hours sod 26 minutes, oruise for 6 hours and
It minutes or could maintain a duration night for f hours,
!%•

nifeM
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and toH tit# was 7593 dollars P.O.a, the Curtlse faetory.75
0HXvt & M .sBwsfSSssS tthftfe && %laa * * . . 6^ iibinb11,'F *fca;tartle& as

^ M W t t f Aviation Saws#* Aerial Age Weekly.
July it# inS# P* 625.

?6#Biiitary Aviation Hews,* Aerial Age ..weakly.
July It# I W , p. 625
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W m first as we# delivered to Saa Diego, California,
May 10, 1915 for acceptance te#t«,

Theae wore conducted by

toto#*1tato itCtolk- #f to# CtoPt&M £&iifo?M&
f«sofew*y*yy ©a done £1, 1915* the remaining seven ^ m «8
machines arrived at saa Mego ,?8 o » month later, July 26,
1915, the first Aero Squadron deported s m Otago* California
o» tfcs 3:10 p.m. train enroute to fort Sill, GjElaho»a» for
duty with ttio Artillery School of Fire*79 fha W i t remained
thera until November if, 1915, W a n it conducted the world* a
first #ttpt*1i jaov©- to A'tftoft fcha i&ManiM to
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San Antonio, teaas,80
© » departure from San ©lego* California by the First
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The unit '& forthcoming activities, both at Fort Sill and fort Saa
Houston, and the growing tensions along the iyfexican-tJnited States
border would soon publicize the activities, the deficienees, and
the requirements of United States military air power*
The Aviation Section of the Signal Corps, United States tony
was an energetic,, but small service in 1913®. It bad flown 3^58 flights,
for a duration of 1269 hours and 50 minutes#

In this time it had

transported 1730 passengers, established two new American altitude
records of 17,M l feet for sol© flight and 11,690 ‘feet for dual
flight*

The service had '.set new duration flight records of 8 hours

and 53 minutes solo and 7 hours and 5 minutes dual.

The Aviation

School, had conducted important tests in bombardment, communications,
mine detection, emergency equipment, and aircraft improvements*

The

First Aero Squadron had begun to prove its capability to support
artillery1'fire, make rapid deployments and support front line
surveillance activities*

Despite these, and other lesser achieve

ments, the Aviation Section remained a crippled unit*

It needed

8l
expansion in funds, manning, personnel procedures and equipment.'
Until these deficienees were corrected it would fail to be a
n . * • service commensurate with the needs of the country and

82

suitable to the requirements of an army* • • *w

Anarmai Report 1915. p. 12
82

Ibid*, p. 53.

S«Af£t8 III

THS ?IH3£ AttO SQDAMQW IS f»S VXJBUD* 1913-1915
Military aviation was first employed tactically daring
the Rexican revolution.

Both Venustiano Carranaa and

Francisco (Poncho) Villa maintained air forces for use in
limited interdiction and reconnai ssanoe roles.1 fhe Mexican
revolution also provided the reasons for united States Army
aviation to first see field service,2
fhe first attempt, toy the Army, to employ air power
occurred as a result of General Victoria*® Huerta's success
ful 1913 coup d'etat, captain Charles DeP. Chandler, command
ing offleer, Aviation school, Augusta, Georgia, received
©rtera from the War Department, February 25, 1913*

He, his

men, and equipment were to proceed to Texas City, Texas, as
soon, as possible, and commence duty with the Second Division,
three days later, February 28, 1913, the unit of five officers,
twenty-one enlisted men, and their aircraft, departed on a
*0.3., Department of the Air Fores, A Chronology of
American Aerpaaaeo Events (Air Force PampHlW A W 190-2-2,
Raroh i», I960), p. 13, hereafter cited as Chronologyi and
Benjamin 0. Fouloie and C. V. Olinea,
... ____
(sew fort: rScoraw-Hiil'aook
la
eited as
2chandler and Laho, How Our A m y Grew

PP. 253-25*.

special train of eleven ears* Arriving at featae City, Texas,
Harch 2 * 1913* they established a camp, assembled aircraft,
and commenced flying a few Cays later*3 Their arrival had been
preceded by that of Captain Frederics B, Henaeaey, Aviation
Section* who selected the airfield site; one that was suit*
able for land and seaplane operation*
the squadron adjutant*

Hsnnesay remained as

A few days later* two student flyers,

Lieutenants Eric L. Ellington and Loren C. Call arrived with
Airplane 1? from the Palm Beach, Florida, flying school,
•By Harch 5, 1913* the First Provisioned Aero Squadron was
formed,4
The Squadron organisation consisted of an administrative
section* and two companies with four and five aircraft respec
tively*

captain Chandler retained command, but, as he was not

a pilot* Lieutenant Rilling was appointed * * * * Senior Instruc
tor and M s orders • . . were to be obeyed without regard to
ranSs.°5
In preparation for a 'possible invasion into Mexico, the
men began practice Hying as weather permitted.

Their activi

ties were limited to cross-country flying and maneuvers.
3Chandler and taftm*
pp. 253-25^.

how

Our Army Qrew

Sptret Aero Squadron, Held Order H , March 5, 1913,
United States Air Force Archives 168.650 a-?.
(Photocopy.>

The

embryonic aviators proved their ambitions by setting endur
ance records and spotting •enemy* units* but were not pit to
a real test as.the invasion of Mexico sever occurred.

By

June it, 1913, the Mexican issue was temporarily settled* and
the bulk of personnel and aircraft were transferred to
San Oiego, California.6
fhe next opportunity for the fledgling army air ant to
prove Itself.in combat support oaae in March 191S.

Tense re

lations over Vera Crus led to a War Oepartaent request for the
North Xaland, California, school to send five qualified avia
tors. thirty enlisted men, and three Burgess tractor aircraft
to Port Crockett, near- Galveston, Texas.

captain Pouloie was

given oenanand, and accompanied by Lieutenants Milling,
welter B, faliaferro, Joseph E. Garberry, fowmssad F. »odd,
and a medical offloor, Adna o. Wilde, he departed for Texas,
April 2d, 1916*

On Kay 6, 1916, Lieutenant Joseph C, Marrow

Joined the detachment.

In addition, arrangements were made

at North Island to increase -flying training in order to pro
vide for sore aviators. Ones again the flyers failed to see
ooabat action. While the navy flew at Vera Crux, the aray
remained in Texas for three months without ever uncrating their
aircraft.

They returned to California, July 13, 191%,?
>, pp. 76-79; and Chandler and Laha,
£2* PP» 256-256.

i P- 2?6| aad Steady fg, pp. 105-106, f M j g l g
.1 23, 26, and 27, 1916 carried articles emphasising
role of united States* wavy aircraft at Vera Crux, Mexico.
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The Mexicans, however, did utilize the airplane in actual
combat as an instrument of war.

fin Hay 10, Iflf* two American

citizens* Didier Kaeson, pilot, and Thomas J* Sean, Bombardier,
bombed a Mexican Federal Gunboat In Ouaymas Bar* Mexico, from
a Glenn Martin pusher eiroraft.9 This first in the annuals of
aviation history', was in support of Pancho Villa's army,

Seven

months later* in Bovember 1914, fhii aader* another American
flying for Huerta, engaged a Carranziata pilot*'' Sean Ivan lamb,
also a citizen of the United States* over’Baoo* Mexico, in the
first known aerial oombat.

A dozen pistol shots were exchanged.?

The Mexican interest in aircraft continued as did the re
volution.

Carranza and Villa each vied with each other to hire

American fliers, offering as auoh as 300 dollars a week in gold
for the services of men such as Charles F* Silas and W. Leonard
Eonney.10 By April 26, 1915, Villa's air fore© consisted of six
new Wright airplanes* and the Aerial Age Weekly reported that
” . . , both factions' -have shown much activity of late in the
acquisition of aeroplanes.*11
On March 13, 1915, in response to a request by Brigadier
General Frederick Funaton, Commander, Southern Department, a
g8sw fork Times, May 20, 191ft ana Chronology, p* if,
?ma.
K®i*lco** jgJ^#..4 gg.fMaspy> April 5, 1915
p. 64; and "Booney Goes to fflv in Mexico." Aerial asm weaki:
April 26* 1915* p. 128*

detachment of the Aviation Section was alerted for daty with
the border patrol at srewasvllle, Texas.

aspeeted warnings

to both Mexican revolutionary factions hah not resulted in a
decrease .la border incidents.

Funston hoped bo use the air

craft to locate the position of Villa*« artillery in ease it
became necessary to disable 1t.
(hi April lb, 1915. lieutenants Thomas Dew. Milling end
Bryon $• donee departed 8 m Diego, Californio, by sod-1 with
ftl£ft&ftfft Biimal
me.

&JLtft&ftft# *11*

ft detachment

Three days later they arrived at Brownsville, Texas, and

V

established a camp at the west- and of a cavalry drill field.
Stair airplane, a Martin Tv Curtiss, powered by a ?f horse
power OX engine, m s assembled and tested by April 19, Iflf*
On Tuesday afternoon, April 29, Iflf, the first mission was
flows, with Jones as pilot and Milling as observer*

Cruising

at an altitude of 2600 feet, they He w along the border easily
Observing the Mexican trench lines and correotiag plot errors
on their canvas chart*

sepeated machine gun fire from the

Mexican side was reported by American ground units, bat none
struck the biplane nor its occupants.^
A later flight, that sane day, grounded Punston's sir
force.

Jones, accompanied by Corporal Arnold Beuf, bit a

12atudv 98. p. 1%S{ for border incidents see foreign
Halations,

pp.

?f#-?9e«

•^"Military Aviation notes,* Aerlel Age weekly.
'« 298
298*
Hay 1?, 1915, p.

ditch mile taxiing in the- -high grass of tbs drill field.
'ftisslisyss. crt? t&Mi
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fuselage, or anew machine, bat Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Bober,
Qff±&&]? im Cfo&2t-M%* Ayiatl&H SftftfeiftB* INPflWtl#- to authorise: ths
replacement. 9a April 26, 191$, this decision m s overruled
by the Adjutant General, tamer H. Bliss, and Airplane .39,
SUdSliftl1,MftlHsjLii SS14S®y ^PSSSHS1'tf&§ Slt|.;|»^ftJl ftftjppftftil
Diego, California, A fear weeks later, May if, Iflf, lieutenant
Colonel Sarauel Bober, Chief of the Air Service, requested the
return of m e detachment, as the artillery it ms- to support
had been withdrawn.

On Hay 2?, Iflf, Jones, Milling, and

their 'mm and equipment returned to -North- Island, California.13
*fll# ft$#ffi|EliI

lint. $HMMI tWW-m WteZM ttftfll

M s troops, April 1?, Iflf, three days before the- first
m issio n was #¥#1* A ftiisi*.

$fftlt$iet* Ainr>lftJie 33* ftp A lro la n ^ i f

m s equipped with radio equipment, and as the terrain did not
poroit a sard signaling system, HO WOJf*kftbio IBdthftd ftj* ftftEESSSS-**
oatlen between spotter and -artillery existed.

Finally, insuf-

fioient field work had been accomplished to determine the
ft# mufummm m&m&m am& *a»ftml&mnnmvnn.m SMSasSI^S BSftSftSS^SI #ftf*
aircraft deployed la taotiottl operations.16

Ifstudy 98. p. i%ff and •Army Aviation -Notes,*
l ^ # ' B . . 1 6idg. Kay 20, Iflf, p. 22b,
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When, on July 26, 1915, the First Aero Squadron, Foulois
commanding, departed San Diego, California, for duty with the
Artillery school, Fort Sill, Oklahoma! It was anticipated
tls & t* m a i n t « n f t n o «

ii f i t -

s^b sS x n q S B T O fts ftw e s

would a s m he established,!? The rail caravan consisting of
sixteen cars, 'left Saa Diego at 3ilf p.m. ”Three days later,
July 29,-1915, the unit unloaded automobiles, airplanes,
trucks, motorcycles, -and horses at Fort Sill, Oklahoma,1®
Sl$£%Sto!S ipsSFSSS’S f t f l f t f f t c i X l & l 08 W&P® S f t f t l d U l g # .

-$ $ i#

aen expended their efforts until August 13, 1915, in oonstruction projects*

with the completion of messing, storage, -and

maintenasoe facilities, the aerial activity increased.1?
while at Fort sill, the- First Aero Squadron concentrated
on artillery observation, field tests of varied reconnaissance
equipment, and the evaluation of their inadequate airplanes.
Exigtn&■ malfunctions
ilbfc *ta2M k,«aat.^fcjMitka4fedJfc

SaBpI m3.
*iw

-JBtf t ‘
Mm.jSmni.^.TikfcjaM

p$o;p&3? ssssgiisS sSwfwsss '$iiilii^llf
tfta ilfti 1 0

tJfl®

'ftfc&Xa srim iMIl s i x f t dtte A td i^ ttU d 'd d ii

a l£ m .S

Aerial operations oommenoed on August If, Iflf, and «fith
in three weeks the unit m s nen-operatienal. f»# first major
paPftW-SB jfftftft*! Wftft $lMK& &f ftllSsSsSBS' W®flUWMWIHH$fe *fyt^vishiaT Of
!7Annual Report 1,913. p. 12.
l®BKiiitary Aviation sews,*
August 9, 191$, p. 507.
19study 98, pp. 1C6-1A?.
26*Poulots teeerd,* p. §,
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twelve Replacement powerplants, six were immediately condemned, and
a seventh had to toe joverhauled before it was used*
1913* three airerafti

By September 1$

Airplanes 42, 43, and 48, were out of commission

for parts, one- was grounded for general maintenanee, mother for*
engine work, two were detached to the Southern Department at Browns*'
•■
.21
ville, Texas, and the eighth aircraft was lost in an accident.
The crash, which destroyed the eighth aircraft occurred August 12,
1913*

It was attributed to toad weather and poor flying technique.

The aircraft'was .a total loss.

Captain. $* H* Knox, the observer,

•***

was hilled and R. B. Sutton, the pilot, suffered serious' injury.

22

The accident amplified.a .growing concern in'the'squadron over the
inadequacies of the new service 'machine, the Jlf-2, to perform a
combat role.
The JM-2, hailed toy%e press as a ’’’rakish” addition in July
1915, was considered by the aviators to toe underpowered, oversensitive
to control and cheaply constructed.

Both Captain Cowan, at the

Air Service School, and lieutenant Colonel Hetoer were aware of
the deficienees.

Cowan wrote Hetoer that he knew the aircraft were

unsafe, tout had failed to notify the flyers because ” . . . there is
a tendency among the younger officers to get rather panicky when ques-

21Study 98. p. 147.

22’’Military

Honors for Dead Army Airmen, ” Aerial. Age- Weekly.
August 30, 1915* f»* 569*

felons of safefey are brought out.* Tea of the twelve aviator*
0W twlft JyJiJRftft JfftlPft

W^mw mm 'lift w#

y3SMfc|f

col. Hilling, fehe two moat experienced aviator*, maintained
til# Mftttiuift* ft&tetefft 1^1% ftofftefe# mis te&teft&ft tilte&t* Muitft*
tiOJW.1?
Difficulties with the JJi-2 boa been, and were 'being ex
perienced elsewhere.

Carberry, the first military aviator

to fly the J M , June 4, 1915* hod fouai it underpowered,
teH Ini f e sSSSS swwHMftMwtfWI it# acceptance*

Ute

log aeofelon at the Aviation school bad also noted the inadequaoie* of the J8-2.
.$!§#■ wlS3nEg fiftol
’Sa#

jftWMt'

IfcnwM vft'

''ftl1# hQiti-*! ■—-

The engineering ehief. Captain Virginias
^ MM, ’€\

tft ftftlEKaftStft fubft
xik. JMa-atOftkJflt j A l n i e c a ' ftfcfttetAax-

1915* 00 he considered th* airoraft unsafe*

ft

OJPftftli* 3MII
---

ft'aofc.

He was supported

in his findings by M a t tunnel teats conducted in August 1915,
that confirmed longitudinal instability at eagles of 11, it,
•ad I5*3 degrees*

The report of these teste prompted Briga

dier General soriven, fehe Chief Signal officer, to call Glam
Curtiss to Washington, B.C. to discuss the situation,
readily agreed fee convert all JH-2 *a into JH-3* at

Curtiss

the neces

sary modifications were to be accomplished la the Held,

'this

required tbs installation of no* upper wings, stabilising fins,
ruddftr#p

teft

MgjUift* In

te ftftwjr ftftf*

23*Transcript of Court Martial of Lieutenant colonel
Lends t* Goodier, judge Advocate,* United states Air Force
Arohives, 168,650316, pp. b?7-480, hereafter cited as
Goodler Court Martial* (Typewritten,)

the work# Curtiss sent one expert mechanic to Fort Sill, Oklahoma and
Brownsville, Texas.
While the main unit remained at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, a detachment
of the First Aero Squadron, consisting of four officers and fifteen
enlisted me equipped with two aircraft, arrived at Brownsville, Texas,
on August 18, 1913*

The aviators, Lieutenants Morrow, Jones, Arthur E.

Christie, and Harry Harms, rapidly discovered that the landing field
used for similar purposes, in April 1919 by the Martin machine was
too small for the slow climbing, heavy, underpowered JM-2.
service machine required a longer runway.

The new

Morrow, the senior officer,

requested permission from the Chief Signal Officer to prepare and
use a larger, but rougher field six miles from Brownsville, Texas*
Permission was granted and the aviators became airborne, only to
experience severe flight difficulties in rough air.

These difficul

ties were so severe, that on September 9* 1919# Morrow crashed Air
plane 46.

As a result of the injuries he sustained, he was relieved

of command, and Captain Townsend Dodd was ordered from San Diego,
California, to replace him.

In the interim, lieutenant Jones

assumed temporary command, and in this capacity, he reported, at
the direction of the Commanding Office**, Brownsville

Ibid** pp. 477-478; Study 98. pp. 148, 149* Edgar S. Gorrell
wrote in October 1932 that only two of the First Aero Squadron’s
JK-2 *b had OXX engines at the time of the Mexican Funitive Expedition.

District, the dangerous characteristics of the JN-2. By
September 13, 1915* Funston. prohibited further .flying of the
airplane for artillery adjustments unless totally necessary.25
The detachment, limited by lie equipment, had accomplished
little other than aerfiag as * target for Carranza*» soldiers.^
®he First loro Squadron, without usable airplanes, can
celled all operations with the field artillery until October
It, 1915.

it that tioo, with modifed aircraft, 'teste were

resumed sal continued until the squadron loft Fort -Sill,
Oklahoma in November 1915.2?
®MI OitiSSSSSS

0jf

®uis<?©:SS Hi1 $i$# exp«rl£3ent&
Fifth Field Artillery.
w m

learned.

q

fin sS^SS^BCS 1;Iff!

Hi# fidwMfc

Ili0
^

However, several valuable lessons

It was clearly demonstrated that trained aerial

observers, rather than artillery officer*, were needed as
artillery spotters,

tbs value of the automatic aerial camera

In chotoKrashlmff mosaic overlays for ««>*> m»ki««■ waa explored.
r«sult»d in b&vqv&X valid su&R&BtIona ${*

t.ha

Arthur Brack automatic camera.2® Aircraft service tests* after
the modification of JH-2 *s to d®-3*#:
, were conducted which
tSltdd,. pp. 197-108.
26ietter, Secretary of State to the Confidential Agent
of the Constitutionalist Qovernment of Rexleo, September 10,
xvxa. p. 819} and *0.3. Aviators
ladron Needed,* Aerial Ase Weehly.
September 13, 1915, p. 613,
tfstady 98. p, 19f.

28ihid.

tm
eventually • , . * save/a/ the M u m of m e m * • • flying
officers * . * la the

faaibiw© Expedition. * * ,*®S>

Finally, the SQuadroa he* an opportunity to test and modify
its' mobile equipment and maintenance procedures.39
the officers of the Army Air Service haft long desired a
permanent flying oeater one that would besoms • , . . the
army aviation oeater * . » as,well as a finishing school for
army aviation students* . , .<■31 port sam Houston, San
Antonio, faxes was selected as the alia of the a m center*
In Hareh 191ft Fouiois bad M m ordered to Port Sam Houston to
prepare flans and estimates for the new airfield location.
The site, four miles north of the fort proper contained two
old hangars*

fen new hangars were to bo erected, as m m

housing, maintenance, and messing facilities,^2 Fouloie had
submitted an estimate forl 83,20O dollars for the project,
but Congress appropriated only 4f,0OG dollars,

The funds

were not satisfactory, but aa they were all that were avail*,
able, Colonel Sober directed that * «

Feuioia will have

to got it Into his head that we will have to. get along with
the money we Have end. not the money m ought to have, *33
29»Poulois lepert** p» 5*

3°atudv 98. p. iby,.

31»war froviag Boon to Aero Aotlvity la Texas,0
lAMrtutobUftaMtts June 21, 1915, p. 321*
33Letter, Sober to Cowan, Harch 29, 1915, la “Goodier

hi

Because of these limited funds, only a machine shop, troop barracks,
a stable, and two bachelor officer quarters were completed by
Wovember 1915*

Orders were issued November 11, 1915# for permanent

deployment of the unit to the San Jbitonio, .Texas, area*

'

The trip from Fort Sill, Oklahoma to Tessas, began, November 19, •

1913,

Foulois, eager to increase operational experience and advertise

mobile .military air power, requested and.gained permission to move''
by. a i r I n order to permit the motor caravan and' airplanes to ■
reach their destinations simultaneously, five enronte stops were ■
planned*

The itinerary called for landings at Wichita Falls, Fort

Worth, Waco, Austin-,'and San Antonio, Texas.^

It was ”• * . the

first time any organised air unit in any army had undertaken a
JpeXf^ movement * • • *w and the .move was. a success*^

The aircraft and vehicles travelled the 35® miles in seven
days.

The aerial movement was without serious incident and the

only damage m s one bent arch and one broken tail skid*~-eosts
of repairs fifty Cents J&tc?*

The only, flaw

^ Benjamin 0* Foulois, Report on Cross-Country Flight from
Fort Sill, Oklahoma to Fort Sam Houston, Texas by First Aero
Squadron, Signal Corps, U.S. Army, November 19 to 26, 1915,” in
nU.S.A. Aero Squadron's Fort Sill-Fort Sam Houston Might,n
Flying* January 1916, p. 819, hereafter cited as Cross Country
Seport5 ^nd Annual Hecort 1915* ’p. 13
•^"FauXois Record," p. 5.
Cross Country Report, pp. 8X9, 831-832.
'^"Foulois Record," p. 5*

38Ibid.

was the loss of a Jeffery truck, destroyed during a gas stop,
Hovamber 21, 1915.
The personnel of the squadron functioned exceptionally
well*

Captain Benjamin D, Foulois sale special comment of

the *, , .» constant ears and watchfulness • * .* the enlisted
maintenance a « provided the aircraft.4*0 They often travelled,
on one meal a day, all day by truck and motorcycle, only to
work late at night in order to prepare the .aircraft for the
nest day's flying.4*1
The impression o» the public was Immense.
ed the aircraft at each landing spot*

Crowds swarm

After the first stop

at Wichita Fails, Texas, where “each aviator was kept con
stantly on guard over his aeroplane to protect it-from daaage
by the crowds of people * * **' it became necessary to procure
police protection and sroped-off landing and work area*.4*2 The
pilots were entertained at banquets by various oity officials
enroute,

Foulois, speaking on these occasions, sold air power

and the need for its future growth,

he chided * » . . business

men who /were? interested only in civil affairs * * . and /had/
act the time to think of preparedness.***3
Operationally, the Journey proved the value of the spe-

‘

..................

^•Army Aviators at Fort Worth, Texas,* Aerial & m Weekly,
December
somber o, 1915# p. 2?6.

P«831.

dally designed mater eouipmeat and pointed out some obvious needs fop future cross-country military -dip operations,

The

trucks, carrying loads up to 3000 pounds, stood the test of
rough roads and deep sands enroute,

On occasion, nows had

broken through the flimsy bridges, hut the self-contained
wrecker equipment enabled the truoks to continue to destination*
Despite the mobility offered by the truoks, and the more
rapid movement of the m a t skilled aircraft mechanics by motor*'
oyele, the exercise proved beyond any doubt that it was
* »

II ptyr8&0ft& &XSgN9M&$i&it»F #01*

^

system to keep up the pace .set by aeroplanes in flight.
?oulola recommended that suitable landing fields, in the future,
should he selected,

They should, be continued, he located near

0* 635HfcBlw0l%,s00ty3*0*s

03HR*iMejP0#iisaW3l0jSfc .JT01r *6-0330 01

£'

wad have facilities to protest the aircraft from the elements
jHkW* siilih<(h dittkdiMi ^iNSf
#*
W00vlMIJP•

Although the aviators all successfully reached Saa
Antonio, Texas, it was apparent that adequate aeronautical
navigation charts did not exist.

The maps used, which were

Geological Survey Sheets, scale Is12500, compiled in the
list's, were outdated, aid therefore could not be depended on.
foulois suggested that .possibly the more modem feet Office

maps, if modified by the addition of terrain features, could
be used by aviator*.^
da the nan facilities were not ready for occupancy until
#taaa^if la I9li. 4s&# Wk&m% 4#i#
“
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December 1915, at Fort fan Houston, Texas.^
19X6, rnkm %&& wiSSs vi&v& %& new $uartora* $&$
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would the new airfield facility be a part of Fort Saa Houston,
Texas?

Foulois swiftly docked 'What be 'dewed aa a» attempt
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^fitti H# IMI***
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Mated the Chief signal Offioer that it wee'bait for the w a y
to maintain eeparate local administrative oontrol.

As a re«

suit, the First Aero Squadron became the Aeronautioal section
of the Southern Department,

With its establishment as a

separate entity, the squadron busied Itself sodas into new
quarters and building roads, walks, drains, and a landing field.1®*
On January if, 1916, a request for two aircraft for
artillery control experiments at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, was
issued by the Adjutant General.

Foulois objected on the

grounds that the alreraft were no longer serviceable after
the six months of field operations*
la&Mai. adequate winter tflytftfy
^ibid.

He argued that tbs fliers
ftWI. fetiaatfe

^Stu&v 98. p, 160.

*5
could fee better accomplished at Port Sam Houston, fexaa,
after the entire squadron had suffiolent time for systematic
training in the rigors of military flying.

Fouloig* opinion

prevailed and on February 15* 1916# the Chief Signal Officer
decided that the detachment mould not fee sent until the unit
mas more adequately prepared for field service*5®
2n September 1915* a reporter commented in the Aerial
Age Weekly* on the Kexlcan issue and air power* by stating
*What is needed is a complete air squadron and a firm policy
. . . .*51

5°ifeia.
51«u.s. Aviators Fired On * Complete Air Squadron
Seeded,* Aerial Age
September 13, 1915, P* 613*
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1915-1916

From 1910 to 1920, Mexioo was gripped by a violent
social revolution.

The revolt generated destruction that

unsettled and scourged the Mexican countryside, and touohed
all strata of Mexican society. The ohaos and fury spilled
across Mexico's northern boundary into the United State*,
creating incidents of pillage and depredation.

By 1915,

Mexico itas considered as " . . . a thorn la our side.*l
The Salted States and Mexico share a comma boundary
of over 1?QQ miles that stretches from the Gulf of Mexico to
the Pacific Ocean*

It follows the Bio Grande for more then

180© miles through desolate sparsely settled country, turning
due west at SI .Paso, Texas, toward the Continental Divide.2
Its hordes security la 1915, wee the responsibility of Briga
dier General Frederick Puraston, Commander, Southern Department,
United States Army,3
Icaspar Whitney, "Why Mexico is a Thorn in Our Side,*
The Outlook, Ray 5, 1915# P* 81*
2Harry A, Toulmin, Jr.,
The Military service Publi '

(Harristourgt
, pp. 17-25.

3u.s, war Department
zoioiiij 'p.' 1 , hereafter cited'as Funston*
H

(Microfilm.)

f it * Southern Department had reacted 'to herder disturbances

as early as 1910, when In response to growing concern over the
early activities of fiexioan revolutionaries, troops had been
dispatched to Del Bio and Eagle Bass, Texas,

they were autho

rised to aid civilian officials in maintaining United States
neutrality laws, but they were not given permission to cross
into Mexican territory.^
As the internal situation in Mexioo deteriorated, the
United States' troop strength along the border increased,
reaching 20,000 men on July 1, 1915 when Funston reported,
, . the entire border line from the mouth of the Bio Grande
to San Diego, California was patrolled."5 These troops were
instructed to provide all possible protection for American
life and property, to warn Mexican forces along the border to
refrain from endangering American life and property, and if
neoessary, to use force to prevent Mexican destruction on the
American side.6
Repeated United States' warnings had little effect on the
Mexican commanders, who claimed that the raiders weas deserters.
On August 28, 1915, Secretary of State, Bobert Dancing, oomment.fed
on the Mexican indifference to the activities is the Brownsville,
\etter, Secretary of Bar to Secretary of state,
January 26, 1916, U.S., Papers Belatlng to the Foreign
Halations of the United States 1916 (Washington D.c.:
Government Printing office, 192$), p. ^73.
^Ibid.j and Puneton. p. 1.

Texas area* warned Carranza Iso take corrective action*

Other*

wise* the Secretary of State stated, the situation * « * *
might easily lead to most serious consequences*
Funston,' anticipating a general outbreak along the border,
requested from the Secretary of Mar, August 30, 1915, additional,
troops to be used as a preventive measure because "the time for
economy had passed . . • and action > , , should be taken at
once,"®
la the period between duly 1, 1915, and Hareh 7, 1916,
twenty-seven raids were perpetrated on dotted States* soil*
These raids resulted in f troopers killed, 16 troopers wounded,
6 civilians dead, 1 civilian wounded, 2 civilians captured by
Mexicans* 21 horses killed or stolen, 110 head of cattle
rustled, as well as the destruction of farm houses, bridges,
stores and the theft of ammunition, anas, and saddles.?
^Telegram, Secretary of State to Special
August 28, 1915, U.S., 2|
- Government

*' p. 8G5, hereafter cited

®Telegram Extract, Funston to Secretary of Mar,
August 30. 1915, Foreign Relations 1915. p. 806*
?U.S,, Mar Department, “Annual Reports of the Fiscal
fear 1916 by Major General Frederick Funston," AGO File
2A3231, Box Ikl SB national Archives, Washington, B.C.,
pp. 16-19, hereafter cited as "Funston Beport.” (Photocopy
of typewritten Beport.) A compilation of all border inci
dents excluding those that were classed as purely revenge
or for cattle rustling. The latter were assumed a normal
occurrence for the area.

In addition to the raids, incidents of goo shots northward
across the entire border from Brownsville, Texas, westward were
increasing.

A few were truly accidental, a result of dash be

tween Villa and Carranza:

more were planned,*0 Several in

volved operations up to seventy men with directed fire from
fortified positions.** On one occasion, a group of hexiean
soldiers led by Carramsista officer crossed the border and
attacked a detachment of American soldiers.12 As 1915 pro
gressed into 1916, the dispatches of the Southern Department
contained ever-increasing reports of incidents against United
States troops, citizens, and aircraft.
In order to,discharge the responsibility of border patrol,
the Southern Department divided the 1700 mile border that
separated Hexico from the United States, into seven cavalry
districts,

The districts were augmented by camps and garrisons

at Laredo and Bagle Pass, Texas; and Douglas, Baco, ftogales,
and luma,. Arizona.

The border patrol was almost entirely a

function of cavalry units.

As the raiding increased, greater

^Translation, Private Correspondence of
in Charge of Foreign Relations and Justice,
Foreign Delations'1915# p. 795; and Latter,
Adjutant General, Bovember 2, 1915, Foreign
p. 819.

the Official
March 2?, 1915*
Funston to
Relationa,i915.

.llLetter, Secretary of State to the Confidential’Agent
of the Constitutionalist Government, October 6, 1915,
Foreign Relations 1915. p. 815; and Beport, Funston to Secretoryofl^rsepteiber 17, 1915, gorelgnBelatlona 1915. p. 812.
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consideration was being given la military circles, to the use
of infantry as a means of containment, ^
As the border became mors and more disturbed, the American
public and Congress became ever more anxious 'to correct the
Mexican situation*

On January 6, 1916, the Senate adopted a

resolution that initiated an investigation into the Mexican
Bevolution, its impact on United States* property, the assur
ances granted by the Mexican government to protect' American
lives, and the actions and instructions given the United States'
military to defend the rights of American citizens.1^
Four days later, January 10, 1916, Panoho Villa became
the chief Mexican antagonist of the United States.

In a care

fully planned act, meant to provoke an international incident,
viliiata bandits led by fable Lopes stopped a train at San
Isabel, Mexico.

Eighteen united States mining engineers,

armed only with safe conduct passes issued by the jug, facto
government, were made to disembark from the train,

they were

stripped of their clothing and then murdered in cold blood.1^
the reaction was immediate,

the news media of the United

States, aroused over continual Mexican incidents, demanded;
"if Carranza and hie defects governaent cannot protect
£Aserlcan§7 • • • the President should send armed forces into
^•Pension deport,* pp. 1-2.

l^Senate Besolution submitted by Mr. Pall,
January 6, 1916, Persian delations 1916. pp. 463-464*
*%hc independent. January 24, 1916, p. 113.

51

northern Mexico.*16 Secretary tansing demanded thafc Carranza
punteh the murderers and the Senate debated the wisdom of armed
United States* intervention,1? Carranza declared Villa,
fiafael Castro, and fablo I<opea outside the law, but little
effort was made to arrest them*16 instead, Fancho Villa and
his force of 300 men moved at will throughout the Mexican
State of Chihuahua, well protected: by loyal followers m & »secure knowledge of the rugged countryside,3^ gy mid-February
1916, Villa was reported to be attacking American-owned mines
and ranches in hie native state,2® secretary lansing requested
that Carranza furnish sufficient forces to protect United
States citizens and. their interest.21 Me was assured that the
garrisons were -adequate*22
By March 1, 1916, reports began to accumulate that Villa
and his band sought to .cross the Waited States* border and
surrender, mad that Villa would then proceed to Washington
F. m i M J m & J H M * January 13, 1916,
expressed the same sentiment in an editorial, p. 10*
17»ew fork mmea. January 13, 1916, p. 1.
ISTelegram, Special Agent Sillimaa to the Secretary of
State, January if., 1916, foreign Halations 1916, p. 665?
and Extract, Consul letcher to the Secretary of State,
February 9, 1916, Foreign Relations 1916. p. 668.
i9ama,
2®irhe Independent. February 21, 1916, p. 257,
2lTelegram, Secretary of state to Special Agent Sillitnan,
February 16, 1916, Foreign BeIationel9l6. p* 669.
22?elegram, Special Agent Sllliman to Secretary of State,
undated: received March 5, 1916, Foreign Relations 1916. p. 678*

to confer with President Wilson,2^ It was certain however that
Villa was moving toward 'the herder, and his small army was la*,
creasing,

m e Carranza government, sow not to the crucial

test, did not arrest him claiming they had insufficient troops
la the area,21*
On March 9, 1916, -Villa crossed the herder at Columbus,
Hew

M e x i c o . 2^

xn© force estimated between 500 and 700 Mexicans

launched a double thrusbed attaok at 4;00 a.a.- against the
baited states Army camp on the south side of Columbus, Mew
Mexico,. The first Indication of an impending engagement to
the defenders was the sound of the shot that killed the guard
on the west edge of oamp,2^
The Officer of the Day, Captain daises P. Castleman,
immediately .called out the guard.

The'troopers, although out*

numbered (330 troopers compared to 500 to 700 Villlstas) and
handicapped by weapons stored under look sad key, rallied and
soon broke the Mexican attaok.

The Mexicans retreated north*

ward into the town of Columbus, where they lOoted stores and
23felegra®, Collector Cobb to Secretary of state,
March 3, 1916, Foreign delations 1916. p. 478.
2**S©rl©s of Telgrams, Collector Cobb to Secretary of
State. March 6. 1916 to March 8. 1916. Foreiizn Halations
1916. p. 479.
n ^ -- 88
25Telegram, Collector cobb to Secretary of state,
March 9, 1916, Foreign.gelations 1916. p. 4§0.
2^BFunston Beport,* p. 22.
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set fire to the principal buildings and depot.^ This aot
accomplished, the Villistas moved west of the city, regrouping
about three-quarters of a mile from the town's edge*

there*

at 6il0 a«m., Villa* waiting on the outskirts of Columbus
with forty men and the horses, reformed his men and rode south*
ward* A pursuit by twenty-nine sea of the 13th cavalry* led
by Major Prank Tompkins, followed the Mexicans as they scurried
for the border* Tompkins pursued them for an additional
fifteen miles* carefully avoiding the main force and engaging
the enemy's stragglers when he oaught then*

Be broke off the

chase when he ran short of ammunition and returned to Columbus,
Sow Mexico.28
The surprise raid on Columbus, 'lew Mexico* was costly
for Villa*

He sustained eixty-savan casualties, as opposed

to American losses of eight dead soldiers* eight dead
civilians, seven wounded troopers* and three wounded towns*
2?Ibld.. pp. 22-23} and a complete although biased account
is inTompklns, Chasing Villa. Chapter v m .
28Ibid,. pp. 55*5?* “Funston Heport," p. 23} aid
Alberto Salinas Carranza, “La Expedioion Punitive," trace*
hr J. M. Gillespie (unpublished manuscript 1938)* PP« 59-61.
Carranza launches an attaok at Tompkins in his version of
the pursuit, stating that if Tompkins had pursued as rapidly
as he relates, then surely Villa would have out him off with
his rear guard, especially after Tompkins dismounted to
better attaok Villa's rear guard. Carranza feels Tompkins
used up his ammunition, keeping his distance', from Villa's
superior force, and then returned to Columbus. Eighteen
years later* September 11* 1939, Tompkins received the
Distinguished Service Cross for his notion at Columbus,
Hew Mexico,

folk.29

ho

had. achieved his mission.

Villa's objective, eon-

firmed by a portion of his private papers found mi the battle*
field, had been, ever since January 6, 1916, ”

to pre

cipitate aa international conflict by one blow at the orack of
dawn mod then -to fleo— nothing

more*

“3© jg m g * » • . one of

those acts of audaolty so frequent in the turbulent life of
Francisco Villa, /an7 . . . audaolous, decided, impulsive and
revengeful nan- who did not know how to lose, *3*
the American reaction to the raid.was a ory for .revenge.
On March 9 and March'10, 1916, Funston. urgently recommended the
hot pursuit of Villa to the War Department in order to prevent
further raiding and pit' mi end to Villa's' * • . . policy of
merciless killing of Americans in

M e x ico.

*32 yunston, certain

of the inability of Carranza to capture Villa, cited examples
of the past * . . . apathy and gross inefficiency of Mexican
Government troops . . .* to contain or even press 'Villa.33
29*Punston geport,* p. 23; end Carranza, "la sxpediolon
Punitive,” pp. 50*51. Funston states in his Annuel Beport
'that up to 190 Villlstas may have been killed; Carranza
takes exception to 'this primarily because of his strong
feelings about Tompkins, who claimed to kill 75 to 100
during the chase. The value of sixty-seven dead is based
upon the body count*
3©*Funston Beport,* p. 23, and the .quote from Carranza,
"La Bxpedioion Punitive," p. bp,
31lbld.. p. 63.
32"Funston Beport," p. 2k.
33ibld.. p. 25.
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fhs American press, long weary of Mexican non-action, gave the
Columbus raid undue importance * . . , thus firing the entire
public , . « with a spirit of wear and revenge.*^

-^Carranza, *£>e Sxpedicion Punitiva,• pp. 65-66.
“The Independent. March 20, 1916, p. 404, ran an editorial
entitled "we San no Longer wait.* St traced relations
back to Vera Crus and then called for invasion as • . . .
our present duty . . . peace and good order oust be
established in Northern Mexico.0

CHAPTBB V

THE EXPBDITXOK OHIGIUATES
Paaoho Villa's attaok on Columbus, Now Mexico, convinced
the authorities of the United States that the time for diplo
macy alone .had passed:

punitive motion was needed.

On

Maroh 10, 1910, Genera! Henry P« McCain forwarded President
Wilson* a reply to Funston*s request to " . . . relentlessly
pursue and . . . scatter . . .» Villa*s forces.* She Command
er of the Southern Department resolved the following instruc
tions.
President has directed that an armed force be sent
Into Mexico with the sole object of capturing Villa
and preventing any further raids by his band, and
with scrupulous regard to sovereignty of Mexico*
Secretary of War directs you to telegraph exactly
what you need in order to carry out foregoing
general instructions, tat you will not take any
overt steps until receipt definite orders from
war Department**
The field command of the expedition fell to Brigadier
General John J» Pershing.

His selection, March 10, 1916, by

President Wilson and Secretary of war Baker, was based solely
upon the recommendations of General Hugh 1. Scott, Chief of
^Telegram, General funston to Adjutant General, Maroh 10,
1916; and Telegram, The Adjutant General to General funston,
March 10, 1916, foreign Belations 1916. p. 983.
2Ibld.
56

Staff, and Major General Tasker H. Bliss.

Pershing, stationed

at fort Bliss, Texas, was one of the few officers la the Army
-who possessed extensive field command experience,

he had

served in the Indian campaigns in Arizona and the hakotas as
well as the campaigns against the Monos in the Philippines,
In recognition of his command ability, President Theodore
Boosevelt had promoted him in 1906, over 862 more senior offi
cers, directly from Captain to Brigadier General.3
The basic plan of the expedition had been, conceived by
General. Funston,

On March 10, 1916, the Commander of the

Southern Department proposed a southern pursuit by two columns
of cavalry, one originating at Columbus, ami the other from
Baohlta, Mew Mexico.

The force, of four regiments of cavalry,

one battery of field artillery, assorted support troops, and
one aeroplane squadron, would merge sixty miles south of
Columbus at Ascension, Mexico.

In order to assure the safe

return of the penetrating force, if the Mexican population rose
in mass, Funston, recommended a reinforcement brigade of cavalry
as well as infantry to protect the lines of communication and
supply.**
%iohard O'Connor, Black Jack Pershing (Garden City:
Doubleday and Company, Inc.,'1961), p. 85, 117? and
Bobert S. Thomas and Inez V. Alien, "The Mexican Punitive
Expedition Under Brigadier General John J. Pershing, United
States Army 1916-191? Chapters I thru V." (unpublished
monograph, War Histories Division Office of the chief of
Military History, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C.,
1954), p. II-4, hereafter cited as "Monograph,*
^•Funston Beport,* pp. 25-26.
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fhe proposed supply routes were to be initially supported
by truck and peek train from advanced supply depots at Columbus
and Hachita, Mew Mexico,
ward from £1 Paso, fexas.

fhey would eventually branch south*
When the troops reached Casas Grandee,

Mexico, supplies oould be shipped via the hoped-for primary mode
of transportationi

the Northwestern Railroad.

In order to se

cure the border, troops from Douglas, Arizona were to be shifted
to H Paso, Texas.5
On March 11, 1918, the plan was approved, except for any
'pre-planned use of the Mexican railroad.

The latter was view

ing as unadvisable due to the railroad*a availability being
contingent upon existing conditions and the attitude of the
de facto government. ’Funston was cautioned to instruct his sub
ordinates that the occupation of any Mexican city or t o m was
forbidden.^ Further, his orders directed that
. . . the work of these troops will be regarded as
finished as soon as villa's band or bands are known
to be broken up . . . . /and the expedition/ will
be withdrawn to Ameriosoi territory as soon as the_
de facto government is able to relieve them * . .»
5lbld.
Enclosure, MoCain to Commanding General Southern
Department, March 11, 1918, in U.S., Records of the Adjutant
General's Office, Record oroup Ro. 9b, "General Pershing*s
Report of the Punitive Expedition to June 50, 1916,* AGO
2980591, Box 191 National Archives, Washington, D.C., p. 3,
hereafter cited as *Pershing Beport." (Photocopy of type
written report.)
?2nelosure, MoOain to Commanding General Southern
Department, March iO, 1916, in "Pershing Beport,* p. 3.

In addition to other directives, Funston, was instructed
* . . . to make all possible use of aeroplanes at San Antonio
for observation*"®
The arrival of Special Orders 61, Southern Department,
March 12, 1916, designating the First Aero Squadron a part of
the expedition, were completely unexpected.

They arrived in

the midst of an inspection by the Inspector General.

However,

the aviators and their technicians were swift to deploy, leav
ing San Antonio, Texas, March 13, 1916, in a truck automobile
train with the aircraft crated.9 All the. aircraft were taken,.
as it was anticipated 50 percent would be unserviceable under
constant use.

By Marsh 16, 1916, the squadron commander,

Captain Foulois, and Captain Dodd conducted the first flight
from Columbus, in Airplane 94.10
The deployed unit to Columbus consisted of twelve officers}
Captains Foulois and Townsend F. Dodd; lieutenants Carleton G.
Chapman, Joseph S. Carberry, Herbert A. Dargue, Thomas s. Bowen,
®2nslosure, McCain to Commanding General Southern
Department, March 10, 1916, in "Pershing Beport,” p. 3.
^Benjamin D, Foulois, "Beport of Operations of the First
Aero Squadron, Signal corps, with Punitive Expedition, U.S.A.,
for Period March 15 to August 15, 1916* United States Air
Fores Archives, 168.650 1I-?A, August 28, 1916, p. I, here
after olted as "First Aero Beport." (Typewritten.) and
Edgar s. Cornell, "why Biding Boots Sometimes Irritate an
Aviator's Feet," U.S. Air-Services. Ootoher 1932, p. 29.,
hereafter cited as
10»Pirst Aero Beport," p. 1, and
pp. 125-126.
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loberb

Mm-

lilllii M* &* Elinor, Edgar $*. 0orrell , Arthur B.

Christie, Ira

Am

Ea&er, and a* $*■ Warren, a medical corps offi

cer; $2 eallabe& men; a civilian mechanic, Jacob Bailey; and 3
Hospital Corps men*2^
th e o p e ra tio n a l s ta tu s o f the a ir u n it was fa r from- s a tis 
fa c to ry *

th e e ig h t JH -21a considered inadequate when new, were

dangerous a fte r spending tb s summer, f a l l , and w in te r in th e
open*

th e u n it possessed no machine guns, bombs, o r o th e r

armament, and o n ly a few o f th e e ig h t p ilo ts c a rrie d s id e anas
o r 22 c a lib e r r if le s fo r s e lf p ro te c tio n *

th e ir g re a te s t a sse t

was th e ir y o u th fu l eagerness and com plete b e lie f in th e va lu e
o f an a ir s e rv ic e to th e anay*3^
P e rsh in g , m eanw hile, went about th e ta s k o f o rg a n isin g ' h is
command o f 10,000 men*

He bad been n o tifie d o f h is s e le c tio n ,

March 11, 1916, by fu n s to n , who l e f t him. * . * * fre e to make
such assignm ents o f th e tro o p s under / h is / command as /h e
th o u g h t/ * * . b e st in o rd e r to accom plish th e purpose in
han d .1*2'3 th e ta sk fo rc e

ms

to c o n s is t o f th e Seventh, fem th

(C o lo re d ), E le ve n th , and th irte e n th C a va lry Begim ents; th e S ix th
and S ix te e n th In fa n try aagim ents; B a tte rie s £ and a , s ix th F ie ld
A r t ille r y ; F ir s t Ambulance, Company lum ber Seven; F ie ld H o s p ita l,
F ir s t Aero B e p o rt,* p . 1*
i % o r r # ll* p . 2b.
!3 k e tte r, Departm ent A d ju ta n t to B rig a d ie r aeneral John 2T*
ParalbUigt la rc h 1 1, 1916, in •P e rsh in g B e p o rt,* p . 2*

Humber Seven; various Signal Corps detachment; Wagon Companies One
and Two'| and the First Aero Squadron*

14

As the plans took shape and

units were placed,: operational difficulties became more apparent*
One of the most immediate and obvious of' problems was'how to maintain the continuity of supply and communication lines.
Hie expeditions area of operation was the State ’of CMbuahua, ■
Mexico*

About -three times the si&e of Hew York State, it consisted -

of four^fifths eastern plateau region and one-fifth western Sierra
Mhdre mountains.

Hie plateau area,-a series of'plains divided by

low barren mountains, gravel ravines, and dry lakes, represented a
serious obstacle' to military movement* ; Hie mountain region' rose'
from a low elevation of 3,000 feet' to a high- of 10,000 feet, it too
was almost inaccessible. 1The remote canyons offering plentiful
water, food, forage and fuel were a favorite haunt of fugitives*
The climate of Chihuahua was as harsh as the topography*

16

the

area., cold in winter, hot in simmer, was extremely dry, except
for a mid-summer rainy season.

As a result of the harsh climate,

the plateau region boasted little vegetation, other than thorns, cactus,- mesquite, and yuccas*

The little grass athat appearedddaring

duly and August soon dried up, making-

^"Pershing Report," pp. 4 *3 *
^"Punstcm Report,n p. 2 8 .
^".Monograph," pp. 11 -1 4 , 1 3 *
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forage for horses scarce.1?
These topographies*, and climatic conditions made logis
tics* support difficult even if suitable transportation mas
available.

It was not, and this laok of capability was *the

moat critical situation which confronted the entire expedition
at the outset.*1®
funston*s staff had completed the immediate steps of
accumulating .supplies* ammunition, and troops at Columbus,
New Mexico, and Pershing had developed deployment plans, but,
as * . . . practically no motor trucks were available . . .*
logistical support did not exist.1? The fifty-four trucks
ordered by the War Dapartment for the expedition were not ex
pected until March 19, 1916, four -days after the expedition's
scheduled deployment*2®
fortunately, the ten trucks possessed by the First Aero
Squadron arrived in sufficient time to provide a partial
solution to the transportation problem.21
The expedition*s Instructions were to depart no later
1?Ibid.. p. 11-15*
18«Foulois Record,* p. 6,
19*Funston Report,* p. 26; and The Outlook. March 29, 1916,
P. 732.
20Ibld,. “Foulois Record,* p. 6; and Report of the
Quartermaster General, Annual Report 1916. p. 376.
21*Foulois Record,* p. 6.
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than 6:00 a.nu, Marsh 15* 1916.22 However, this was delayed
until the arrival of the First Aero squadron on the morning of
Harsh 15, 1916.

At noon, Harsh 15, within' an hour after the

squadron's arrival at Columbus, Hew Mexico, the southward march
began, 'this expedition marked the first experience that the
army had with motor vehicles, mod an aviator, lieutenant
Edgar S, Gorrell was la charge Of the truck train.

Oorrell, •
'

later President of the Stuz Motor Car Company of America, had
been selected for the duty because he and his ground crew had
been first to uaerahe their airplane, and he had no other
Immediate duty.

As he travelled toward Mexico, he felt a hit

uneasy, knowing that the airplane mechanics serving as guards
were totally unfamiliar with the rifles they carried.

They had

rarely if ever fired them.*3 The young officer's apprehension
was further intensified by thoughts of the threats of the
Carranza commander at the border gate at las Polomas, south
of Columbus, Hew Mexico, who had promised to resist American
entry.

Fortunately, neither the Mexican nor his command were

encountered when the eastern column crossed the border.21*'
The western column consisted of the Second and Tenth
Cavalry.

Its departure point was Hachlta, Mew Mexico. Desig

nated as the Second Provisional Cavalry Brigade, it was commanded
22nFunston Report,'8 p. 28.
23oorrell. p. 25.
2^*Pershing lepert,8 p. 7*

by Colonel George A. Dodd,

A late intelligence report revealed

that Villa's bazxl, estimated between 500 and 1000 men, had
passed Casas Grandee, Mexico.

Pershing# is hopes of cutting

off Villa, directed this all cavalry column to by-pass the pre
planned Aacenciaa rendezvous and to make a forced march toward
Casas Grandes.

Relishing action, Pershing decided to load the

forward thrust himself, and ordered Dodd to delay departure
from the Culbertson Sanch until ho arrived.

Pershing's decision

delayed the planned departure as ho was Involved in an auto
mobile accident.

It was after midnight before the column got

under way.23
A day later, March 17, 1916, Dodd's flying column arrived
at Colonia Dublaa, Mexico.

They had covered the 125 miles of

rough terrain from the Culbertson Sanch in less than twenty
hours with only two halts.

A temporary advanced base of

operations was established a mile north of Colonia Dublaa.
The eastern eoluma, commanded by Colonel James Lockett,
Eleventh Cavalry, .paced itself more slowly, stopping at Las
Polamoo, Boca Grande, Ascension and Corral!too, Mexico.

It

arrived at colonia Dublaa .'Shortly after noon, March 20, 1916,
bringing the expedition's strength in Mexico to 192 offleers,
0800 troopers, and 6175 horses.2^
23%bid., pp. 5—7.
^Tompkins, Chasing Villa, p. 77-78, and ‘Monograph, •
p. 11-18.
'
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Pershing’s first task was tea locate Villa,
continued 'to perplex him the entire campaign*

This task
Villa* at home

in Chihuahua and six days ahead of M s pursuers* was able to
evade the American troops at will*

(local reports indicated

that Villa was In the vicinity of San Kiguel de Bableora,
forty-five miles south of the expedition*s camp*} In an
attempt to prevent Villa from moving Into Sonora, and hoping
to out the bandit’s trail before he could move into, the moun
tains near Guerrero* Pershing executed, his first attacks
three separate but parallel cavalry columns*2?
With the campaign Initiated, Pershing ordered the First
Aero Squadron to Casas Grandes for immediate service.2®
fh® orders to proceed to Casas Grandee, Mexico, were
received by Foulois late Sunday afternoon, larch 19, 1916*
Acknowledging receipt of the order, Foulois asked Pershing to
have landing fires set around the field at the destination*
A lack of squadron truck transporfcation. existed, so only 50
percent of the enlisted personnel'were ordered to move for
ward* The men who remained at Columbus, New Mexico* were
expected to provide technical support for the Quartermaster
truck operation.
previously,

The available squadron trucks had been packed

the aircraft were soon fueled' and readied.

Both

the ground and air elements departed Columbus, New Mexico at
2?0Pershing Beport,” p* 7.
28*First Aero Beport,” p. 1.

5(10 p.m., Rarch 19, 1916.
She deployment mission, a flight of 110 miles, was not
normal*

§!$$ Isi# dejiarfcur© made a ni^i% Sandiag a certainty*

the only pilot in the unit who had flown at night was. Captain
Dodd who had previously logged one night sortie*

She aircrews

had only a vague idea where Casas Grandes, the intended destination, mss.

Their maps wees inaccurate blueprints that

barely portrayed a rough representation of the locale,

the

aircraft were not equipped with instruments, nor lighted for
night operations*

Saoh JW»2 had a different compass system,

all of whioh were commonly unreliable,

the aviators, eager

to respond to the urgent oall, east their cares to the wind,
but at the same time, each " . . . wondered what the country
beyond Columbus had in store for him."3°
The first aircraft to abort was piloted, by lieutenant
Kilner.

Barely clearing ground, due to the low power of his
OX engine, he flew a dosed pattern and landed.

He wisely chose to remain until the ground smews installed a
new OXX engine.

He departed Columbus the next morning, flew

non-stop to Casas Grandes, and was first aviator to arrive at
the intended destination, harsh 20, 1916.31
Foulois, in the lead aircraft Airplane Vi, anticipated
z%ereH 19, 1916, Ibid.. and Sorrell, p. 25*
30lbld.
31lbli,, p. 26., and harsh 20, 1916, "Pirst Aero Beport,"
p. 1.

6?
the hazards of night flight*

noticing a dust aloud., created

by cavalry of unimown origin, and aware of the rapidly de*
creasing daylight, he decided continued travel was futile.
He landed at ABcencion, Mexico, and was followed in by Air*
planes 45, 48, and 53.32
Willis in Airplane 41, and Gorrell, in Airplane 52,
initially experienced little difficulty.

Each had *a good

propeller,8 and they flaw on, Gorrell trailing Willis.

Even*

tually, they lost sight of the other machines in the sky.
noticing that the ground had grown rough and had a higher
elevation they each climbed an additional 1060 feet. Dark*
ness earns, but they pressed on.

Gorrell soon lost sight of

Willis.33
two hours later he saw him again, when Airplane 52 and
Airplane 41 almost had a midair collision,

loth aviators had

seen a lighted area and headed for it, almost meeting one
another in the process.

The light, however, turned out to be

a forest fire in a hlgh*walled canyon.

Gorrell, in Airplane

52, looking for a suitable lending area, applied power and
climbed out of the canyon area.

He saw only four things,

mountains below, a full mooa, the north star, and darkness.
He was completely lost.3^
3%322§1I* P* 26.
33xbia.. and Mew fork Times. Maroh 28, 1916, p. 3.
3**0orrsll. p. 26, The iiew fork Times article stated that
Willis landed at the location of the fire.

¥11118* luck was not sear better*
a night landing near Pearson, Mexico.

He waa forced to make
As he rounded out, the

aircraft hit a low knoll, and was destroyed.

Willis, somehow

uninjured, climbed out of the smashed cockpit, consulted his
blueprint map, and headed in the direction in which he hoped
Casas Grandes lay.
brush the next day.

He walked all night and hid in the under
assuming M s journey the following evening,

he narrowly missed being captured by three armed Mexicans whose
fore attracted him*

He succeeded in evading them by .hiding

in the mesqulte, emerging only after they had departed*

Willis

finally reached the base camp at Colonia Oublan, 2:00 a*®.,
March 21, 1916.^ Salvage .parties were dispatched to the orach
scene the next day, bat due to hostile fire they withdrew,

A

second attempt, Marsh 23, 1916, was successful.^
Gorrell had even less fortune.

Assuming he had flown

too far .south, unable to see his compass for direction, and
totally lest, he turned toward the north star in hopes of
trying * . . . to reach my comrades and obtain assistance,*
Plying between the mountain peaks, the only sign of civili
zation he noticed wees a few small lighted shacks*
tinued on.

He con

In a short time his oil supply was consumed.

He contemplated shutting the engine down before it seised,
35»Government•b Aeros hot Suitable for Mexico,*
Aerial Age weekly. April 3, 1916, p. 86} and Hew York .glass.
&aroh 25V 1 9 1 6 , pp. 1-2.
36fiarch 22, 1916, March 23, 1916, “First Aero Beport,* pp. 2-3.
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but a lack gf fuel, soon stopped hie ‘good

p ropeller.

*37

Stair-stepping the aircraft down, he loaded In a field
filled with hunch grass.

Nearby were a few lighted adobe touts.

Some dogs sensed his presence in the blackness and began bark
ing.

Gorrell, trail briefed on the good possibility of un

friendly Besieans, rapidly gathered his gear and departed, the
aircraft*3®
The young aviator spent the neat several days surviving*
Sressed- in blue overalls and leather flying coat over a khaki
service uniform with a football like Hying helmet on his head,
he set out across the desert.

His equipment, a pistol, can

teen of water, emergency rations, and the blueprint map, was
meager at best.

Evading a herd of horses and cattle, which

chased him into a stream of water:, Gorrell pressed forward
until As00 a.m., when he paused for a rest.

Two hours later,

he awoke, to find himself on the crest of a hill in the middle
of a desert,3®
Hoping to cross either the lines of communication or
supply, he set off across the barren soil*

By mid-afternoon,

with half of his water already consumed, he realised the
37oorrell, p. 26. The Aerial Age Weekly. April 3, 1916,
p. 86, Mid, Gorrell had a fuel leak, but Gorrell states in
his article he never talked to any reporters.
38 x b i d . .

pp.

26-27.

39ibld., p. 27,
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futility of his journey.

He retraced his steps, barely

reaching the stream he h#d easily forded the night before.
Unused to the desert conditions, he had fainted twice and ex
perienced a fit of convulsions and vomiting.
fill of water and fell asleep,

Me drank his

Upon awakening, he returned

to his aircraft and found It intact except for a Mexican name
recently- writtenf.oa it in pencil.^
Gorrell decided hie only hope of survival was to steal a
horse, and ride to safety*

In the midst of procuring an

animal, he was surprised by a Mexican.
cumstance probably saved his life,

This fortunate cir

the native knew where

the Americans were, and Gorrell, in no position to argue,
succeeded in purchasing the guide's services for four silver
dollars*

The return trip, about thirty miles, to Ascension,

Mexico, was uneventful,

Gorrell rode behind; his service

pistol was constantly cocked, as he feared treachery.

The

Mexican, already nervous, half expecting to see villistas at
any moment, became steadily more frightened as they approached
Ascension*

By the time the duo reached the town, a crowd of

curious people had gathered.

Under this exposure the Mexican

desired little of the young American's company.

When a cloud

*»°lbld.. pp. 27-28. The Aerial...Age Weekly. April 3, 1916,
p. 86, fabricated a story that Gorrell creased the desert,
tacked a note, giving his location, on a stick near a wagon
trail, and then returned to guard his aircraft until rescued.
The correct account appeared in the hew fork Timas. March 28,
1916, p. 3.

of dust of an approaching troop appeared, he collected his pay
and rapidly departed, leaving Gorrell, horse, and all*

Sorrell's

ragged appearnaoe caused the American troop to first suspect
him of being a Mexican bandit, but fortunately the detachment
of the Sixth infantry did not fire, and he was saved.
The following morning, March 22, 1916, Sorrell scoured
a ford automobile, eight gallons of gasoline, one quart of
oil, and a new guide*

Beturning to his aircraft, with the

guide and a chauffeur, he filled the radiator with stream
water, refueled and serviced the engine, and cranked his "good
propeller**

Before he was ready to depart a strong wind oaae

up, and rain began to fall.

Be had never flown in a rainstorm,

nor had he flown without his goggles.
previous day.

These he had lost the

instructing the guide and chauffeur to'hang- on

the wings, he applied .full power and * . . . by luok . * * *
managed to take off without nosing over in the bunch grass.^
He flew to Ojo Fre&erieo, a point along the supply route,
where he landed,

later in the day he flawed down a truck

train, refueled, and attempted to fly to Casas Grandes.

After

being airborne for only five minutes, a huge part of the air1
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return to Ojo frederieo, where after a night’s stay, he obtained
^Gorrall. pp. 2S-29.
*»2lbld.. pp. 29-30.
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« ride da another truck convoy and returned to hie command,
March 23# 1916,*»3
©a March 15, 1916, Gorrell and hie meohanlas returned to
Ojo Prederioo.

they aade emergency repairs and on March 26,

1916, Airplane 52 joined the force.^
Squally disastrous was the trip of Lieutenant Bowen.
Plying la Airplane 68, he nade a successful landing at
Asoeneion, Mexico, behind Foulole, March 19, 1916.

Depart*

lug the following day for Colonla Dublan, he encountered enroute fuel problems and landed at cases Grandes.
he resumed his Jouaaey that afternoon.

aefueled,

Ones in the Colonla

Dublan area, he flew Into "puffy alr« and whirlwinds during
his landing approach.

At only sixty-five feet absolute

altitude the aircraft was caught by a " . , . sudden puff of
wind /It/ »side-slipped,* crashing Into the ground.*^ m e
entire air frame burned leaving only the engine intact.

Bowen,

who was knocked unconscious, was rescued and luckily suffered
only a broken nose and minor Injuries.
The First Aero Squadron had finally joined the punitive
expedition in the field.

Their aircraft, definitely under

powered, had barely managed to traverse the plateau area of
»3lbld.

*% M d .

^"Government* s Acres hot Suitable for Mexico,"
Aerial Age weekly. April 3 , 1916, p. 86.
I*%areh 2®, 1916, First Aero Beoort. p. 2,
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Chihuahua.

The aviators, although eager to serve, were capable

of flying only when navigation over the .area m s easy*

Fortu

nately, however, to ease some of the unit's deficiencies,
■* . . « the prairie . . . offered numerous good places to
land.*^7 fhe short deployment from Colu&bus to Colonia Ouhlan
had resulted in the loss of two aircraft,

only six JN-2's

remained and eaoh according to Henry woodhouse, * . . , m s
worth one thousand men in the Mexican campaign."^®

^7«oovernment•s Acres Not Suitable For Ktsxico," Aerial
Age Weekly, April 3, 1916, p. 86. The statement Is attributed
to lieutenant Bowen.
^Henry Woodhouse, "Wo Aeroplanes for Mexican Campaign!"
giving. April 1916, p. 101. hr. woodhouse*s estimate of a
j S-z 's value was probably high considering the low capability
of the machine# However, British General lord Kitchener,
speaking of European war airplanes stated, "an aviator is
worth an army corps." See U.S., Congress, House of Bepresentatives, Bepresentative William S. Bennet speaking on Aeroplanes,
June 9, 1916, 64th Cong*. 1st sees.. Appendix, Congressional
Beeord. Vol. LIXI, p. 1140.

c u A P m vi
m m ssasch coktmoss
On Hereto 20, 1916, the pace of pursuit increased. Pershing,
foreseeing the 'need for additional units organized four more
detachments.

Each one m s held in readiness against any oircura-

stance that might 'arise* these new thrusts, commanded toy
lieutenant Colonel Henry f* Allen, semi Razors Elmer lindsley,
Frank Tompkins a m fiotoert to. Howze, were dispatched between
Harch 20 and 29, 1916.

As all units would eventually converge

in the Hamiqaipa area, Pershing relocated bis advanced field
headquarters near that Hexiean village.1
the Second Squadron and troop to, Thirteenth Cavalry, were
the first detachment to depart,

toindsley, and his command of

eleven officers and seventy-five troopers, were ordered to
guard trails m at of Chuhulchupa, in the event that Villa
turned in that direction*

However, 91110*8 forces appeared

to be headed due south, mad tolndsley*s orders were altered
Hereto 24, 1916.

Be was redirected toward San Jose de Babicora.2

On Harch 21, 1916, Tompkins left Colonle Dublaa at the
head of eleven officers and 160 troopers of Troops K and It,
l*pershing Beport," pp. 11-12.
2Ibld.. p. 11.
?6

and nm&him Gaa plgtooa* fMrfceemfcb Cavalry, and troops I and
I* tenth Cavalry,

Mia missions

to proceed up the Santa Maria

liver* thence to Mtoi^uipa where lie was to * * * , he on hand
should his services he needed later in the pursuit * # * • of
Villa* 3 fnis he accomplished, arriving at Maaiouipa* larch
29, 1916.*
Ment* on March 2%* i f Id * lo u se le d a com posite command o f
10 o ffic e rs .a n d

225

tro o p e rs southward a lo n g th e lin e s o f

CGHsmimication between C o lo n ia Duhlan and H«n&gtiip&*

He a ls o

arrived at Baraiquipa March 29, 1916.5
Three days later, March 2?, 1916, Alien left the camp at
Colonia Dublan.

Moving southward toward fiamiquipa, this

composite unit of 19 officers and 282 troopers was as unsuc
cessful as all the other columns and detachment* in locating
Pancho Villa.*
The cavalry oolumns of Brown, Erwin, and Evans also met
an equal amount of failure.

Brown, his forces 'bolstered by

those of Ivans, who had joined him March 23, 1916, received con
firmed reports, Harch 25, 1916, that Villa had been defeated
by the Gsrransistas of Colonel Upeleaio Cano at Namiquipa.
The Villistas were said to be hiding in the vicinity of either
3ibid.. and for a full account, Tompkins, Chasing Villa,
pp. llSCTlQ.

^•Pershing seport,* p. 12.
h m *

6s m -

?6
SI Oao or Santa Clara.?
Brown decided M s Best alternative was to join forces with
Cano, who promised that his Mexican scouts would find the ban
dits.

Brown dispatched the plan to Pershing, the division

oommander, and Colonel George A. Dodd, the brigade commander.
Brown's optimism for possible success was shortlived, however.
Cano, possibly preferring Villa's escape more than his capture
through cooperative action with the Americans, never intended
nor attempted to flush Villa.

Brown, in disgust, disbanded

the pirn, March 2?, 1916, aid moved his column to La Quema&a
for the remainder of March, 1916.®
On March 21, 1916, Colonel Dodd was instructed

by

Pershing

to join Erwin* a detachment, and from that vantage point to
assume command of field operations.

He was directed to

establish communications with the other columns and to attempt
to secure the cooperation of the Mexican forces. Dodd and his
forces arrived at si Valle, March 22, 1916. A conference was
held with Colonel Salas, Commanding General of the SI Valle
Mexican forces.

Salas confirmed that Villa had defeated him

at Namlquipa, March 19, 1916.

Dodd, too, headed for Namiquipa,

on the assumption he could catch Villa.

On March 20, Dodd,

apprised of the battle between Cano's Federales and the
?Tompkins, Chasing villa, pp. 91-92; and Carranza,
"La Expedlcion Pimltlva," pp. 90-91.
^Tompkins, Chasing Villa, p. 92; and "Pershing fieport,"
pp. 8-9*

V illis t a s , changed h is d e s tin a tio n to- Santa, Ana.

8© hoped to

cro ss v ill a 1a path, a n t c u t him o ff*®
fit©

s w iftly - s h iftin g movement o f th e campaign, d riv e n more

by rum or th a n v a lid in te llig e n c e , cre a te d a s e rio u s problem o f
command c o n tro l fo r Pershing#
more shadow th an lig h t .

The s tra te g y o f th e search .Had

P e rsh in g 1® tro o p s , u n fa m ilia r w ith th e

t e r r it o r y , r id in g mounts unused to th e rig o rs o f th e K sxioan
p la te a u la n d s , and u n c e rta in o f th e a ssista n ce o r a ttitu d e o f
a ll n a tiv e s , stum bled a fte r every w isp o f Poncho1s t r a il*

To

G eneral P ershing f e l l th e ta s k o f c o n tro llin g and d ire c tin g th e
chase in some semblance o f o rd e r.* 0
th e G eneral recognised th e n e c e s s ity fo r a fle x ib le ,
re s p o n s iv e , and tim e ly f ie ld command dem ent*

He mounted h is

command p o s t in an open to u rin g a utom obile and chased between
h is fo rc e s in th e fie ld # * * Whenever p o s s ib le , te le g ra p h and
ra d io com m untcations were e s ta b lis h e d *

te le g ra p h was v e ry un

c e rta in due to th e co n sta n t sabotaging o f th e lin e s *

The enemy

in s u rg e n ts snapped te le g ra p h p o le s , a n t o fte n c u t and c a rrie d
o f f 100 yard lin e s e c tio n s **2 la d le to o , was fa r
to ry .

from s a tis fa c 

-the p la te a u area had e xte n sive iro n ore d e p o s its .

^Tom pkins, Chaainx V illa , p .
pp. 8-9#

92;

and "P e rsh in g le p c r t,*

*0 $ o u ln !n t W ith P ershing in M exico, pp. 4?-51*
l * ib id #
^

T h e ir

F e rsh ln g to Punston^ A p r il 18, 191#,

effect on the weak and In e ffic ie n t ra d io systems was re fle c te d
as a co n sta n t h i- le v e l o f s ta tic th a t isade ra d io com m unication
d if f ic u lt i f n o t Im p o s s ib le .3 3

Pershing1s re m a in in g a lte rn a tiv e .,, in o rd e r to m a in ta in the
control of h is fo rc e s and campaign, was an aerial c o u rie r se rv
ic e .

th e inherently weak F ir s t aero Squadron was o fte n h is

o n ly means o f d ir e c t, ra p id communication w ith h is su b o rd in a te
f ie ld commanders.3*^
As th e fin g e rs o f th e Am erican e x p e d itio n a ry fo rc e s spread

sporadically southw ard, th e a v ia to rs o f th e F ir s t Aero Squadron
v a in ly attem pted to f u l f i l l th e d u a l ro le s of c o u rie rs and
sc o u ts.

P ershing needed them , and from th e day o f th e ir a r r iv a l

to th e ir f in a l d e p a rtu re , th e y were u t ilis e d , 3^
A t noon, March 20, 1916, s h o rtly a fte r a r r iv in g in th e
f ie ld , th e f i r s t combat m issio n went a lo ft .

C aptain P o u lo ia ,

fly in g in h is normal, p o s itio n o f o b se rve r, and c a p ta in Dodd,
as p ilo t , departed Casas Cran&es in A irp la n e

fh e ir in s tru c 

tio n s were to lo c a te Brown1a column., th o u g h t a t th e tim e to be
lo c a te d in th e la k e B abicora a re a ,

th e a v ia to rs proceeded

southward about tw e n ty -fiv e m ile s from th e base,

th e y soon, en

countered 10,000 foot m ountains, whirlwinds, and tre ach e ro u s
v e r tic a l c u rre n ts o f a ir ,

The low

powered JM2 was in ca p a b le o f

c lim b in g high enough to evade th e a ir c u rre n ts o ve r th e f o o t h ills ,
13statem ent by newton B, B aker, A p r il 8 , 1916, as c ite d
by A e ria l Am W eekly. A p r il 1?, 1916, p . l4 l.
^ I b ld .

p e rsh in g B e p o rt," p . A3*

n
much less traverse the mountains.

therefore, the disillusioned

aviators sere fereed too return to the station without completing
their mission.1^
the following day, fiarch 21, 1916, a second mission was
dispatched.

Once again Foulois and Oodd were airborne and

heated toward the Galena Valley where the Brigade Commander,
Colonel Dodd, and Irwin's forces were operating*

fbe column

was located, dispatches were delivered, and a request by Bruin for supplies was delivered hash to Pershing’s headquarters.
As a result, six truoKe of supplies war® dispatched, arriving
late that same evening.1?
On March '22, 1916, the squadron received two missions!
communicate with ©vans* troops moving southward along the Sorth*.
western Bailroad, and reeonfcact Dodd*

Airplane 62, crewed toy

lieutenants Kilnsr and Bader, and Airplane 65, piloted toy
Carberry, flew Into the Galeiaa Valley,

the crews reported to

Cedd, obtained M s reports and returned to Colonia Duhlan*1®
Captain Dodd and J»leuteaant Christie in Airplane 66 and
lieutenant Chapman in Airplane 53 had .less fortune*

flying

south into the sierra Madras they attempted to find Stans* troops
along the railroad*

Again, the low powered aircraft failed to

l?Samuel P. Ballam,’»fhe Punitive Expedition of 1916,®
fhe. Cavdlry Journal, duly 192?* p. 38?; and March 21, 1916*
wPi'rSt"'Aero Heport,* p* 2.
ISKaroh 22, 1916, "First Aero Beport,® p* 2*

so
overcome toe whirlwinds and stiff currents of toe mountainous
area*

The aviators flew as far as the northern end of toe

Cumbre Bass tunnel, toe air currents driving them at times
* ♦ * . within twenty feet of toe tree tops,11 hut their were
unable to cross toe mountains and were compelled to abort
their mission*^
M a rrie d fey to e fa ilu r e s encountered, F o u lo ls subm itted a
re q u e st to F e rsh ln g , March 22, 1916*. fo r am im m ediate remedy:
new a ir c r a ft*

The memorandum fo r P ershing s ta te d in p a rt:

1 . in view o f to e fa c t th a t to e p re se n t
aeroplane equipm ent o f to # F ir s t aero Squadron
Is n o t capable o f m eeting to e p re se n t m ilita r y
s e rv ic e c o n d itio n s , i t is u rg e n tly requested
th a t th e fo llo w in g number o f a ir c r a ft * * . be
purchased /w ith 7 * * , Im m ediate d e liv e ry by
express * * • 720
2*

A eroplanes
(a ) Two (2 ) M a rtin a erop la n e s, Model S,
w ith army standard, la n d in g g ea r, H a ll^ S c o tt 125
h* p* 6 c y l* m otors*
(b ) Two (2 ) C u rtis s a e ro p la n e s, Model
32, C u rtis s 160 h* p . s te e l c y lin d e r m otors*
Co) Two s tu rte v a n t aeroplanes* 160 ti*p *
S tu rte v a n t m otors*
(d ) Two C2) Thomas aeroplanes* 135 h*p*
Thomas m otors*
(e ) Two (2 ) Sloane a e ro p la n e s, 125 h .p *
M a ll-S c o tt 6 c y l* m o to rs.2*
th e fo llo w in g day* March 23* 1916* th re e separate s o rtie s
l% ia re h 22* 1916* * F ir s t Aero B e p o rt** p* 2*

2®mmo F or to e commanding G eneral P u n itiv e E x p e d itio n *
O'* S* A ror» A t Casas Grandee* M exico, March 22* 1916* in
“ F ir s t Aero B e p o rt** P« 2*
2I Ib ld .
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for C olonel Dodd from
A irp la n e s kkt <*5# and 53#

were d isp atch e d w ith com m unications
G eneral P ershing*

th e a ir c r a ft*

fly in g in e xtrem ely tu rb u le n t a ir * reached th e B rigade Head*
q u a rte rs a t a

V a lle .

T h e ir d e s tin a tio n was co nfirm e d by a

s o ld ie r waving a b la n k e t in re c o g n itio n .

The a v ia to rs landed

w ith g re a t d if f ic u lt y in . th e s tro n g w inds*

As th e y parked

th e ir a ir c r a ft* one was n e a rly o ve rtu rn e d by th e wind w hich
pushed i t tw enty to t h ir t y fe e t.

The fly e r s * forew arned* so*

cured th e ir machines w ith la r ia ts and te n t p o le s .

Because o f

th e w inds* s le e t* and snow* th e y were fo rc e d to rem ain two
days*

D u rin g th is p e rio d * th e i l l equipped a v ia to rs had to

sle e p in th e open w ith o u t b la n ke ts *

On Harch 25* 1916# a fte r

two to fo u r' hours o f han&eraaking th e ir *cold~soaked* engines*
th e a v ia to rs were, once a g a in a irb o rn e fo r home*22
C olonel Dodd* th e Brigade Commander, had been p u rsu in g
¥1110*0 movements sin c e jo in in g th e column.-

On March 26* 1916*

w ith no in d ic a tio n s o f V illa a t Santa Ana* Dodd in re a c tio n to

a re p o rt re c e ive d from Brown* moved h is colum n tow ard Bachiniva.
The march was conducted under freezing conditions.

Enroute*

* . • . men and animals had icicles hanging from their whiskers*
and canteens were frozen solid.*23 The column reached laehlnlva
early March 28* 1916.
22Kew York Tim es. Maroh 28* 1916* p . 1 | and harch 23* 1916#
• F ir s t Aero B e p o rt** p . 3 .
23i>aliam# •The P u n itiv e E x p e d itio n o f 1916** p . 388.
2^Tompkins* Chasing V illa , p . 82.

is

On the same day, lieutenant Chapman achieved too firsts*
Dispatched os a 110 mile round robin from El Valle* he crossed
the Continental Divide for the first time*
sortie was also a success.

Bis reconnaissance

As he penetrated the mountains, he

spotted a group of suspected finishes*

He immediately re*

turned to Si Valle* and delivered his report.25 Dodd*s command
at Sachinlva was the closest column to the insurgents* position,
the valuable information was rapidly delivered to Dodd by
lieutenant Dargue, in Airplane b>*2$
Colonel Dodd received the report.

It confirmed rumors of

500 to bOO Vllllsfcas in the Querrero area.

He alerted his

column for battle, and began a forced march through the
mountains.2?’
By 8:00 a.m., Baroh 89, 1916, Dodd reached the outskirts
of Querrero*

the town, located in the lower plains of a valley,

was surrounded by high bluffs*

the eastern approach to the

town was blocked by nearly impassable arroyos, but the western
access through the foothills was less difficult.

To prevent

the. esaape of the enemy, Dodd placed the Second Squadron across
the river west of town. With his main body of troops hidden by
the eastern bluffs, Dodd ordered the attach.

In the short battle

25Harch 28, 1916, “First Aero Beport,0 p. 5l And "Bore
Aeros and larger Engines for the Rexioan Campaign,” Aerial.
Age Weekly. April 10, 1916, p. 116.

26harch 28, 1916, “First Aero Beport,0 p. Si
Carranza, “La Expedleion Funitiva,0 p. 86.
2?”Pershing Beport,® pp. 13»lA.
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that followed thirty Mexicans were killed, one of whoa was
suspected 'to he General Elielo Hernandez, two machine guns
were captured, as mil as a number of horses, saddles, and
assorted arms,

Xa addition, several Carranzlsta prisoners,

scheduled for exeoution, were saved.

Dodd's fores suffered

only four easualtles, all wounded,2®
Dodd had however missed catching villa.

He had followed

a route into Guerrero preferred, by hie civilian guide, Mr.
Baker, foreman of the Bavlcera Banch, rather than that
recommended by his advance guard.

As Dodd marched toward

Guerrero on the recommended road, Paneho Villa followed the
other route out of town.2^
the expedition not knowing Villa's true location continued
to search, and the First Aero Squadron continued to try to pro
vide it aerial support.

Between March 26 and April h, 1916,

the unit flew seventy-nine mail and dispatch sorties.3° these
flights, between Columbus, Mew Mexico and points within Mexico,
were a constant battle for survival.

The aviators, exposed in

2®Colonel Dodd's Beport on the Plghtt Guerrero, Chihuahua,
Mexico, 29 March 1916, In "Pershing Beport," pp. la-16.
29pailam, "The Punitive Expedition of 1916," pp. 390-391.
Villa had previously been wounded while observing a battle
with Carranslsta troops. As a result of this and increased
Carranzlsta activity, he hid in the mountains in a cave until
6 July 1916 when he rejoined his followers at San Juan Bautista.
See Carransa "la Expedleion Punitive,' pp. 85-86, and pp.
289-296.

3®Kareh 26, 1916 to April 5, 1916, "First Aero Beport,"
p. 5*

open, oookpits to the extremes of cola, thin air, unstable air
currents, and an oooaaional bullet, provided a sketchy, but
valuable reconnaissance and oourier service for the expedition.
The frequency of their flints Is borne testimony by the re
currence of the dateline:

‘Field Headquarters, United States

Army is Mexico . . . (by aeroplane to Columbus, hew Mexico)."32
However, the inadequacies of the small unit, so highlighted
by its Frees notices, were undergoing serious consideration.
The limitations of the Aviation Section quite evident
to its members, were finally being exposed to the general
publio and Congress*
Concurrent with the journalistic coverage of the First
Aero Squadron, the organisational problems of the Air Service
were also being reviewed in the oourt martial of lieutenant
Colonel lewis £. Coodier, Judge Advocate of the Western
Department,

aoodier, father of Captain lewis S* ooedler, Jr.,

Aviation Section, had become incensed by the poor operating
procedures that directly resulted in his son's injuries.
Therefore, he had launched an unofficial investigation of the
aviation sehool.

In order to gather evidence, he had allied

himself with his son's friends. Captain Dodd and lieutenant
Taliaferro,

The trio's Investigation had resulted in charges

318Government's Aeros Hot Suitable For Mexico," Aerial
Age Weekly. April 3, 1916, pp. 86, 95.
32i8suea of Hew fork Times for late harch and early April,
1916.
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calling for the removal of captain Cowan as the aviation School
head,

She charges of illegally receiving flight pay were

filed by Goodier against cowan and Captain W, L. Patterson,
An Investigation of bheee charges by the Judge Advocate General
revealed that the complaint could not be sustained.

In addition,

Goodier was courtmartialed for soliciting evidence,

The re

sultant proceedings aired the organisational problems, as
well as capabilities, of the Air Service to the Congress, the
President, and the nation.

As a direct result, Goodier, on

April 1?, 1916, received a reprimand from President Milsent
Colonel Sober and Captain Cowan were subsequently removed
from aviation service; and Secretary of War Baker began con
sidering a complete reorganization of the air

servioe.33

The Mexican Punitive Expedition further advertised the
Air Services lack of capability.

On March 11, 1916, in re

action to the Columbus raid, the Aero Club of American had
offered to provide men and aircraft for active service in
Mexico,3** Their offer was immediately rebuffed by the Secretary
of War, Baker, who though appreciating their patriotism, was
certain the expedition had “ . . . all the planes neces33*aoodier Court Martial,* (no page}) “The Mews of the
Week,* Aerial Age Weekly. April 10, 1916, p. Ill; “Plying
Corps to be Separated from the Signal Corps?" Aerial Age
Weekly, April 2b, 1916, p. 173} add stijdy.flS, pp. 153-15b.
3bfelegram, Aero Club of .America, to Kewton D. Baker,
in "First Aero Squadron to Mexico," Aerial Age Weekly.
March 20, 1916, p. 26.

m
sapy,*35. several days later whoa the First Aero squadron was"

ordered to Mexico* Beber, still the Chief of the Aviation
Section, under the direction of Chief of Staff Scott, assured
all concerned that the * « « # short time . , ,* expedition
had ® ♦ . . all the aeroplanes n e c e s s a ry .* 36 The A e r ia l Asa
Weekly expressed a deep concern over the nation*a capability
to wage war.

Commenting that ’comment is unnecessary,*1 it

compared four headlines;
’Preach Alrmaa Brings B o m His Eighth German
Aeroplane,* ’Entire 8. s. Aero Squadron Con
sisting of Bight Aeroplanes to Go to Mexico,0
*12,000 0. 3* Troops Beady for Mexican
Expedition,0 sand “Carranxa Orders 25,000
Troops to the Border."37
The Aero Club of America and its president, Alan 8 . Hawley,
on March 14, 1916, demanded ’an immediate appropriation of one
million dollars . . •* for aircraft and equipment. 3® In an airpreparednoas campaign that had begun previous to the expedition,
the air enthusiasts noted that European air forces possessed
SSfelegram, Hewton B. Baker to Aero Club of America,
in *0.S. Forces Utterly Unprepared - and Possibilities
Underestimated,* Elvina. April 1916, p. 101.
36felegram, S. Sober to Aero Club of America, in ®A
Million Dollars Asked to Save lives of 10,000 American
Soldiers,® Aerial Age .Weekly. Harch 27, 1916, p» 54.
3?®The irony of It,® Aerial Age Weekly. March 20, 1916,
p. 9.
38felegrs®, Aero d u b of America to President Wilson,
Secretary Baker, Bepreeentatlve John J. Fitagerald,
Bepresentative James Hay, Senator George B. Chamberlain,
and other officials, March 14, 1916, in "Aero d u b Aske
®1,00G,OOO for Aeronautical Equipment,® Plying. April 1916,
p. 101.

8?

three aircraft for ©very aviator ami the United states aerial,
force could barely furnish one aircraft per “ « . * aviator
now at the Mexican border. • • .*39 Hawley and hie associates
felt that at least four aero squadrons Mare the minimum Mexican
campaign requirement.

Shay volunteered to furnish fifty civi

lian aviators especially trained for the harder conditions by
Carranza's former chief pilot. Bonney.

These men and 100 high

performance aircraft would in Hawley's words. • . . . round up
Villa and his band in a very short time. • •
Hawley's campaign was not reoeived favorably by the War
Department,

the telegram to the President, secretary of War.

and the Congressional leaders proffering an augmentation of
the military air arm by civilians created numerous memoranda.
Brigadier General Soriven, Chief signal Officer, rebuffed the
patriotic offer by stating that military service could only
be furnished by regulars, militia, or volunteers who 'may be
called out by the President* under the existing laws.

This

statement was not totally correct as the First Aero Squadron
had a civilian mechanic, the expedition had hired civilian
drivers, and funston, on March 83, 1918, in recognition of the
pilot shortage had, at the time, suggested the immediate employ
ment of civilian aviators.1®-

*®Wesiey Phillips Hewton, "Aviation in the delations of the
United States and Latin America 1918-1929* (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Alabama, 1964}, p. 45.
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Tim uncomfortable pressures, brought by the Aero Club of
America on the Mar Department continued.

On March 23, 1916,

Hawley wired President Wilson that "every aeroplane is worth
1000 soldiers , .

and therefore "t* protect the lives of

thousands * ♦ »» the Club offered two high powered maohines
as well as nineteen trained aviators.In addition, the Club
had arranged for the training of militia officers in thirteen
states all * . . . available for service in a short time,
forming a valuable reserve.
Secretary of Mar Baker acknowledged the deficiencies of
the Aviation section and the need for aerial reserves to the
Club on March 23, 1916.

He stated his appreciation of the

Club's intense interest in improving the army effectiveness;
however, -with due consideration by both himself and General
Sorlven, the proffered aircraft were refused.

Baker further

stated that the creating of the Air Service had been *. » »
as rapid and effective as the provisions of Congress have
permitted.
The hue and ory for an effective aerial service spread
across the nations through the newspapers of the United States.
^2Telegram, Alan 8. Hawley to President Wilson, Harch 23,
1916, in "Club Offers Two 110,000 Aeroplanes to Government,"
Firing. April 1916, p. 103.

^Telegram, Baker to Hawley, March 23, 1916, in Hewten,
"Aviation in the Halations of the United states and Latin
America 1916-1929," P. 66.

Editorials promoting military flying appeared in Mew Xork,
Chicago, Savannah, Boston, Philadelphia and other cities.
They denounced the "neglect* and "national shame" of aerial
readiness.

Some editorials openly stated that positive oorreo-

tive action could he achieved by "new faces in Congress.
Congress was slow to reset to changes, especially when it
came to appropriating funds for new military toys still con
sidered experimental. They had a continuous record of pro
viding only minimum appropriations for the dir service*

The

psu£ lack of funds was due in part to an isolationist attitude,
in part to War Department tradition and in part to the Con
gressional ignorance of the real value of air power.

Begardless

of the onset ratio of each cause the damaging effect of insufflcient funds had become obvious to the nation.^
On March 27, 1916, Congress began to react to the pressures
of the press, the Aero d u b and the situation in Mexico.

Al

though the legislatures considered Hawley and his associates
" . . . high-minded, honest, patriotic, Intelligent /aerial/
faddists . . . extreme in their eriiieiest and looking in infor
mation," it could no longer brush aside the severe need for
^5«a Pew of the Many Editorials That Have Appeared in
the Press Condemning Aerial anpreparedness," giving.
April, 1916, pp. 106, 107, 137, 136.
^Mew fork.Times. April A, 1916, p. 12, o.s,, Congress,
House, Representative Bonnet speaking for Bill H.l. 13768,
6Ath Cong., 1st seas., March 28, 1916, Congressional
Beogrd. Vol. bill, p. 5018, and goulot

preparedness
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The United states Army was In Mexico,

out of funds and oat of equipment, the expedition had begun
to flounder and the American public was beginning to realise
the nation's lack of military capability.

United States'

private investments wore at risk, and there was still a sin
cere desire to punish Villa for his villainy*

In reaction to

these, and other' causes, an urgent Deficiency Mil was intro
duced, Harch 27, 1916.

The Bill m s rapidly debated and passed

through the House of Bepresentatives by March 28, 1916.48
Secretary of War Baker, well aware of the mediate needs
of Pershing, authorised an expenditure of 80,000 dollars for
the purchase of eight new aircraft,

Pour steel 'battleplanes

were ordered from the sturtevant Aeroplane company, Jamaica
Plains, Massachusetts! and four Curtiss B-2 aircraft were
ordered from the Curtiss Corporation at Buffalo, Mew fork.

All

aircraft were to be equipped with 140 to 150 horsepower engines
and be adopted for Mexican use.

The machines, to be delivered

in thirty days, would undergo suitability tests prior to their
delivery to the bonder,^
4?y.s.. Congress, Mouse, Representative Fitzgerald reported
the bill to supply urgent deficiencies for the Military Estab
lishment (H.R. 13768), 64th Cong., 1st seas., March 27, 191?,
Congressional Beoord. Vol. bill, p. 4933{ Representative
Fitzgerald discussing H.a. 13768, 64th Cong., 1st sees*, March
28, 1916, Congressional Record. Vol. bill, p. 5019, and a
survey of Congressional Actios 1912 to 1916 in Congressional
Record.
48lbld., pp. 4933. 5017-5023, The House voted 374 to 1,
with 59 members absent in favor of the Bill M. B. 13768.
49*sturtevant Aeroplanes for General Pershing,* Aerial

On March 31, 1916, in response to the country's needs
Congress passed the urgent Deficiencies Bill for the Military
Establishment.

The Bill appropriated 609,000 dollars of which

500,000 dollars were allocated for • , , , the purchase, main
tenance, operation and re p a ir of air ships and other aerial
machines and accessories of the aviation section. * , ,*50
This sum, an emergency fund, was the largest even appropriated,
at the time, for the Army Air service.51
Immediate steps were initiated by the Chief Signal Officer
to transform the funds into military materials.

A war Depart

ment Aviation Section Advisory and inspection Board was formed
'to test aircraft and inspect factories.

Consisting of

lieutenants Milling and Byron Q. Jones, Captain Clark, and
supporting civilian consultants, it met to select a suitable
aircraft for the Mexican campaign.

One of its first actions

was to dispatch a telegram to Foulois requesting his recommen
dations for aircraft specifications.52
Atce Weekly. April 24, 1916, p. 193} and "Mere Acres and
larger 'Engines for the Mexican Campaign.” Aerial Axe weekly.
April 10, 1916, p. 116.
'
*******
5°u.S., Statutes at Large. Vol. XXXIX, pt. 1 (December 1915
- March 1917), "Urgent Deficiencies Appropriations for the
Military Establishment,* March 31, 1916, eh. 56, p. 45,
5lsep©rt of the secretary of War, la U.S., War Department,
Annual Reportb I916. Vol. l (Washington B.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1916), p. 26, hereafter cited as
Reports 1916.
521bid.. and 'Baker Talks," Aerial Age Weekly. April 1?, 1916,
p. 14IT
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Secretary of Mar Baker, with Congress* deficiency Bill
passed, an aviation board, appointed, and new aircraft ordered}
happily informed Hawley and his associates that their services
were not really needed.

He wrote "the Department . . . appre.

ciatlve/neas7 of your kind /past/ offer /Tor aircraft/, tot
. . . Congress has appropriated the sum of 1500,000 for avia*
tion purposed, which makes it unnecessary . . . to take ad*
■***

**.*■«.

-—— —u.

or four Kinu-noss* -^
-w-^- -jc ......

&as<2

^aa j a ate

IS 1

3

As the long awaited Congressional action fomented, and
began to he implemented, a realistic reappraisal of the First
Aero Squadron* e capabilities was being formulated by Foulois.
He realized that with his present equipment it was impossible
to continue all operations.

A suitable support plan had to

be developed presented to Pershing and if accepted, followed,
Foulois developed four alternative sohemes, each * , . . for
the most effective use of the 1st Aero Squadron, with its pre
sent equipment of six low powered airplanes.o5^
Flan 1 had a stated objective of " . . . maintain/Ing/ aero
communications between Columbus, New Mexico, Casas Grandee,
El Valle and Namiquipa.•55 Foulois proposed to statical two
JH2* a at El Valle with support personnel and equipment.

She

53*The Ksxiean situation," Aerial Asa Meekly. April 17, 1916,
p. 161*
5%enoraadutt Fori Chief of Staff, Punitive Expedition,
u, s. Army, Harsh 30, 1916, "First Aero Beport," p. 3.
55ibld.
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remaining aircraft wer© to stay at Casas Grandee.

Routes would

be operated daily by single flights, with overnight stops be
tween SI Valle and Basniquipa; Casas Grandes and Columbus; and
Casas Grandee and Kamiquipa,

She * * * * plan contemplat/ed/

the maximum use of all aviators and all aeroplanes . .

tout,

it did not provide a communications network, east, south or
west of Hamiquipa, 36
Plan IX was designed to provide General Pershing aerial
communications between Casas Grandee, El vsile, tfessiqulpa and
points south of 8amiquipa,

By utilising available radio

telegraph, motorcycles, and other surface transportation for
the Casas Grandes, El Valle Hah, foulois surmised the entire
squadron could be transferred to the forward headquarters at
Hamiqulpa, Refueling points would be established at all bases,
including a forward station somewhere -south of Kaffiiquipa.57
H a n 1X1 relied upon an effective radio sad telegraph link '
between saaiquipa and Casas Grandee, dll aircraft would be
concentrated at Eamlquipa to provide forward, communications
between Pershing and his advancing troops; only in an emer
gency would aircraft too used for support communications,

this

plan provided the maximum support for field operations and the
minimum communications support for logistical and support ,
facilities.^8
Plan XV, the final plan, was to toe employed in case a tao56ibld.

5?xbld..p. 4.

58lMd,
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tleal contingency arose.
original purpose:

It employed the JM2,a for their

observation, and reconnalssanoe of the enemy.

Is it. Foulois recommended that if contact with Pancho Villa
was established by the expedition's forces, all aircraft
should be concentrated at the front for Immediate service*59
In proposing the alternative available. Foulois reminded
General Pershing that all plans depended entirely on aircraft
that • » • * at any day /oould7 be placed out of commission
as unfit and too dangerous for further field service.*^® He
urged that at least ten new. high powered, machines be pur
chased and with these the Squadron would increase its * * . .
effectiveness to this expedition at least five hundred per
cent.*^
On April 1, 1916. Pershing approved Plan III, and ordered
that it be implemented.
the Mexican punitive expedition was colly fifteen days old
as March 1916, ended.

Over 4000 American troops had penetrated

nearly 500 miles into Mexico.

None had seen Villa, and less

than 10 peroent had identified a Villieta, and this only on
one oecaslon.

The men's rations were low, end most were foraging

off the earth or dipping into personal funds to support their
59ibid.
60ibld.

6*xbia.
First Aero deport,* p. 5,
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needs.®3
the aviation activity, only in the field ten days, had
been folly taxed and Its equipment ton paying the price.
of eight original aircraft, six remained.
of these were operative*

Out

At times only 'too

Pershing, unable to control his.

forces by radio, telegraph, or car had resorted 'to- an aerial
communication lints, but it too tats -rapidly failing*®4
Congress and the nation had cheered when the pursuit of
the villain Villa was first announced, but both failed to
recognise the inability of America*s military to capture even
one Mexican hostile.

However, less than sixteen days had

elapsed before the weaknesses of the military establishment
"be&sB© &ppa2P«3ntj

fcte®

reacted*

iti#

first solid proof of this, the urgent Deficiency Bill of
March 31, 1916.

63orlan&o c. Troxel, •’The Tenth Cavalry in Mexico," She
Cavalry.Journal. October 1919, pp. 201*203* Captain' Troxel
states that his unit ate their last issued rations on the
day they deployed to the field, March 20, 1916* Each
officer used his personal funis to support the expedition
as it foraged off the countryside* Colonel Brown issued
his own personal cheeks for a total sum of 1,680 dollars
in order to purchase food and forage for his command*
6% e w fork Times. March 28, 1916, p. 2* Secretary of Mar
Baker announced, March 27, 1916, that only two aircraft
were serviceable as of that .date*

CHAPTSB VII
STALEMATE in MEXICO
General Pershing*s expedition halted, then stagnated in
April 1916.

Although Villa** hiding plaoe was net unoovered,

Pershing was forced to order a partial withdrawal and con
solidation of the expedition.

By the- end of the aonth, the

operations in Mexico resembled a gigantic field maneuver aore
than an active pursuit.*■ April 1916 was also a decisive month
for the First Aero Squadron:

it collapsed completely and

ceased all operational support.2
After the tattle at Guerrero, March 29, 1916, Villa*e
army scattered.

Stories aad rumors were widespread as to his

actual location, aad at times he was reported to be in several
places simultaneously.3
Pershing, acting on reliable information, ordered Major
Tompkins, at Mamiquipa, to search the arse west of Santa Ana
for villa while Major Howse, at Geronlmo, scouted the mountains
to hie east.

Pershing, meanwhile, relocated his headquarters

to Bachinva.

On April 1, 1916, both offieers reported to

iToultnln, With Pershing in Mexico, p. 113.
2*Pershing Report,* p. 23; and *Fouloia Report,* p. 8 .
3«Pershing Heport,* p. 17.
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Pershing with completely negative reports.

Villa had apparently

vanished} Pershing resumed his first strategy!

the campaign,

of parallel columns toward the south.^
Hajor Tompkins* column in the center served as the point,
colonel Brown was placed the furthest east*

Having a day*a

march behind Tompkins, he and hie men provided a left rear
guard.

Hajor Howze furnished a similar role as the right rear

guard to the west*

All three forces were expected to converge

near the Chlhuahua-Durango border.5
Colonel Allen*a forces, three days to the rear, formed
the rear guard.

He was directed, April 8, 1916, to move from

Kamiqulpa, southwest via SI Osa, in an attempt to out Villa* a
path before h® crossed into Durango,

Although Allen*s men

encountered sniper fire, they uncovered no real Information.
By April 12, 1916, they rejoined Pershing at Satevo.6
Colonel Doflfl was given the task of sealing off the western
mountain trails.

Dodd*B patrols deployed on a line from

Provideneia and Hlnaea watched the mountain passes carefully
and recorded frequent clashes with the Insurgents,

to April 3,

1916, Dodd decided to move hie headquarters to Hinaca in order
to extend his operations nearer to Guerrero.

The local Mexican

commander, General Xaiis Herrera, protested that the American
*» m a .
SitoMU. Tompkins
i Pershing In Hex:

Villa, p. 120: and Toulmin.
SfSfSfc.

Pershing aeport," p. 20.

9®
patrols would interfere with Carranaista plans,
to Pershing for diplomatic assistance.

eodd appealed

The appeal was success

ful, and Dodd continued his operations from the new location,?
the first Aero Squadron* a activities the first six days
of April were quite normal.

Between April 1 and April A, 1916,

forty-three mail or dispatch flights were flown through rain,
hail-and snow storms.

Several times, when the weather was

too severe for visual flight, the aireraft were foroed to
land and wait out the storms.®
On April 5 , 1916, the Squadron moved to San Garonlao.
The tracks and maintenance personnel went direct, while the
aviators flew sorties intransit.

'Typical was the -mission

flown hy Lieutenant Bargee and Captain Foulois.

Tasked with

locating Brown's column for Pershing, the fliers headed toward
San .Antonio de los Arenalea.

En route they spotted a paok

train 'returning to San Geronimo.

A landing was accomplished,

and the officers inquired If the members of the peek train
knew where Brown was.

Fortunately they did, and Airplane A3

was soon airborne and proceeding toward Cuoihulrioohlo Canyon.
A short time later, the aviators reported to Brown, secured
the column commander's report for Pershing, and returned to
the 01vision Headquarters,?
?lbld.. pp. 17, 20-21.
®April 1, 191® to April 5 , 191®, "first Aero Beport,* p. 5.
?April 5 , 191®, "first Aero deport,* p. 5.
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On April 6, 1916, four such missions ware flown.

One

deliveredmovement orders 60 Brown* s column, who was ordered
to protest the eastern edge of the search area#
resulted in the destruction of Airplane 44.
totally destroyed in a landing:

this mission

the craft was

those pants still usable

were salvaged, the remaining air frame was condemned and
destroyed— only five airplanes remained.10
Along with the hasards of flying, the first Aero Squadron
was also encountering the ill-will of the Mexican populace.
On April ?, 1916, Dargue and Fouloia, in Airplane 43, flew
from San oeronimo to Chihuahua City carrying dispatches to
Marion H. Letcher, the American counsel, from General Pershing.
The papers obviously had a greater than normal urgency, as
Captain Dodd and Lieutenant Carberry, in Airplane 45, departed
at the same time with a duplicate set of dispatches and an
identical mission,

in addition to serving as a courier

fouloia was detailed to arrange for the local purchase and
transportation of nssessary supplies for those troopers
operating north of farfal#11
Both aircraft arrived at Chihuahua City concurrently*
By pre-arrangement, Airplane 43 landed on the south side of
the city, aad Airplane 45 on the north side* ■Poulois gathered
l®Aprll 6, 1916, “First Aero Seport,■ p. 6,
^Aprll 7, 1916, “First Aero Eeport,* p. 6,
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his documents, climbed out of the rear cockpit, and instructed
Bargue to fly to the north side of town, Join Barberry, and
'wait for his return*

Poulois then departed for the Consulate.

As Dodd began his take-off roll, four mounted ruralos. a half
mile distant, began to fire at M m and the -aircraft*
still within earshot, heard the gunfire.

Fouleis,

He reversed his

direction, quickly located the ruralea and attempted to stop
their activity. -Hie ruralee. distracted by Poulois* actions
did stop shooting, but in the process, they arrested Poulois
and marched hist to the local jail.

4 crowd of several hun

dred m m and hoys, attracted by the disturbance, soon gathered
and formed an escort for the Jail hound procession*

In the

confusion enroute to detention, Poulois successfully attracted
the attention of an American bystander*

Hie aviator requested

the m m to inform Consul Letcher of his plight, as well as the
possibility of a similar precarious situation on the north
side of town where Dodd, Barberry and Dargue wore with the
aircraft.12
Once at the Jail, Captain Poulois succeeded, after con
siderable delay, in contacting Colonel Miranda, Chief of staff
to General Gutierrez, M e Military’Governor of Chihuahua.
Miranda, when appraised of the situation, took Poulois to
Gutierrez, who swiftly ordered the aviator's release.

Poulois

was still apprehensive about the real possibility of the two

101.

aircraft toeing damaged*

Me requested the services of some

Hexican soldiers as aircraft security guards.
to arrange this.

Gutlerre2 agreed

Poulois, accompanied toy Miranda, then de

parted to locate the other aviators,

tips® reaching the north

landing site,.only Dargue and Airplane **3 were in sight.13
Dargue reported that he had landed along side Airplane
as directed.

Captain Dodd left shortly after that, hound

for the Consulate with the duplicate dispatches.

The aircraft

rapidly became the focal point for first a curious .gathering,
which soon transformed into a menacing crowd of peasants,
soldiers, and Mexican army officers.

As the mob increased

in size, it became more antagonistic and began to make aggres
sive moves.

Insults, at first, were the crowd's only weapons,

tout in a short time the aviators found members of the angry
mob extracting bolts and nuts, or turning teles in the linen
fabric with cigarettes*
places.

Airplane 03 was slashed in several

Under the circumstances, it did not take Dargue nor

Cartoorry a great about of time to realise that if they re
mained they would soon have two wrecked JM2*s.^
The safest, and therefore best decision, was to fly the
aircraft to the smelter location of the American Smelter and
Refining Company six miles away,
without further difficulty.

Carberry fired up and departed

The crowd, seeing their prey about

to vanish, showered Dargue with stones aa he taxied out and
13lbid.

Iblbld.
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made hi® ta k e -o ff r o ll.

He was soon a irb o rn e , b u t had. flo w n

o n ly a s h o rt d is ta n c e when th e to p s e c tio n o f tils c r a f t 1®
fu s e la g e , o b v io u s ly m issin g a few b o lt® , fle w o f f and h it the
v e r tic a l s ta b iliz e r .
in g s t i l l w ith in

He was fo rc e d to make an emergency la n d 

s ig h t o f th e mob.

Be fo rtu n a te ly was a b le

to stand o f f th e crowd, and n e ith e r he n o r A irp la n e

kj

s u ffe re d

fu rth e r damage#
th e day*® e xcitem en t was o v e r, b u t work rem ained to be
done.

For th e rem ainder o f th e d ay. C aptains P o u lo is and Dodd

and Consul b a tc h e r arranged fo r th e tro o p s u p p lie s w h ile

Carberry and Dargue repaired tee damaged Airplane
On A p r il 8 , 1918, th e a v ia to r® were a g a in a irb o rn e *

They

a rriv e d back a t San Oeronimo lu s t in tim e to re c e iv e th e n o ti
fic a tio n o f a n o th e r move, to San A n to n io de le a A re n a le s.
P e rsh in g 1s army was pushing so u th , and th e headquarters and
it s

s o le ra p id source o f com m unications had to tra v e l w ith i t .

On A p r il 10, 1918, two reconnaissance f lig h ts scoured th e area
f if t y

m ile s south o f th e home base.

S ot a s in g le V lllis t a

was seen.l?
P ershing moved hi® headquarter® a g a in ,
Satevo*

fh ls tim e to

The A ir S e rv ic e , h is autom obile and h is p erson a l s ta ff

a ls o made th e move, A p r il 10, 1916,*®

*5ibia.

l^iMd.

l? A p r il 8 , 1918 to A p r il 11, 1918, • F ir s t Aero B e p o rt,* p . 8.
l® A p ril ID , 1918, • F ir s t Aero B e p o rt,1* pp. 6 -? .
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The next toy's flying activities, the first from satevo,
resulted la ten sorties, almost all courier missions between
the eolumns and rear depot areas.

On one of these, lieutenants

Dargue and Gorrell established an unofficial distance record,
in Airplane 43, they flew from the front (San Antonio de los
Arenales) to Columbus, Mew Mexico, a distance of 315 miles,
with just a single fueling stop.1?
lieutenant Chapman, on a reconnaissance mission to Santa
Rosalia, had a more ominous experience.

Upon landing Airplane

53 at Santa Rosalia, Chapman disembarked from the aircraft.
He was Immediately placed under arrest by Carranzista troops
and escorted to the local garrison commander.

During his

very short internment, the Mexicans stripped his aircraft of
his field glasses, flying goggles, and *considerable" ammuni
tion.®®
Chapman was not the only member of the Squadron to have
trouble with the 3*ocal people, April 11, 1916.
truck train arrived at Satevo at 11:00 p.m.

The Squadron

They reported

encountering villista sniping fifteen miles north of Satevo.
Fortunately, there were no casualties.2^
Major Hawse, camped near San Jose del Sltlo, was also ex
periencing difficulties with the Mexican population.

On

l^April 11, 1916, "First Aero Report,» p. ?: and "The
Mexican Situation," Aerial Age Weekly. April 20, 1916, p. 193.
®®April 11, 1916, "First Aero Report," p. 7.
21Ibld.
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April 10, 1916# he sent a detachment to Santa Cruz de Herrera.
The troop was under fire several times during the day*

At

about 5*30 p.m. they case under an active attack near la Joya
do Herrera.

The troopers easily contained their adversary,

ate soon dispensed the bandit force# killing its commander
in the process.

Before daylight, April 11, 1916* Howze'e

detachment 'had arrived ate surrounded Santa Cruz do Herrera.
The Mexicans within sensed an ambush* ate attempted to escape*
In tee darkness it was impossible to tell who was fleeing*
bat tee Americans fired anyway*

A Carranzista lieutenant ate

sdidier wore the only possible enemy deate* and Hows©, although
he tried, was unable to identify the force that had fled*22
Howze* a main column, weary from two days rapid march,
was given a rest ate a detachment was seat into tows to se
cure supplies*

On tea way they passed a ranch house abustlo

teth unusual activity.

The detachment, intent on its task,

passed by without investigating.
m s hiding there.

It was later thought Villa

He was not, but he was in tee mountain above,

secure in his oave ate within earshot of camping troopers.
Hows©'s actios in this area was probably tee closest Villa
earn® to being captured by the expedition.2?
Bowse*a attack had killed only Carranzlstaa.

He, as well

as tee other field commanders, was finding more ate more
22*Porshlng Report,® p. 19; ate Tompkins, Chasing Villa.
p. 160.
&3ltold*. ate Carranza, *&a Expedieion Punitive,® pp. 291-294.

xm
hostility as the expedition advanced.

The re a l feeling o f

antagonism of th e Carranza government toward th e U n ite d S ta te s*
in v a s io n o f Mexico was gradually coming o u t in th e opea*^
In s te a d o f h e lp , th e .n a tive s p e rs is te d In a s s is tin g Villa

by fu rn is h in g Fershing*a men m is le a d in g in te lllg e n o e .

Further,

it became q u ite e v id e n t th a t th e M exican peasants, a lth o u g h
awed by American m ethods, th o ro u g h ly re se nte d th e ir presence#

mm

those opposed to V illa had no sympathy fo r th e •Gringos,*

th e re fo re a id from te e Carranxiebas was unlikely*^
The expedition was approaching te e end o f it s

te th e r*

Pershing* a lin e s o f communication and supply were v e ry nearly
over-extended•

The tro o p e rs were fo ra g in g ' o f f o f te e country. 26

I t was q u ite apparent th a t te e so le purpose of Carranza and
h is army was to d e to u r, hamper, and eventually fo rc e te e with

drawal o f te e Am erican army*

E ventual n o rth e rn re tre a t was a

c e rta in ty , all th a t was needed was an incident to fo rc e i t *
fa r m ! fu rn is h e d te e in c id e n t.
On A p r il 7 , 1916, M ajor Tom pkins, camped a t Santa E o s s lia ,
considered h is s itu a tio n .
2000 to 3000 C a rra a z la ta s .

E ls fla n k s and re a r were blocked by
S ca tte re d 50 to 100 m ile s s o u th ,

Z^Telegraun, Pershing to Funston, May 1, 1916, Foreign
Relations 1916. p. 539.
25Telegram, Pershing to Funston, April 1?, 1916, Foreign
Relations 1916. pp. 521-522.
26Telegram, Pershing to Funston, April 15, 1916, Foreign
I^latlohd-.-ili8* P. 526*

on his front, were at least 300 Vililstas.

He needed forage

for hie horeee, ration* for hie sen, and hie nlselon required
that he never the .area to the- south, as well as offset a
reteesvoua with Colonel Brown*

Tompkins considered the alter

natives, aad decided to head for Parrel, purchase supplies,
and then move thirty miles further southwest of farrai and
await orders.2?
On April 12, 1916, at 11:45 p.m. the command arrived at
Farrali a large town with a population of 20,000, and a "good
club.*

Tompkins and his offleers assumed they could get

• . . . hot baths . . . , long cool drinks and . . . good
food,* as well as replenish troop supplies, ate obtain rail
road transportation for movement further south.*® however, no
officials awaited to welcome the Americans,

instate, Tompkins

ted to gala permission from the city guard to enter*

Accom

panied by a Carranaista soldier, Tompkins ate his men were
guided to General Ismael ioxaao's headquarters, a two-story
building note the center of town*

Tompkins entered, ate the

troopers formed ranks outside tho building*2?
Hie Mexican .general was not pleased to have American cav
alry in his city.

He asked Tompkins to leave Parral, but pro

mised to arrange for the purchase of fodder ate. provisions for
2?fowpkins, Chasing Villa, p. 133*
SSltold*. p. 139.

the purchase of fodder and provisions for the Americans through
a local merchant, Hr* Scott.

Scott, described by Lozano as

American, appeared to be a Mexican and spoke English with a
heavy accent*

After the business was completed, Lozano delayed

an hour before he was ready to take Tompkins to a designated
camp site.3® ,
While the two officers conferred an angry crowd had
gathered in the street*

By the time the conference ended

cries of 8Viva Villa." "Viva Mexico.* and "Baertan lea Orlaaoel”
were being shouted.

Tompkins ordered an immediate withdrawal

aai the column moved out.31
The populace was spurred on by a "Qerman* looking man with
a "Van Dyke beard," later identified as the German Counsel,
Edward Cook,

Eliza Griense, a member of one of the leading

families in Parrai, was in the front of the mass that followed
the troop's hasty march,

when they reached the edge of town.

Hiss Grlensa raised a Hauser rifle she had borrowed from a
Headcan soldier, and begun to fire it.

The crowd surged

through and around the troopers* ranks, an! succeeded in_
cutting off Tompkins, who was riding at the rear, and
threatened him. Tompkins in an attempt to humor the riled
citizens shouted "Viva

Vill a.

*32

3°Ibld.
311bid., and "Attack on Our Cavalry at farral,* The
CavalryJournal. Hovember, December 1916, p. 231*
32carranza, "ha Escpedioion funitiva," p. 115} Tompkins,
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General Lozano had been at the head of the column.
was at first ignorant of the situation at the rear.

Me

Once the

gun fire began he must have heard the report* hut he did not
Investigate*' Instead he continued to lead the column across
the railroad track and through a gap between two knolls into
a hollow** Tompkins, afraid of an ambush established a rear
guard a kilometer outside of tom* under lieutenant Clarence
lininger, covered his flank by placing a troop on the western
knoll* and notified Insane that the townspeople were shooting
at him and his men* losano disclaimed ail responsibility for
the situation* but had his staff return to tom. to try to calm
the populace*

Tompkins* certain bozano had treachery in his

head, considered shooting the Mexican general on the spot* but
* . . • let hi® go as his pistol was still in his bolt***33
Tompkins* generosity was probably influenced by the large group
of Mexican soldiers* displaying a Mexican flag* that had gathered
on a hill 800 yards to the south* losano quickly returned to
tom* aad sent a message to Tompkins requesting his immediate
withdrawal as " • , « he could control 'neither the soldiers nor
the people.*3^ Tompkins agreed to move north after the supplies
Chasing Villa, p. 135} Telegram, Pershing to Funston,
April l|, l5l|, forMiBB, 8elaMoai_..|.m% P. 520} "Pershing
Beport.-* pp. 21-23} and Telegram, Pershing to Funston,
April 16, 1916, Foreign Relations 1916. p. 526.
33ibld.. and Tompkins, Chasing 9111a, p. 138,
3% bid., and "The Attack on (Ah * Cavalry at Parral,®
p. 251*
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he had ordered were delivered.35
Tompkins seem changed his mind.

In the fees of hostile

action, 20,000 enraged Mexicans, BQQ Mexican soldiers, and gun
fire, a retreat northward was the only prudent course.

A

group of Mexican soldiers attempted to flank the Americans on
the left, Tompkins stood, up, the Mexicans fired missing the
Major, hut killed Sergeant Jay Biokley and wounded a corporal
and private.

At 1*30 p.m., Tompkins ordered a hasty with

drawal to Santa Crus de Villegas, a small village, that could
he easily defended by the American cavalry

u n i t . 36

The fifteen mile ride to the north was characterized by
sporadic fire fights and the continual effort by mounted
Mexicans to out flank the retreating cavalry men.

The able

troopers suecesafully negated every move, and by 9:00 p.m.
arrived safely in the small village.

Defensive positions were

secured, and the wait for reinforcements began.3?
During the retreat, Tompkins had dispatched couriers to
Colonel Brown informing his senior officer of his precarious
position.

By ?$06 p.m., members of Brown's column begem

arriving at Santa Cruz de Villegas.
1916, Allen arrived.

The next day, April 13,

Two days later Major Howze, also aware

35Tempklns, Chasing Villa, p. 138.
36rdegram, Pershing to funston, April 15, 1916, foreign
Halations l916. p. 520; "Pershing Beport,* pp. 22-23;"
and Tompkins, ^hasJ^ngi
_BVi3L^ja, p. 139.
37ibld.. pp. 139-182; Carranza, “La Kxpedieion Punitive,*
p. Il6; and "Pershing Beport," p. 23.

of the sKlrmish, reported to Brown, and the troop strength at
Santa Cam® swelled to 680 men.38 Howee, himself, had very
nearly had a "Parral" five days earlier, April 8, 1916, when
150 Carranzistas commanded by General Colvaeao had changed
hie unit.

Only by Major Howsse'e 8 . . . coolness « . • and

splendid discipline fofj command was battle averted,839
The encounter at Parral resulted in two Americans dead,
six wounded including Tompkins, and one man missing.

Over

forty Carranzistas were assumed dead and an unknown number
wounded, 86

The American expedition had reached its furthest

point south.
While Tompkins, Brown* and Allen were advancing on Parral,
Pershing had lost all contact with them.

Me ordered the First

Aero Squadron to contact them, but the reconnaissance missions
on April 10 through April 13, 1916 failed to reveal the where
abouts of the columns.

On April 19, 1916, Pershing received

the first news of the Parrel fight from Captain Foulois.81
38?elegram, Pershing to Funston, April 15, 1916,
Foreign delations 1916. p. 52; and Tompkins, Chasing
Villa. P. 193.
39Telegram, Pershing to Funston, April 25, 1916,
Foreign Relational916. p. 530.
88fospkins, Chasing Villa, pp. 183-188, *Aita«k on
Our Cavalry at Parral,* p. 253;- aad *Pershing Beport,*.
p. 23*
8lfelegrams, Collector Cobb to the Secretary of state,
April 15, 1916, Foreign,Halations ,1916. pp. 519-520;
and April 12, 1916, toApril lo,191c, "First Aero
Beport,* p. 7,

Foulois and Lieutenant Carberry had been dispatched,
April 131 1916, to Chihuahua City with messages far the
Consul*

Pershing also detailed Poulois to query Marion

h«

Letcher for any late intelligence on developments in the
field*

She aviators landed on the outskirts of town, and

Poulois walked to the Consulate*
of the fight at Parral.

Upon his arrival he learned

Consul Letcher told him .ell the

Mexican newspapers in. Chihuahua City had been shut down and
that there was a great animosity for all foreigners in the
city*

fhe Mexicans had warned them all tfc leave.

the Consul gave Foulols an ultimatum for deliver to
Pershing from General Gutierrez, the Miliary Governor of
Chihuahu&--bh© American forces must withdraw at once I As it
was unsafe for any foreigners to travel through the city,
Poulois remained at the consul until early the following
morning*

In the early darkness of April l*f, 1916, he returned

to his aircraft, flew hack to Satevo, and delivered Gutierrez1
ultimatum and the news of the Parral fight to General Pershing.^3
Pershing immediately re-ordered Foulols hack to Chihuahua
City, only this time by automobile, as all the aircraft were
either airborne or grounded for maintenance*

Foulols, accom

panied by fourteen enlisted men in a one truck, one auto
caravan, made his way to Chihuahua City*

Once on the outskirts,

82app 11 13, 1916, "First Aero Beport," p. ?j and
"Foulols Record," p. 7.

Hi

the vehicles asd the enlisted personnel Here hidden, and
Poulois and M s chauffeur, Corporal Arthur Weetermark, pro*
seeded to the Consulate, delivered the dispatches and. without
any difficulty returned to the waiting escort*

She entire

group returned to satevo, late 'that same evening. ****
fhe airborne portions of the First Aero Squadron were
hating less success*

Lieutenants Dargue and Gorrell, in Air

plane A3, attempted to establish contact with Carranziota
forces reported to he moving eastward along the lines of commu
nications.

the two aviators departed Columbus, dew Mexico,

m & flew the entire 315 mile route non-stop,

fhey set a new

record, hut failed to locate any hostile troop®. Lieutenant
Bader, on a similar mission, flew southward toward Parral.
As well as locating Carranzistas, ho was directed to establish
contact with Bowse*s column and inform M m of the Parral en
counter.

Me succeeded in reaching the cavalrymen in the vici

nity of QJltio, near the Durango State line,

fhe terrain was

extremely rough, and the aircraft, Airplane 52, was damaged upon
landing,

enable to make repairs, and in hostile country 100

miles from the nearest aircraft maintenance facilities, Bader
Joined Bowse and Airplane $2 m m abandoned.45 onfortunafcely,
the "news* Bader had was already possessed by Jiowse*^
AAjbiS.., and April 14, 1916, *First Aero Beport,» p. 7.
»5ibia.
**%o®pM»s, Chasing 9111a. p. 167.

Between April 15

April 20, 1916, th© eellvltlea ©f the

first Aero Squadron degenerated#
flights ifere

mades

On April 14, 1916, f e w

One, hy Lieutenants Dargue and Oerrell

was of 415 miles with only two enroute steps#' But, on the
same day. Airplane 42 was cannibalized of Its lower wings in
order to put Airplane 45 into flyahie condition*
of Airplane 42 was condemned and

destroyed. **7

tfeui remainder

on April 16,

17, aid 18, 1916, the squadron was able to support only two
courier flights per day.

During this period, on April 16,

1916, the1Division Headquarters aade its first move northward,
back to Haniquipa.

The following day, the first Aero Squadron

followed it.**®
April 19, 1916, marked the squadron's last day of aotivity.
Lieutenants Dargue and Willis were sent aloft in Airplane 43,
on a reoonnaissanoe mission.

They were briefed to soout the

area between San Antonio de los Arenales and Chihuahua City
as well as photograph all the approaches to Chihuahua City.
Engine failure ended their photography.

Dargue landed the

aircraft in an area of rolling hills west

of the city. In the

ensuing emergency crash landing, the machine was totally
destroyed,

Willis was pinned under the wreckage, and sustained

a severe scalp wound as well as bruises on his legs and ankles.
^April 15, 1915, "First Aero Beport,0
4®April 16, 1916, thru April 20, 1916,
"First Aero Report," p. 8.

p. 8*
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Dargue, in the front cockpit was uninjured,
observer from the wreck,

tie assisted his

the two aviators gathered -their

personal gear; burned the, airframe sod began the sixty-five
mile walk to the nearest base, -San Antonio de las Arenales.
Their only provisions for the walk across the desert were a
days rations of cake, chocolate, bread, hardtack, and a pressed
meat bar.

Forty-five hours .and two mountain ranges later,- on

April 21, 1916, they arrived in a weak, tot alive condition,
On April 23, 193-6, they proceeded by automobile to ftamiquipa,
whore they delivered their reeonnalssanoe report to General
Fershlng.69
During Dargue*s and Willis* ordeal, the First Aero
Squadron had been ordered back to Columbus, dee Mexico.

Of

the- eight aircraft flown south- into old Mexico, only two,
Airplanes 45 and 53, remained; and they were condemned as
unsafe for further field service.

These two old JK2*e were

flown to- Columbus, and eventually destroyed*

By April 22, 1916,

all personnel of the First Aero Squadron were relocated in the
United States;

their service as the eyes, ears, and mouths of

the expedition at an en&.^°
The entire character of the campaign changed after Faroe! •the southern most advance of 'Pershing's forces m m to a halt
and a slow withdrawal northward was Initiated,

the relations
J-

69fiew lark Times. April 26, 1916, p. 4 and April 19# 1916,
"First Aero Heport,» p. 8 .
S®Aprii 20, 1916, “first Aero asport,® p. 8 .

between the Mexican government ana U e government of the Unitea
States had reached the point where the positioning of troops
as far south as Parral was no longer practical.

Although

Colonel Brown, the Senior Qffloer at the Immediate front, was
fully capable of controlling the local situation tactically,
he m s In no position to secure logistical support for the
four columns.

Their rapid, push southward had resulted in a

thinly stretched line of communication and supply If© miles
long, which reached bach to San Antonio de les Arenales.
These if used, could be subject to attach at any time.
Parahlng, well aware of the situation, dispatched M s Chief
of Staff, Colonel, DoHosey 0. Cabell, to Brown*s headquarters
with orders to effect a northern withdrawal, if an investiga
tion of existing conditions warranted it,

Pershing had ended

his campaign of columns,51
On April SI, 1916, the cavalry began the movement north
ward.

By hay 3, 1916, almost M l the units of the Mexican

punitive expedition were assembled in the area around San
51°Pershing Beport,* p. 23; ’’Honograph,** p. IV-10;
TompMns, ■Chasing Villa, pp. 1?0«1?1; and Extract, Pershing
to Puneton, April 15, 1916, foreign delations 1916. Although
Brown felt he had the situation in order, the Commander of
Mexican forces at Parral Issued him an ultimatum, in writing,
forbidding the further southward penetration of American
troops. Circular Telegram, Secretary of State to all American
Counsels in Mexico except those at Chihuahua City send Mexico
City, April 18, 1916, m m A s m ..JMMlpas tmi, p. §26,
Indicators also began to arise, foretelling of future Mexican
troop concentrations to force American withdrawal. Telegram,.
Consul Letcher to the Secretary of State, April 17, 1916,

Antonio a® los Aramloa.32
Tompkins summed the results of the pursuit as:
It was a hot little campaign of loss than two
weeks, essentially cavalry and typical of our
cavalry campaigns against the Indians immedi
ately following the Civil War. /no/ » « ,
will never see ^another? one like Oils ■ » . .
the airplane and the raio .have changed all
that . . . . It was the last appearance of
the Old Cavalry.53
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The return of the First Aero Squadron to Soluobua, Met#
Mexico, marked the end of mm adventure la the early history
of the Air Service, the squadron* 0 aocompliabsents hod been
few, hut the experience gained was invaluable,

the squadron*e

service to the expedition was filled with failures, hut the
message of failure was ultimately of greater importance than
success itself would have been.1'
The efforts of the aerial unit ware aptly described in
the June 1916, issue of flying:
... « "the little old last year's aeroplanes at
Columbus Army base, have folded up their tired, wings
and passed on to the land Where the Woodbine Twinetft,
and from whence no traveler returns.0 At any rate
these eight diminutive and. tattered flyers which did
their damdest— and it was no slouch of « job— to
locate the elusive Villa over the' dreary wastes of
northern Mexico, have been dismantled and tenderly
laid away ia their figurative coffins, the work of
dismantling was not a prodigious task, for owing to
a War Department's faith in methods pursued by our
forefathers, these dinky planes, ultra modem in
their day, had long ago outlived their usefulness,
and it required test a few well-directed taps with a
lu.S,, War Department, historical Section, The Army War
College, The Signal Corps and Air Jterylee * «*••»*» «** «»**
.Washington, D.C.:
hereafter cited
G0V&ragB8l%% r n 3 l « M & vIT3,C®f
pm
as Slgnal Cogps and Air service.. ~

11?

m
mallet and a turn or two with a acraw-driver to
reduce thorn to a pile of junk.
But they had. done their work: bravely had they
the task set before them, a task beyond their puny,
-80 horsepower rated strength. They breasted the
capricious winds, they dropped Into the numerous air
pockets of the Chihuahua deserts; they drooped under
the torrential rains of this district* and they
soared late the arfctc air of the mountains* but
never once did they say *1 quit* until physical
disabilities forced them to* It was a noble work
they did.*
their noble work had ended with the loss of all service*
able aircraft and on April 88, 1918* the First Aero Squadron
returned to Columbus, Hew Kexlco* to secure new airplanes.3
three days earlier, April 19* 1918* four new Curtiss H8
<JNt) aircraft had been delivered to the baae*^ these airplanes
were not the ideal military machine for Rexiean border use* but
they were the only aircraft immediately available from any menu*
facturer, , Although the engine* an CHS# was rated as more effi
cient than the older OX engine by lieutenant Byron H, Jones, a
member of the Aircraft Advisory Board* It still produced only
'90 horsepower.

Captain Foulols did not consider the aircraft

suitable for field use*5
'The four aircraft, Airplanes 8© through 63, were given
rigorous practical field tests April 23, through April 29* 1916.
2«ho Aeroplanes for Mexican Campaign) « X . # aa-lSE.
June 19I6»:p* 196,
3April 20* 1916* “First Aero Beport," p, 8.
XblO«
98. p. 172{ and Hew forte times. April 26, 1916* p. 5

The aircraft were soon found inadequate for Mexican service,
and declared unusable.

The seven aviators Mho flew in the tests

Mere unanimous In .stating that the aircraft should he used
only if an extreme military emergency existed,^ On April 2?,
1916, General Puneton declared to the War ©apartment that the
aircraft were unsuitable far military service*? On Ray 9 , 1916,
a hoard consisting of Captain Dodd end lieutenants Dargue,
Carberry, and Chapman recommended 'the. condemnation, of the re*
eently purchased machines*

They listed deficiencies of con

trol, climbing ability, inadequate power, slow speed# Meat
landing gear, and defective manufacture as the reasons for re
jection.

Captain Foulols agreed with the board's recommenda

tion, but condemnation never occurred.

The machines were

shipped to San Diego, California, for alteration and additional
service.^
On Kay 1, 1916, the squadron finally received aircraft
more nearly suited, to the region, and the bash at hand:
Curtiss B-2.

The

The first shipment of two aircraft was rapidly

followed by more, a d by Hay 25, 1916, twelve* 160 horsepower,
Curtiss B-2 aircraft sat on the flight line at Columbus, Hew
Kexico,?
6#First Aero Beport,* p. 8; Hew forte Timas* April 26,
1916* p. 5j a d jfalilgf, p. l?3#
?New Tortt Times* April 28, 1916, p. 5.
Qstudy 96. p. 1?3,

9*First Aero Beport,* p. 8.
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these airplanes were a bigger version of the M 2 aid A,
and were “ . » . adapted to military purposes calling for fast
scouting and endurance flights.. . »#1® Capable of carrying
a pilot, observer, and 209 pounds of cargo, the machines had
a maximum spaed of 90 miles per hour, and a seven hour curiae
capacity,11
Although the fi-2 aircraft were a definite improvement,
and passed the Aircraft Advisory and Inspection Boards* cri
teria, the First Aero Squadron found them less than satisfac
tory,

Fedots noted in tils monthly report numerous and con

stant aircraft problems.

Curing hay, dime, and July, 1916,

he called attention to defective construction, motor parts and
propellers,

the aircraft were delivered with shortages ranging

from missing touch up paint to non-instailed compasses, brace
wires and toll skids,

the Curtiss Corporation products had

a marked lack of craftsmanship, and each aircraft required a
careful process of inspection, adjustment, modification, and
repair prior to being placed in service.12
Jm total, on the twelve aircraft, eight-seven shortages,
forty-four line defects, and twelve general deficiencies were
noted by Captain Foulois.

these Included the requirement for

bigger radiators, modified breaker cams, new magneto switches,
IQcurtlas 1916. p. 6.

Hlbld.

12*First Aero deport,* p. 6; and "Exhibit A, Shortages
and Defective Equipment R-2 Aeroplanes,0 in "First Aero
Seport,* /5 pages tot numbered?, hereafter cited as
"Exhibit A." (typewritten.)

m
stronger ana safer truss wires, footbara for tetter ©iroraft
oontr-ol, ana a complete replacement of all landing wheels*
®»e wheel replacement win A«a to too landing gear failures on
separate «irplaaes;*3

Of Oil maintenance difficulties encountered by the First
aero squadron, 'both la the Held ana at Columbus, sow iloxleo,
the propeller probls® was the greatest,

the excessively dry

air along the Mexican border aggravated a propallor problem that
feed initially appeared in April 1915*^
Oa April 8, 1913* Captain 0©dd had experienced one of the
earliest propeller aalfuiiofeiona oa a flight froa son eiago to
San Francisco, California,

the propeller 0 . . . broke near

the tip and snapped the propeller shaft just la frost of the
eraakoase.*i5 Several mates later, June 26, 1915, Lieutenant
Oorroll lost another propel!®** after a sovore engine vibration
on a trip froa Sana Oiego to long Sooth, California.

Both of

these failures were considered isolated occurrences, until the
unit arrived la Bexico.16 M r s , tender the harsh field caMl»
tions, propellers that noroally could withstand hours of test
stand operations, failed# shattering to pieces In almtm la
13lbld.

l^*First Aero Report#* p. 8; Aooaal «epogt,...191£, p. 26,
«>* gouiois.-AutoblogaaiaiV, p» W
15i,etter, Captain »odd to lieutenant Colonel 0©odi©r#
April 16, 1915* la ‘Coodier Court Partial.*
16SiSaLS« F» 139.
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the dry all** it was assumed by fflalntenan.ee experts that the
glue was drying oat between the wood laminations*1? Therefore,
a new squadron policy was instituted5 propellers were re*
moved from the aircraft between flights and stored in a humidor
in order to preserve the binding glue's viscosity*1®
la order to find a more practical solution, a propeller
test site was established at Columbus, dew Mexico in late
April 1916,

Propellers were procured from aircraft manufac

turers throughout the baited States and then subjected to
rigorous testing*

This procedure, although understandably

slow due to makeshift test facilities, produced uniform re
states

practically all the propellers received were unserv

iceable.1?
On June 29* 19X6, the Gurtise Aeroplane Company sent three
propeller experts to Columbus, Sew Mexico, to establish a pro
peller production shop*

utilizing various types of wood, and

a special toot stand created by first Aoro Squadron maintenance
personnel, & more elaborate series of tests wore conducted.

As

a result, extensive data on propeller durability was gathered
by the joint efforts of the contractor and military*

The work

progressed to a point that satisfactory propellers were being
l?*0ifficulties of the Mexican Campaign," Aerial-

^ f i r s t Aero Report,* pp. 8-9; and "Foulole Beoord»B
PP. 7-8*
•

produced within a month,20
fbe mechanical and maintenance difficulties highlighted
by such experiences of ih© First Aero Squadron pointed out
immediate national need to develop manufacturing standards and
minimum specifications in the m m science of aeronautics*2* As
a direct result of the inadequacies of the Mexican expedition,
underscored by the growing awareness of the probability of the
felted States*’ entry Into World War X* the first step toward
the standardization of aircraft manufacture was taken.

Worts-

-lag arrangements, under the auspices of the National Advisory
Committee for Aeronautics, were established between the Bureau
of Standards, the American .Society of Aeronautic Engineers,
aid the Society of Automobile Sngineers.

She first meeting

was held July IS, 1916, at the Bureau of standards,

the

failure of propellers m m & major subject,22
fhe following day, July 19, 1916, a similar conference
between manufacturers and military representatives set to
discuss the standardization if aircraft manufacture, this
ftfrtWfrOiirrr|
|
n-HMrriflr^ttiinltrifr'T?rT,iu‘
"l
1f^r>
*‘‘‘‘l
>
,
‘‘
^
20ibid,s
pp. 26-27, *first AeroBepori;,* p* f§ ana * « m w *!*
2iAnnual Beaort 1916* p. gf$ and "Foulois Becord,* p. 7.
First Steps in Standardization taken Under the
Auspices of the War Department,” Aortal Age Weekly«
August 7, 1916, pp. 632-636; Howard S. Coffin, "baying
the corner stone for a Great Industry," jftying. August 1916,
p. 262; Annual Aepprt 191.6, p, 27; “War Department Anxious
to Co-operate with Hanufaeiurera to increase standard 6f
American Aeroplanes, Engines and Accessories,® Flying.
August 1916, pp. 283-28?; and Annual Heoort 1917. p p . 3-7*

meeting was chaired by Lieutenant Colonel George 0* Squier,
the new chief of the Aviation Section who had replaced
Colonel Sober, Kay 5. 1916*

ieber had been reassigned as a

result of the Goodier Court Martial Board findings.

Aside

from the general subject of standardization, the group con
sidered motor overheat in the new 160 horsepower vx engine and
propeller problems.

It was suggested as an iterlm fix on the

latter, that all wooden propellers be shipped and stored in
metal boxes with felt seels; that propellers on parked air
craft be covered with heavy canvas jackets lined with flannel;
and, in the case of unscheduled landings, a woolen sock
saturated with oil should be pulled over the blades.

She

ultimate solution, a metal propeller, was advocated.

In a

step toward that direction, a consulting engineer was author
ised to assist any manufacturers who were attempting to produce
the ultimate propellers.23 Prom these meager beginnings, which
resulted from the aerial support furnished along the Mexican
border, the Air service first began the application of field
experience to manufacturer standardisation*
In addition to the purely engineering tests, the squadron
performed operational testing of new equipment and techniques.
The Brock automatic camera project was renewed.

Photo flight

lines were flown, and mosaic maps ” . . . superior to the road
23*First Steps in Standardization Taken Under the
Auspices of the war Department,* pp. 633-636.

M5
map » .

were eonstruefced.21* The fine details of the terrain,

available on the photos, were transferred to standard maps in '
an early attempt to oreat© aeronautical navigational charts*25
By the end of May 1916, the squadron received its first
armament, hm%m machine guns, heaths, m & bomhslghts,2^
lieutenant Gorrell, the Squadron Supply Officer, procured
twelve

L e w is

machine guns,

mess represented nearly 50 per*

cent of the Army*a total lewis gun arsenal,

The guns, each

weighing twenfcy*B©ven pounds, were to he hand held and fired
from the shoulder.

She squadron also received 100, 3*inch

artillery shells, converted to bombs,

The aircraft lacked

the means to lift, carry, or-.aim the projectiles, and it was
suggested that they could tea band dropped.Cornell later
wrote of this armamentj
They were sent not for use, but so that certain
authorities in Washington could tell the nows*
papers that we were equipped with bombs.2u
While the bulk of the squadron busied itself around Columbus*
Hew Mexico, two sections, of aircraft were detached to Pershing* s
headquarters- in Mexico,

She first element returned bo Mexico,

June 2*$, 1916, six. weeks after the entire squadron toad returned
26«p$,rgt Aero Report,1* p. 9*

a% M & « '

26*lfo Aeroplanes for Mexican Campaign! 1X1,* p. 196.
2?Gorr«Il, pp. 26-25; and ‘aeeoHaaesa&ationa,0 ‘First Aero
8%

@ s B * p.,25. _
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to Columbus#

The delay In returning to the field was mainly

attributed 'to the .propeller shortage, although the processes
of assembling and testing the sew aircraft certainly tots a
factor.29 these two sections, plus an additional two, ordered
to the field September 29, 1916, remained with General Pershing's
forces until the expedition's final, withdrawal.3°
The difficulties that the squadron experienced in support
ing General Pershing were a result of the unexpected environ
ment encountered in Mexico, the .poor equipment possessed, and

a lack of operational experience.
Early in 1915, Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Beber, Chief of
the Air Service, had contemplated the problems that the First
Aero Squadron might encounter at San Antonio, Texas, a much
sore satisfactory locale -of operations than the plateaus and
mountains of northern Mexico.

Beber wrote, * . . . there is

no cover for the squadron /aireraft7, there are not enough
officer/87 f°r the squadron, there are not enough men for the
squadron, . . . /aad7 there is not enough transportation . . .831
The JN2 aircraft of the squadron were known to be overly
dangerous.

The serious lack of power of the OX engine and the

control difficulties were correctly analyzed in the Fall of
1915, but proper corrective actions were not taken before the
fork Times. June 25, 1916, p. 2.

30study 98, p. 176.
3lLetter, Lieutenant Colonel Beber to Captain Cowan
January 7, 1915, in •Ooodier Court Martial.*

squadron

nm

needed in the field*

The aircrew personal flying equipment was found equally
inadequate.

Reports of the expedition's progress frequently

cited the numbed fingers and hands endured toy pilots in open
cockpits,

Captain Poulols made a special note of this in his

final report.32 The flying uniform consisted normally of a foot*
hall type helmet, gauntlets, a leather eoat, and goggles over
a service uniform.33 it provided little protection from the
elements.

In Hay 1915* a hoard had been convened to consider

aircraft instrumentation and personal equipment in order to
achieve * . * « greater convenience and comfort . . . £aa& totf
Increase flying efficiency.*3** their findings .however were too
late for the aviators of the Mexican expedition who ° .. .
were constantly exposed to personal risk and. physical suffer
ing . . . .•33 zn addition, the cramped cockpits did not afford
sufficient room for the survival equipment the aviator should
have carried.36
These intrepid individuals found themselves and their air
craft deployed in an environment they did not anticipate*
the one month of operation they faced a combination of the
■"Recommendations,» "First Aero Report," p. 10.
p. 27} and "Army Aviation Motes,*
»klv. May 31, 1915, p. 257.
3% bid.
35*Recommendations,“ ‘First Aero Beport,* p. 10.

In
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temperature extremes of a normal summer and winter#

Sheir air*

craft were buffeted by the severe air circulations over the
desert and la the mountains.

Shey were forced to operate from

bases of the moment* their frail craft constantly exposed to
sand* grit, snow, rain, and aj.eefc.37
She extreme heat of the desert areas made the mechanic’s
tools too hot to handle.

It caused the mall, an&er#»degigne&

aircraft radiators to preheat to 16® Degrees Fahrenheit before
engine start#

Shia situation increased the incident rate of

cooling system problems and overheated engines#
fho sand of the desert areas was insufficiently packed,
and did not provide adequate support for the wheel loading
capacity of the aircraft#

fh© airplanes* on take off* their

wheels gripped in & furrow of sand, and totally underpowered,
ran » . . • along the ground like quail for a quarter of a
mile before getting enough purchase on the air to lift. *39
the air currents* fierce whirlwinds and constant near
ceiling operating altitudes presented the aviators a continuous
hazard*

On the ground, the winds peppered the aircraft with

sand and Hung them like toys.

She Ayers resorted to tying

3?*@owarasaahb*s Acres sot suitable for Kexico,® Aerial
95? and *aeco«mea&afclons*® "firofdera
38»Difficulfcies of the Hexiean Campaign,0 Aerial Age
m m z * * 0 9 3 , 1916, p. m *
39ibid* ? and Gregory Raeon, »She aough-Boy and the Sraek/i/
Some Eesibns of ©or ffexloan Expedition,0 She .Quttoafc#
hay 31, 1916, p. 282,
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their machines dona with teat peg© and rope to prevent damage.
In the air, the same whirlwinds could prove almost fatal# as
evidenced by Lieutenant Bowen1s crash on March 20# 1916.

The

treacherous air currents of the mountains were more the real
enemy of the aviators than the Villistas, and rarely were they
conquered.^
In the period March 15, 1916, to August 15# 1916# the
First Aero Squadron flew 5^0 sorties# logged 3^5 hours and ^3
minutes, and traversed 19,553 miles.1*1 Nearly every experience
was a first, and the squadron personnel rose to the occasion.
The flyers recognised the inherent dangers they faced and
performed * . • • their service with the Punitive Expedition
as a part of the day1a work and simply in line of duty.
The enlisted personnel provided the expedition with a rare
technical skill, often performing double duty as aircraft
technicians and motor transportation experts#

Captain Foulois

commended these men when he stated in his report;
Without the willing and efficient cooperation of
the enlisted mem of this command the flying service
of the Punitive Expedition would have ended at
Columbus# New Mexico#^
The ablators of the First Aero Squadron had worked under
Government*s Aeros Not Suitable for Mexico#11
Aerial Amo Weekly# April 3, 1916# p. 95*
**1*First Aero Report,a p. 9*
***•Recommendations #* Ibid.. p. 11.
**3lbia.

serious handicaps of inexperience, poor equipment, and inade
quate support,

their failings were in no nay attributable to

mismanagement by Captain Pouloia.

this first oomtoat air

commander recognised the deficiencies of his unit and its equip
ment.

He made a sincere effort to analyse the problems faced

by General Pershing, and to seek effective alternative solu
tions to them.

These he offered to his commander, who made a

decision, thereby transferring toe primary role of his air
support to a courier role rather than one of reconnaissance,
Poulois' able leadership and loyal service are evidenced by
his rapid promotion to Brigadier General and subsequent
appointment,'September 5, 191?, as Chief of the Air Service.^4*
Captain Poulois, in his final report, tried to see beyond
the moment and attempted to provide solutions to improve toe
Air Service based upon toe limited field experience he had
encountered.

Be recommended that centrally located logistical

and repair depots be established at various central locations
to provide support for.tactical squadrons.

These centers were

to be independent in operation and fully equipped for repair,
assembly, test, and modification of operational aircraft.
****!?.S., Congress, House, Committee on Rilitary Affairs,
Pioneer Aviators. Hearings, before the Committee on Rilitary
Affairs, House of Bepresehtatives on B.B. 11273 (statement
of Horn. John J. McSwain, Brig. Gen. Benj. D. Poulois,
Raj, Herbert A. Dargue, Maj Thos. Be w. Killing), ?Oth Cong.,
1st sees., 1928, p. 1?.
65“Recommendations,* "First Aero Beport,* p. 9.

Bis experiences led him to believe tost a tactical squad
ron should confine its duties to toe military employment of
aircraft,

Therefore, all aircraft received should be delivered

in fighting shape and not require extensive overhauls before
totng' put into service.^
As a result of

too

inadequate aircraft of his unit,

Pouloia suggested toot the airplanes of the future should to
tested in other than -perfect or optimum conditions*

Me called

for acceptable environmental service toots before an airplane
was put into service,

further, to recommended tost the altera

tions necessary * . , , to made by too manufacturer.tt4*7 jn
order to accomplish these tests, to felt too government should
create a flight tost center.**®
Captain Fouloia also .ado raeocasendafeions in regard to
squadron reorganization,

the impact of toe first Aero Squadron's

failure, however, had greater effect than just squadron re
organization.

Its collapse helped emphasize too cancer un

covered by too almost concurrent Count partial of lieutenant
Colonel Goodiar,

The public airing of too Aviation Section's

difficulties, coupled with its lack of capability forced to©
reorganisation of toe Air Service as initiated by the Secretary
Of Mar, towtoa D. Baker in April 1916.^
. p. 10.

WfMd.

**9*®!© tows of toe Week,* Aerial Age Weekly.
April 10, 1916, p. Ill,
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Although the First Aero Squadron did not provide total,
air support to the Mexican punitive expedition,.it did intro
duce the United States Army and the leaders of the nation to
the possibilities of air power In a tactical

role*

50

Ae

such

it was recognised by General Pershing in his Report of
Operations*. June 30* If16* who called "particular attention
to the words of the First Aero Squadron Commander.
The experience gained by the commissioned and
enlisted personnel of this command while on active
duty with the Punitive Expedition* has been of the
greatest value#and it is believed that the knowledge
'gained by all concerned should result in more rapid
and efficient development of the aviation service in
the United States Army.^l

31*pershing Report** p. %3*
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The military fora# of the United States found itself
unable to trap Villa*

They had exhausted their capability for

further pursuit In a hostile environment*

Incapable of going

forward and faced with untenable supply lines# General Pershing
switched to a defensive force position rather than face a
total withdrawal to the United States*

The boundaries of the

garrison were marked by the outposts of Oarransista soldiers
that blocked further American movement toward the east# west*
or soaih*^
The expedition remained, ostensively to patrol the State
of Chihuahua in order to pacify those scattered villistas it
could locate*

Pershing# on April 29# 1916, divided the area

around his headquarters into five districts;

Namiquipa,

Guerrero, Busbilies* Saveto, and San Francisco de .Soria*

Each

district was patrolled by the regiment of cavalry that had
seen the most action within It*

These regiments were organised

as separate entities with their own Intelligence service and a
capability for Independent command*

It was assumed by Pershing

that this arrangement offered the maximum initiative and flexl*€arransa, *La Expe&iclon Punitive# * pp. 131# 139*

bllity for the search and destruction of the scattered Villistaa.
Pershing cautioned eaoh district commander to remember he was
* « * • operating within the boundaries of a friendly ration
* * * * hut* if an unprovoked attach should occur they should
not hesitate to administer severe punishment on the

offenders,2

Throughout Ray rad June, 1916, Pershing continued'' to con
centrate his command around Colonla Dublan, as well as pursue
bandits and observe Carranzista capability.

By mid-June 1916,

It was obvious that the Mexican army could cut the expedition*#
supply rad communication lines whenever they desired*
troop strength was massive:

Rex!can

22,000 at Chihuahua City, 10,000

at 9111a Ahuma&a, and smaller Concentrations positioned at
strategic points along the railroad east and west of Colonla
Dublan,3
As Pershing lacked aircraft for accessary reconnaissance
activities, he was forced to use cavalry sweeps for the collec
tion of intelligence.

These sweeps were viewed with disfavor

by the da facto Government.

On Jura 16, 1916, General

J. 8 , Trevino, Commander of Chihuahua, informed Pershing that
he had orders * . . . to prevent* by use of arms . . . American
forces « » « from moving to the south* east or west of the
Places they now occupy,Pershing replied, » . . . my govern
ment has placed no restrictions upon th® movements of American
2«perefeing 8eport,» pp. 20-28*

‘ 3lMd*, p. 29.

foroes.

z shall • * . use ay owa Judgement as to when and in

what direction 1 shall move ®y forces. . . ."5 Pershing did
however brief his officers to avoid any conflicts with the
Carranzistaa when scouting the territory.®
President Wilson* faced with the growing threat of a
herder war* issued activation orders to the organised militia
and national guard on June 18* 1916,

The militia of each state

was ordered to report its loom base oamp, Instructed to get
into shape, and to recruit to full strength.7 Mexican President
Carranza alerted by Wilson's mobilization orders, ordered a
further concentration of Mexican forces and warned Mexican
citizens to a m themselves.8 As each side armed, any spark of
ignition could cause war.

On June 21, 1916, a cavalry sweep

of Pershing's command very nearly did at carrizal, Mexico.7
Two reconnaissance detachments. Troop C* Tenth Cavalry,
Captain Charles f, Boyd* commanding} and Troop K, Tenth Cavalry,
Captain Lewis S. Morey* commanding, Joined forces at Oto Santo
earning©, 5:30 p.m., June 20, 1916.

Boyd being senior, assumed

5*Pershing Beport," pp. 29-30; and Telegram, Pershing to
j, s. Trevino, June 16, 1916, Foreign Belations 1916, p. 577.
6Beport of investigation of Encounter between Americans
de facto Government Forces, AGO files 2377632, Punitive
Expedition,National Archives* Washington, D.C. (Microfilm.)

7aeport of the Chief of Staff, AnnualReports 1916.
pp. 189, 193.
®°Mobllizlng the Militia,” The Outlook. June 28, 1916,
p. 603.
Monograph," p. IV-21.
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command.

Barly the following morning, the tee troope departed

for Carriaal, well aware that 9@6 Carranxlsta cavalrymen oceupled the village,

they reached an open field, southeast of

the town at 6 :30 0 ,0 ,, Jim© 21, 1916.

aoyd, intent upon

passing through C a m sal, sent a message to the tows Sate
Polltine requesting permission to So so.10
She Mexicans, alerted by the approaehing dust cloud, had
evacuated the village of women and children.

She defenders

quickly established a defensive line in an irrigation ditch •
and behind cottonwood trees,

Their position, which separated

the Americans t m m the town. Included a machine gun emplace
ment.

As the Mexican soldiers waited, lieutenant Colonel divas

and two other Mexican officers rode out to meet the intruders.
They informed 80yd that he could not traverse the village.
Boyd was not satisfied with the decree and insisted upon speak.,
ing to the military commander, General Felix Gosses:, who was
still in bed.ll
Twenty minutes later, General Gomee arrived; he too re
fused to give Boyd permission to pass through the town.

The

Mexican General's orders were to stop American intrusion east,
west, or south of the garrison at Colonia Nubian.

Me informed

Boyd, in no uncertain tome, that he would fight if necessary
10®Perahing deport,® pp. 30-31; and Lewis S. Rorey,
•The Cavalry Fight at Carrizal,® f
January 1917, pp* 999-952,^
ilcarransa* "La Sxpedicion Funitlva,®
PP. 253-259.
■ ■
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to obey bio directives.!2
Captain Boyd returned to his waiting troop©, dismounted
them, and moved them up to a skirmish line 300 yards from the
Mexican line*
port.

the trooper© had their carbines loaded and at

General Gomes and hi© officers were still mounted and

at. conference location as Boyd began forming his men.

The

Mexican officers viewed the entire maneuver with shock and
astonishment, barely moving back to their left flank before
the Americans passed the place where Gomes and Boyd had con
versed.13
General Gomes acted stunned by the entire situation, but
under questioning by his Officers, he ordered M s bugler to
"Blow commence firing. *1** Both sides fired almost simultaneously.
Among the first killed were Gomes and Boyd,

the firefighb

lasted nearly an hour*, The Mexicans, superior in force and
arms, and possessing a machine .gun, succeeded in enveloping
the American positions.1^
The .American negro troopers wisely retreated.

They faced

a disaster, two of their three officers were killed, the third
1% M & .» p. 255* and Telegram, Parching to Funston,
June 137*916, Foreign Halations 1916. p. 59**.
13Morey, »The Cavalry Fight at CarrIsa!,* pp.
and Carranza, *Ba Expedicion Funltiva,* pp#. 256*257*
l^Xbid., p. 258.,
XSTelegrap, Pershing to Funston, June 25. 19X6, gggglgB.
Halations 1916. p. 596} Carranza, “La Expedicion Punitlva,"
pp. 258*261; and Moray, "The Cavalry Fight at Carrizal,"
PP. 959-955.
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wounded, and their horses had been scattered.

They fled, some

on foot and some on horseback, to the American owned Santo
Domingo Ranch where they had spent the previous night.16
The Mexicans, who won the field, suffered the greatest
battle casualties; seventy-two wounded and killed.17 The
American casualty list totaled forty-three;

nine killed, ten

wounded and twenty-four captured.18
The officials in Washington, D. c. were the first Americans
to receive news of the battle, at 9:00 p.m., June 21, 1916,
via Mexican diplomatic channels.19 secretary Lansing, .earlier
that same day concerned over the tenseness of the Mexican situa
tion, had relayed a message of united states intentions to
Argentina.

He stated that the United States desired to avoid

war as, “hostilities, in short, would be simply a state of
i6ibld.. p. 955} and Telegram, Pershing to Funston,
June 23," 1916, Foreign gelations. ,191.6. p. 599.
ITCarranza, "La Expedicion Punitlva,* p. 270. Estimates
of the dead and wounded at Carrisal vary. Morey states the
Mexicans * . . . lost according to their own statement
twelve officers and thirty-three men killed, and fiftythree wounded**
ISgeport of the Adjutant General, Annual Reports 1916.
pp. 279-280. Here again estimates vary; Tompkins,
Chasing Villa, p. 209, states twelve killed, eleven wounded
and twehty-ibree captured; the deport of Investigation shows
twelve killed or missing, twelve wounded and twenty-four oaptured.
19felegram, special Bepresentative Badgers to the
Secretary of state, June 21, 1916, Foreign.gelations ,
p. 592} and Telegram, The Adjutant General 'to General
Funston, June 22, 1916, Foreign Halations 1916. p. 593
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International war without purpose. * . ."20 Following this
premise, President "Wilson and Secretary of State Lansing dis
regarded the opinion of the American representatives in Mexico
City, that the notification by the Mexican war Office was
* » . . generally interpreted as announcement beginning
hostilities,Instead, orders were issued to delay all
noses until General Pershing*s official -report arrived.22
fh@ initial reports of the clash at Carrisal indicated
the Americans had been lured into a trap.

A full report, fur

nished by Captain Morey, fortunately clarified this, ana clear
ly revealed the American intent of aifreasive action*

Boyd

had directly disobeyed his orders, and had thereby precipitated
the affair*

Corrective diplomatic actions were taken, and the

situation was eased.23
the news of the incident at Carrisal increased the pressure
of public opinion on the admlnistratlon* An immediate settle20Letier, The secretary of State.to the. Argentine
Ambassador, June 31, 191#.. Foreign Beiatlono 1916, p, 593,

Slfelegra®, Special Representative aodgers to the Secretary
of State, June 31, 1916, Foreign Relations,1916« p. 592*
2%eXegram, The Adjutant General to General Puaoton,
June 22, 1916. goreim ..Relations..1916. p. 593,
!

*

' *

23»Perehing Report,® p. 3Xj Telegrams, The Secretary of
State to Special Representative hedgers, June 32, 1916,
Foreign Relations Iflif and.Telegram, Pershing to Punston
Juno 25, 1916, I^^^.8^tiima....l9||» p. 596. Pershing* s
summary shows he felt the responsibility was two-sided at
Carrisal* He names Boyd*a indiscretion, and the de facto
Government's insistence upon forcing an incident by armed
opposition. .
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menfc of the Mexican problem was demanded by the public,

betters

to President Wilson arrived from all parts of the nation de
manding solutions.

Wilson redoubled hie efforts to find one.24

The de facto Government in Hexioo was just as eagerly
seeking a read to compromise.

It promptly, upon demand, re

leased the prisoners taken at Carrizal

to show its « » . .

sincerity . . . to reaoh a peaceful and satisfactory settle
ment. • • ."25 xt then suggested, July 4, 1916, that a joint
Latin American commission be established to find remedies to
ours the slek relations between the United states and Mexico.2®
President Wilson replied through Secretary Lansing,
July 7 , 1914,

He aeespted the suggestion of a joint commission

as a means to a just and peaceful end.2?
Meanwhile, the United states troop buildup along the border
continued.

By June 27, 1914, the first militia and national

guard units were ready.

Pour days later, these units began

movement to the border bases*

By July 31, 1916, 112,000 State

militiamen were in Texas, Arisona, and Hew Mexico.2®
^•Monograph,* p. IV-33.
^Translation, Mr. Arredondo to the Secretary of state,
July 4, 1916, Persian. Belatlona 1916. p. 399.
2®Ibld.
2?Letter, The Secretary of state to Mr. Arredondo,
July 7, 1910, Foreign Relatione. 1916. p. 400.

2®Heport of the Chief of Staff, Annual Reports 1916.
P. 193.

the Bavy too, In the possibility that wan could happen,
sent sixteen warships to the coastal cities of Mexico, as a
shoe of fo*>ee in late fua@.®9 f^e Aero Club of America, in an
effort to bolster the weak Air Service, advocated the immediate
training of 500 men as aviators end' observers.. Sn a burst of
patriotism the Club, .on July 3, lfl6 , offered to pay the boatfare home of any member of the Franeo-Amerlcan flying dorps,,
so that they could lend their combat experience to the bolted
States,

the French government, who had paid for-their avia

tion training, refused to release 'the fly©rs»30 m e prepara
tion for war activities across the nation caused the Outlook
to not© • . .

there were sp@etacA.es in the cities of the

United States not seen since 18f8»*3i
While awaiting the diplomatic settlement,.the American
expedition already in Mexico trained and maneuvered in the
Colonia Dublaa area,, lessons in musketry and tactics were
practiced,, and the men,.forced to improvise in the field,.cul-■
tivsted their professional skills to new high levels of pro
ficiency. _ For most of the officers, this was their first oppor
tunity to participate and lead largo scale field maneuvers.
29»MobillElng the Militia,* the Outlook,
dime 28, 1916, p. 993,
3®»Aer© Club Invites American Airmen in France
to fieturn for Mexican Service,0 AgriA^Ake Jfeekiy.
dirty 3, 1916, p. 970,
31*i9obllizinc the Militia.* the Outlook,
dune 28, 1916, p, 993.
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First lieutenant George Patton wrote, because of the training
receive * . , * almost unimagined benefits- have resulted,*3a
on January 18, 191?, tbea# braining activities case to
an ««8 . Based upon the netHxmrwi^ttoae of the Amerlean members
of the Joint commission, and in view of the growing probability
of involvement in the European War, General Passion was directed,
iy the order of the President, 'to lnstruot General Pershing to
prepare to withdrew from goalee.

Hovsmanfc began immediately,.

She 'last column departed. Golonla Bublan, January 31, 191?,

By

3s0O p.m., February 5, 1917, Oil of the American forces had
crossed the border.33
On April 8 , 191?, only two months after the expedition re.
burned to the Baited states* congress deelated, a stats of war
existed between the united states and Germany,

She American

nation entered the great confliot, not unexpectedly sad not
totally unprepared.

Xta flabby army* weak air aervlee* and

wm^msAm^
of field aotivltles*

& y^esr
Brigadier General Henry J. Beilly later

Si fi f t ll" ill iV *

Without the Hexioan Border Service it is extremely
3%eorge S. Fatten, Jr., *Cavalier Work of the Punitive
Expedition,* ^»,. ^ v ^ ry .JournfO.. January 1917, pp. 426-433}
•Ronograph,* pp. iv-35-iv-35j seport of the Chief of Staff,
......
P* 189} and foopkiaa, a
'
*
33Beport of the Adjutant General, in U.S., War Department,
arts 1917. vol. 1 {Washington, B.C. t Government
trice* lylS), p. l9o«

m
doubtful if General Pershing Mould have bad the
300,000 with Mhioh he intervened la the Second
Settle of the Heme; the $00,000 . . . /afc7
Salat ftihlel « • .jraft the 1,200,000 weed la
the Argoane. . * ,J*
0&§lQ9$ft3l

urote In hi* memoirs;

, , * while ®p command In Kexieo wee taught the
&£

tiChltitilEi

IfAROh

f'SfilltiSlllEe

it

tfjj#

ISIUESm:.

ttoularly trained la the Mar ef movement. withioit ||i0 *t>iqXi0&t>i.©& #1? opts iMunflsM
&MMMcould have been onljr open stalemate on the Western
Soofainry ef Mar Sewrtoa u. Baker aleo appreciated the falleat of experience received tar tooth the militia and Mae regular
element* f e w the large acale training,

He wrote, the Mexican

expeditions
* ’* * toy the ffiotoilieatioa ef the tegular Army aad
the National Guard, . . * gave on excellent oppor
tunity tooth to the men la the Guard and to the'
swssNtlS#psi*to#iiSs ®f $$10 oovftsrajenfc*
that afforded a moat serviceable foundation upon
trtilah to hi*cni^«nI with
iM&wefip sziMuxslon ##* th«
■

upon to undertake*^
1%4ft

&l*o irefy plausl&l& to te&&09ft that

fotifttf^ifT##*#

hie appointment as the Pomander of the Allied Expeditionary
Force to hia previous command of the Mexican punitive expedition,
®ierefore, It oaa toe seen the total effect of the expedition
o» the army, aad lie preparedness aad mobilization wee great.
ja»iiw»[«h|iMww»M!Mi
wiuM)!MMsii*wWA*MWM~fe>wM*^^
Smeary J* Seiliy, »®h* National Guard on the Mexican
Border,* in foapkins, CfoasingVilla. p. 229,
V

‘

Pershing, «y ExperlenoeB to the, world, war (hew
Fredrick A, Stokes Gwap^, i9PJ, Voi. t# pp.^0*ll,

m m r n f,

forki

3%eport of the Secretary of ww, Annual SeBorta l91?, p. 10,

ltd
No where however wee the leak of preparedness more evident than
in, thfi

nMMiided by the

Air1S a w la&.

The American oitieen, safe trm war Mad Isolated lay
oceans from Europe, had not hew. overly concerned with pro*
parednees in 1915, and did not want to * * . » overload them*'
selves with taxation for defease. * . .*37 Congress reflected
this lethargic mood, and its military appropriations remained
low in 1910 and 1915.
this attitude toward military expenditures was especially
aotieeahle In the appropriations for the Army Air Service.
GougpN*ssional sa^snSSSiKPss

$h© machinea %h&% tsijay

cldered experimental totalled only a soaat 609,009 dollars toy
the end of 1915*. the Aviation Section, limited in funds aad
ag* co:ri*traine& |jy legislated porsoanQi pfsos^wss#

ing pfUJNir equipment, and

XlM&lfig; reorga»ia&&tian#

was not a viable air ana in early 1916*
Mexico end its problems were apparent to the American
public,

when the Mexican punitive expedition invaded Mexico,

the United States* only operational air unit, the- First Aero
Squadron, was ordered to the field*
tit* Jii3t$ii0$

fhe meager exploits of

|nftiffi by W%& &&v& CELtfcl* til* Aiaeriea j$h&

other avid aviation!sts, captured the American public** eye*
-She activities of the first Aero Squadron gave the nation
a vivid illustration of the need for a well equipped aerial
3?**ls it Necessary,* raw independent, October 25, 1915* p* 120.

term*

Its "lack,* la the words of Colonel Samuel

its
Dallam,

W*

seventh Cavalry, was * . * . the greatest deficiency /of the
expe&ltion/. *3® as It was the Host time W a t W e army ea»
ployed even limited a&r power, its use, although far from
effeotivo, impressed General Pershing aad other offleors with
military aviation*a future potential*
M
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supplied hiss hie primary

courier aervloe, it is <{ulte doubtful that the value of their
services or their potential was as great as assumed by W e
Aero Club of America.
faddists,

These gentlemen were truly aviation

nothing would have satisfies them except a sky

overcast with airplanes.

However, W o impact of their aerial

campaign, coupled with the rapid collapse of the Pirtt .Aero
Squadron, convinced the American publia, Congress, and the
Secretary of bar of the real need for as effective air service,
W o immediate reaotion of congress was the urgent Defi*.
eienoies Mil, Kerch 31, 1916, providing $00,080 dollars for
aircraft,

This was followed ty the actional Defense Act,

June 3, 1916, which authorised aa eventual increase of aviation
officers frat 60 to 168, and aa increase in enlisted personnel
from 260 to 6000,

it also removed the 1916 restrictions of

38oallam, "The Punitive Expedition of 1916,* p* 396,
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ago, rank, and marital state*

Probably the asst important

provision of this bill was that it granted the authorisation
for, 'and allocated the asaas to establish, an offloors reserve
corps -as well as an enlisted reserve corps*
serve corps was an aviation reserve corps.

within these re
Through this

vehicle, the buildup of aviators for world Mar I was achieved*39
On august 29* 1916, Congress passed an air service appropria
tion for 13,281,666 dollars; ten times the entire total pre
viously allocated for army aviation purposes*

This bill's

passage was directly attributed to the impact on congress made
by the failure of the first Aero Squadron in Bexioo.1*0
The following year, 191?, the flood of expenditures con
tinued., finally culminating in the great aviation appropriation
of 660,667,889 dollars, passed July 25, 191?*

Although this

great sum resulted primarily from the pressing’needs of World
War X, it is well to remember the Congressional flood gates
wars opened as a result of the Mexican punitive expedition. ***
39».S,, Statutes,at large. Vol. XXXJX, pt. 1 (December 1915
to March 191?), “An Act Forasking further and more effectual
provision for the national defense, aid for other purposes,
June 3, 1916, oh. 136, pp. 166-176*
9©u«S., Statutes at large. Vol. XXXIX pt. 1 (December 1915
to March 191?), “An Aot Kaklng appropriations for the support
of the Army for the fiscal year ending June 30, 191?# and for
other purposes,* August 29, 1916, oh* 618, pp. 619-62?#
bly.g,, war Department, iMMMfcJtinwtiU*...theiMg^tor Of
10. 1918 (Washington. P.C.tGovernment Printing

* $P* 3-9.
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the course of American air power*

The successes and the fail

ures of the young aviators in tiiclr underpowered aircraft
alerted the United states to the fast that it did .act possess
a viable air are*

da a grander scads, the notions of the ex

peditionary force alerted the United states to the condition
of it* aroy*
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The United states* intervention in Kexioo in 1916 was a
failure*

2t did not punish Villa! it only alienated the

Mexican nation*
ubhJ;O
S» iiUHNiic

its lack of success can be attributed to too
Ftrat,

united
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of sustained combat operations on a large scale in 1916*
Secondly, the Army did not possess those qualities necessary
$0 $*p$g$|t* ffif* ttlHitHlfl H
envirorammt.
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General Perishirut «m&lo:red oavalfw fttee&Hi* fie&jrch

and destroy tactics, and district control methods in an attempt
to capture fanoho Villa*

These tactics could have suoceeded if

Iwhitaey, "Why Mexico is A aiorn in Our Side,* Kay 19, 1915,
P» 195.
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the native population had been cooperative; however, it was
not*

She Mexican punitive expedition ie an early example,

for students of military history, of the necessity of indi
genous support for successful oonterlasurgenoy operations.
The Mexican punitive expedition provided hath the segular
Array

ton BsSSsnti SussfS wito to#

t-r^ n^ g

and combat hardening that prepared them for the United States*
entrance into world war 1* As such, it marked the end of the
old horse cavalry and. the creation of the modem mechanized
army of the present*

In addition, the milltaxy requirements

of the expedition afforded the United States the precious time
the nation needed to prepare for world war 1 during a period
when united States public opinion opposed military preparedness.
Throughout the course of the expedition, General Pershing
was faced with two major support problems:
fftnfr

pps n$!&teiNa&

$ntft

logistical support

t Is. an

to

achieve the latter, he used his meager observation capability
of the First Aero Squadron in the dual role of courier and
reeonnalssanoe.

The support furnished the expedition by the

first Aero Squadron was net great, nor long lived; but its in
adequacies rapidly drove Congress to provide the appropriations
needed for the expansion of the A m y Air Service, 'Pre-World war z military men recognized the possibilities
0 ? #%!» J)0M& jtH y»j»f*f>rynyfcft»

**3 SFSSltSIPir tiV&fefc&Ag:*

defense, ground support, and to a limited degree, stmtegio
operations,

la those' early years, the young army aviation

199
service was severely liaised by its* own inefficient organiza
tion ee well as a Congressional reluetanee bo- finance military
experimentation.

The Mexican situation afforded the military

with an unplanned combat test of the new air service, and as
a result,, the united States was alerted to the united states
Army’s low .aerial capability.
The first operational employment of air power was a fail
ure*. The inadequacies of airplanes not specifically designed
for military purposes or severs environmental conditions betkmmm 01WP&0U##
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appeared, and hi$* ranking military and civilian leaders began
to appreciate the full impact of air power if it was available.
Spurred on by publlo pressure and aviation* a possibilities.
Congress finally overcame its lethargy and opened the legis
lative wad appropriation floodgates,

in some instances, such

as cresting a viable aircraft industry, the action came almost
too late*

However, there is no doubt that the resultant effect

ffcSjASMji of the

w&w&t*
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oreating and preparing the United states A m y Air Service for
World war Z. A s air leaders of the young Air Service became
the air leaders of the Allied Expeditionary Forces, as well as
%ha Do«t World wax* I Air S#nrici&e
Mexico tempered their future thinking.

tsteli* experience© in
These experiences pro

vided A s embryo of today's Air Force operations in flight test
centers, environmental testing, aeronautical chart centers,
survival training, logistical and maintenance depots, as well

im
as tactics.
The Mexican punitive expedition wee a distinct step in
the history of military aviation.

It heralded the importance

of air power to A s American nation*. It focused the attention
of the amy, Congress, and the general public upon the future
possibilities of air power, as well as A s lImitations of the
past*

Congress responded, and the wingless American eagle

began to grow the war wings ultimately needed
War.

Therefore, it can to said, the Mexican punitive expedi

tion is a true watershed in the history of the United states
Air Force as it divides the period of pure aerial experimenttatlon

tfo s t

$!&$ beginnings of ojparaftlonal aiw

p o vtw

employment §

as well -as establishing the base line posture for world War X
pr6pai*e&nes**
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